How Russia is using disinformation and cyberwarfare to destabilize Europe

Russia's escalating information and cyber warfare requires a coordinated and systematic response at national, regional, and international levels, combining technological advantage with stronger public awareness.

The proposed changes to the mechanisms designed to counter non-military threats in Central and Eastern Europe should reflect the fact that such threats have evolved in scale, nature and in the means used by hostile actors. Information warfare, cyber threats and social destabilization have become central instruments used by both states and non-state actors to advance their strategic objectives. Their multidimensional nature means that an effective response requires a comprehensive approach, combining regional cooperation, technological development and stronger public awareness.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe face a number of challenges stemming from non-military threats, above all information warfare, which poses a serious risk to political, social and economic stability. Its aim is to destabilize societies and erode public trust in state institutions. By deepening internal divisions, such efforts weaken social cohesion and make democratic systems less effective and more vulnerable to disruption.

In particular, information warfare involves coordinated disinformation campaigns designed to manipulate public opinion and disrupt democratic processes. In Poland, false narratives have been spread about issues such as migration and energy security, deepening political polarization and fueling tensions between social groups.

A clear example is the disinformation surrounding the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, where Russian and Belarusian narratives promoted damaging claims blaming the West for provoking the situation, accusing it of double standards, and portraying the response as racist. The broader goal was to weaken Poland both domestically and internationally, further exacerbating internal divisions.

Disinformation on the rise: the Ukrainian case

In Ukraine, these operations took on a particularly aggressive form in the context of the conflict with Russia, where disinformation was used both to justify military action and to stir up anti-Ukrainian sentiment among international audiences. A particularly infamous example came in 2014, when Russian disinformation channels spread the fabricated story of a boy allegedly “crucified” by Ukrainian soldiers in Sloviansk. Russian media, including the state-run television channel Russia 1, aired a report featuring a woman posing as a local resident who claimed that Ukrainian troops had publicly nailed a child to a cross in the town square in front of his mother.

The story was completely fabricated, with no evidence or witnesses to support it. Its purpose was to demonize the Ukrainian armed forces, incite hatred against Ukraine, and help justify Russia’s intervention in the region. The disinformation campaign gained widespread support in pro-Russian media and social platforms, fueling anti-Ukrainian sentiment not only in Russia but also among international audiences, particularly in the Global South, where knowledge of the realities of the conflict was often more limited. It remains one of the clearest examples of how disinformation was used to manipulate emotions during the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Building resilience against information warfare

Information warfare poses a major threat to contemporary societies in Central and Eastern Europe, as its effects have far-reaching political and social consequences. Therefore, countering such threats requires coordinated action at multiple levels, including national, regional and international.

International cooperation, together with the development of technologies to combat disinformation and information manipulation, forms a key pillar of societal resistance against such threats. In this context, education and public awareness are particularly important, as they enable citizens to better understand the mechanisms behind disinformation campaigns and to respond more effectively to the risks posed by information warfare.

Given the growing importance of non-military threats, such as information warfare, investment in defensive technologies has become particularly essential. Modern information technologies, especially in artificial intelligence, data analytics and cryptography, can provide effective tools to combat disinformation. Protecting critical infrastructure, safeguarding citizens’ personal data and strengthening resilience to cyberattacks are all areas that require special attention and sustained investment.

Addressing such a complex challenge requires a comprehensive and systematic approach. It is essential to develop rapid response mechanisms capable of detecting, analysing and correcting false information in real time. One example is the creation of regional fact-checking platforms that can verify content circulating in the public sphere as soon as it appears. In Poland, initiatives such as Demagog, Konkret24 and Demaskator24 focus on fact-checking and improving public awareness of disinformation. At the European level, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) supports cooperation between fact-checkers, researchers and other stakeholders to combat disinformation more effectively.

Inside Russia's information strategy and operations

Russia has developed advanced forms of propaganda aimed at public opinion in Western countries. These efforts are carried out by specialized media outlets such as Russia Today, as well as directly by state institutions. The highest levels of political leadership are personally involved in this process, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, President Vladimir Putin, and members of the Russian parliament.

A key element of this propaganda is the use of fear and coercive messaging about the consequences of armed conflict, including the specter of nuclear escalation, if the West were to resist Russia's strategic ambitions. Such information operations can be built around deliberately provoked military incidents, military exercises, or carefully calibrated messages about the development of Russia's military capabilities.

A concrete example was the disinformation about the consequences of Russian military activity in 2018 near the borders of Estonia and Latvia. After the Zapad 2017 military exercises, the impact of which in the media extended into 2018, Russia deliberately promoted claims that NATO was preparing “provocations” in the region and that therefore Russian forces were forced to increase their combat readiness.

At the same time, Russian media and official statements portrayed NATO exercises in Eastern Europe as a direct threat to Russia, with the aim of alarming Western public opinion and sowing divisions among allies. False claims about NATO’s “aggressive plans” were reinforced by reports of Russia’s arsenal expansion, including Iskander missile systems, creating the impression that Moscow was merely “defending” itself from an escalation it had in fact helped provoke.

In the information sphere, hybrid activities are likely to focus on projecting an image of the Russian state and its policies that serves Moscow’s interests. At the same time, the Kremlin’s diplomatic efforts will aim to draw previously disconnected states into closer cooperation and broader ties, including hydrocarbon supplies through so-called energy diplomacy.

At the same time, information operations can aim to erode public support for authorities in the countries targeted by such campaigns. This has included false narratives designed to reduce support for Ukraine, stigmatize migrants, and undermine NATO’s credibility. The broader objective has been to discourage public support for Ukraine while weakening trust in national and international institutions.

Another example was the disinformation campaign targeting Poland, which spread false claims about an alleged suspension of fuel supplies in order to cause public panic and undermine trust in the state. In 2023, Russian and pro-Russian online media also spread disinformation about Polish and Ukrainian history, manipulating historical facts to fuel tensions between the two countries and further erode trust in their governments.

Russia also exploits social divisions by promoting the idea of ​​a broader Russian cultural sphere through selective historical narratives and references to its scientific, technological, and economic achievements. The aim is both to deepen divisions within EU states and to rally certain groups around Moscow’s agenda. This approach reflects Aleksandr Dugin’s vision of a world divided between Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian spheres. Its main tools are the mass media, especially digital platforms, reinforced by Russia’s diplomatic apparatus.

Possible effects of information warfare in the future

In the future, information warfare may be waged by states that develop their information capabilities to such an extent that they can impose their will or compel others to comply with their demands without the use of military force, generating:

political effects with far-reaching consequences, including the destabilization and fragmentation of the European Union and helping to install governments and leaders more favorable to the Russian Federation;
military effects, above all by weakening defensive readiness and reducing operational capabilities;
economic effects in the form of disruption to the functioning of the economy, especially in sectors such as transport, energy and banking.
Cyber ​​warfare: a major front in the new Cold War

Cyber ​​threats are one of the most important challenges facing contemporary societies and their importance for the security of Central and Eastern Europe continues to grow. Technological progress and rapid digitalization have made critical infrastructure, including energy systems, water supply networks, telecommunications and transport, increasingly dependent on advanced IT systems.

This dependence creates new vulnerabilities, as cyberattacks can have serious consequences for national security, economic stability, and the functioning of society. In this context, Russia's activities target a wide spectrum of vulnerabilities, from state institutions, critical infrastructure, and large industrial facilities to military assets and society itself, including the possible use of biological or chemical attacks.

An important part of building resilience against cyber threats is the development of national and regional computer emergency response teams, or CERTs. Equally essential are regional mechanisms for sharing threat intelligence, enabling faster detection and more effective mitigation of attacks. Such cooperation should cover both the exchange of technical data, including malware signatures and hacking methods, and joint threat assessments that address risks that may affect regions.

An example of such a mechanism is Poland's National Cyber ​​Security System (KSC), which brings together operators of essential services, digital service providers and the national CSIRT. It coordinates cyber defence and incident response, while supporting international cooperation within the European Union.

Operations in cyberspace are likely to become increasingly important. Their appeal lies in the difficulty of attribution, which allows them to cause significant disruption, and even damage, to Western states in a covert and largely unpunished manner. As a result, cyber conflict may become the feature that most clearly distinguishes the everyday reality of a hybrid cold war from its classic twentieth-century form.

The Geopost