What is Pushing Georgia into Moscow’s Orbit?

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgia’s political balance has changed significantly. Previously considered the frontrunner for European integration, Georgia’s ruling party – Georgian Dream (GD) – has adopted an increasingly anti-Western agenda and rhetoric, whilst relations with Russia are closer than ever. Some observers have defined GD as a ‘pro-Russian’ party. This essay rejects this notion. It argues that two developments have driven the dramatic shift in Georgia’s political orientations. The first development is the war in Ukraine. The second is the adoption of a controversial law requiring individuals and entities that receive funding from abroad to register as ‘foreign agents.’

The essay is structured in four sections. The first section defines the main instruments of Russian influence in Georgia. The second section evaluates the claim that GD is aligned with Moscow. The following section examines Georgia’s relations with Russia after the war in 2008, whilst the fourth and final sections discuss Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia and its decision to pursue only functional ties with the West. The essay draws on the realist theory in international relations, which posits that state survival and the pursuit of security are central drivers of state behaviour.

Russia’s influence on Georgia

Russia has developed a policy mix to exert influence on Georgia, relying on coercion, including economic, political, and military pressure (Sirbiladze, 2024). Amongst these levers, Russia’s support for the secession of two Georgian regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has been at the heart of its strategy. These regions have been embroiled in conflict with Georgia’s central government since the early 1990s. In August 2008 – after a short war with Georgia – Russia established control over the regions and recognised their independence (Kofman, 2018). Since then, Russia has used its de-facto occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as leverage against Tbilisi. In particular, Russia has aimed to scupper Georgia’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO by seizing more territory through its borderisation policy as well as signalling that it would be prepared to undertake further military action (Seskuria, 2021).

Georgia pivots away from the West

Fifteen years after the 2008 war, Georgia is moving closer to Russia, whilst relations with the West are at a historic low. The relationship was so strained that, in November 2024, Georgia actually paused EU accession talks (Parulava, 2024). Some observers have argued that GD had a pro-Russian orientation from the start and have accused Bidzina Ivanishvili (GD founder and party chairman) of steering Georgia towards Moscow. Ivanishvili entered Georgian politics in 2011, after making his fortune in Russia (where he maintains business and political ties). Ivanishvili has rarely expressed himself on foreign policy (Ekman, 2024), but those who support the ‘pro-Russia’ argument see him as little more than a puppet of the Kremlin (Gente, 2023). When GD entered government in 2012, the party maintained EU and NATO membership as a policy priority. However, some argue that it has fallen short, highlighting the slowdown in reforms, especially after Schengen visas were lifted in 2017 (Gorecki, 2022). Others argue that, for the past ten years, GD has hindered Georgia’s pro-Western pathway by targeting pro-Western public officials (Mankoff, 2024), whilst legitimising pro-Russian political parties (Gente, 2022). Furthermore, under Ivanishvili, Georgia has witnessed state capture and democratic backsliding incompatible with EU membership conditions (Thornton, 2024).

GD’s political pragmatism

Many of the contradictions in GD’s foreign policy stem from its political pragmatism. This pragmatism informed a foreign policy agenda, marked by two conflicting goals. On the one hand, GD has sought to accelerate Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. On the other hand, it has attempted to normalise relations with Russia (Socor, 2013). By presenting itself as a pragmatic political force, GD made a decisive break with the previous government led by Mikheil Saakashvili – president during the Georgia-Russia war. Georgia’s relations with Russia became hostile under Saakashvili, and GD blames him for escalating the conflict (Gvadzabia, 2025).

Despite this pragmatism, Georgia’s pro-Western orientation was strong during GD’s tenure in office, with the EU and NATO membership bids being enshrined in the constitution (Kuchenbecker, 2023). Georgia signed an Association Agreement (EUAA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. It opened a NATO Centre (JTEC) in Tbilisi and even fought in Afghanistan alongside Western forces (Lomsadze, 2021). Such integration into Western institutions was primarily instrumental rather than motivated by a genuine quest for EU identity, serving as a tool to offset Russia’s influence (Sabanadze, 2023). In reality, Georgia’s conservatism has frequently been at odds with the liberal values championed by the EU, which partly explains why the party failed to enact the necessary reforms.

Alongside these processes of Western integration, GD has worked on normalising relations with Moscow. This process primarily restored economic ties (Ghazaryan, 2024), which had been frozen since 2006 due to the Russian embargo of Georgia. GD also took more political, controversial steps, such as allowing the visit of a Russian MP (Lomsadze, 2019). During GD’s terms in office, trade with Russia recovered (National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2024). Normalising relations was seen as a necessary condition for resolving the conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a view that was not unique to GD (Georgian News Agency, 2011). Ivanishvili believed he could find strategic alignment with the West, whilst maintaining broadly positive relations with Russia (Civil Georgia, 2013). However, restoring economic ties did not improve prospects for resuming diplomatic relations, given what Georgia perceives as a Russian violation of its territorial integrity (Civil Georgia, 2012).

GD’s approach yielded limited results. Contrary to what they hoped to achieve with their normalisation policy, Russia did not revoke its decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, opting instead to strengthen its partnerships with the two regions (Ambrosio & Lange, 2016). Furthermore, Russia remained hostile to Georgia’s pursuit of closer relations with the EU and NATO (MacFarlane, 2015). Strong trade relations with Russia also came to the detriment of Georgia’s strategic autonomy (Kapanadze, 2024): its economic dependence on Russia has significantly increased over the past decade (Transparency International Georgia, 2024).

Impact of the war in Ukraine on Georgia’s foreign policy

The war in Ukraine gradually accelerated Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia. Georgia’s initial reaction to the war was consistent with the same pragmatism that characterised GD’s foreign policy: Georgia condemned Russian aggression (Parliament of Georgia, 2022), provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine (Georgia Today, 2023) and applied for EU membership (Kucera, 2022). However, it refrained from joining Western sanctions and questioned their logic (Civil Georgia, 2023). This stance took many by surprise, not least because Georgia was in some ways similar to Ukraine, given the fact that both had been moving towards EU integration and both had been the object of Russian military aggression (Brusylovska & Maistrenko, 2024). And yet, since war broke out in 2022, the scale and nature of Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia have increased significantly. Georgia and Russia have restored direct flights and established a visa-free regime (Lomsadze, 2023), and Georgia has facilitated the relocation of thousands of Russian companies and citizens to its territory (Darieva et al., 2022). Public officials in Georgia have blamed NATO expansion for the war, presenting a position aligned with the Russian narrative (Sabanadze, 2023).

Georgia’s policy shift makes sense when we consider it in light of the realist theory in International Relations. This theory, as pioneered by thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau, argues that power and security – not morality or ideals – drives international outcomes (Morgenthau, 1948). States are concerned with protecting themselves, and this concern for survival inevitably comes before ideology or ethics. Small states, especially, are more exposed to external pressures owing to lesser military capacities (Keohane, 1969). Consequently, they must adopt strategic policy choices aimed at maximising their security. One strategy is to align with a stronger power. Another consists in hedging between great powers (Waltz, 1979), pursuing strategic ambiguity and multiple policy options to preserve autonomy (Kuik, 2008).

Georgia’s foreign policy exemplifies a classic case of hedging. This trend departs from earlier pragmatism in that Georgia is rejecting binding partnerships, marking a significant departure from its prior commitment to EU membership. However flawed Georgia’s pursuit of European integration may be, it demonstrated a preference for one geopolitical orientation over another. The decision to pause accession talks reflects a new approach that challenges the traditional narrative of Western vs. Russian influence, prioritising actions framed in terms of its own national interests.

The war in Ukraine played a decisive role in Georgia’s strategic shift, for it demonstrated that Russia was ready to threaten direct intervention if challenged in its sphere of influence. The conflict also led to a recalibration of expectations about what Western alignment could realistically deliver in terms of containing Russia, particularly in light of Georgia’s traumatic experience during the 2008 war (Melvin, 2024). With unresolved territorial conflicts and limited security guarantees, there was a perception in Tbilisi that Georgia risked being caught in a broader struggle between East and West (Kucera, 2024). Against this backdrop, it became unsustainable to balance Euro-Atlantic integration with efforts to nurture ties with Russia.

Political authoritarianism brings Georgia closer to Russia

Whilst the war in Ukraine affected Georgia’s geopolitical balance, the rapid deterioration of its relationship with the West acted as a catalyst. Central to this crisis was the passage of a law requiring organisations that receive funding from outside Georgia to register as ‘foreign agents,’ thus limiting – and potentially criminalising – NGOs and independent media outlets (Thornton, 2024). The law mirrors the one Russia passed in 2012 (Zavyalova, 2024). After its first iteration failed in 2023 due to public backlash, the bill was reintroduced in April 2024 and passed in May (Uberi, 2024). The passing of the law unleashed large-scale protests and drew intense criticism from Western institutions. A review by the Venice Commission deemed it to be incompatible with democracy and human rights (Venice Commission, 2025), whilst the US and the EU announced sanctions against GD officials (Gavin, 2024). In response, GD adopted increasingly anti-Western rhetoric, accusing the West of stirring up domestic instability and seeking to drag Georgia into a war with Russia (Khundadze & Wade, 2025). The law marked a turning point in GD’s approach to domestic governance, signalling a willingness to consolidate control over Georgia’s political space, as well as a readiness to employ governance practices akin to those used in Russia.

The foreign agent law crisis is an insightful reminder that wider diplomatic shifts are not solely reactions to the international system but also to key domestic variables (Ripsman, 2011). In other words, although hedging in small states primarily operates at a systemic level (Kuik, 2008), Georgia’s break with the West must also be viewed within the context of its domestic politics. As discussed above, Georgia’s pro-Western integration was driven by security considerations about offsetting Russia, rather than by normative, pro-European values. The foreign agent law revealed that GD is increasingly oriented towards consolidating political power, creating tensions with the West generally, but especially the EU. Such external tensions have had internal consequences. Research suggests that the Georgian people are, in fact, unequivocally pro-Western – sentiments that often equate with aspirations for EU integration (The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2023). As the EU enjoys broad public backing, perceived departures from EU values weaken GD’s legitimacy at home, making it difficult for it to consolidate political authority without triggering domestic opposition. During the protests, EU public officials voiced their support for the Georgian public (European External Action service, 2024), intensifying domestic scrutiny of the government. In the aftermath of the 2024 general elections, which saw GD secure a decisive victory, they questioned their legitimacy (OC Media, 2024). Whilst democratic backsliding had become a recurring pattern under GD’s rule, it had never previously affected Georgia’s prospects for EU integration before 2022. This time, however, mounting internal pressure compounded Georgia’s already precarious position amid the war in Ukraine, complicating efforts to balance external relations with domestic political legitimacy. This situation further tilted the balance away from the EU. The economic benefits of cooperation with Moscow also played an increasingly prominent role in GD’s calculations.

Conclusion

Georgia’s shift away from the West must be viewed within the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting scepticism towards Western security guarantees. The war altered Georgia’s political balance, moving the country from a policy of EU integration towards a more conventional hedging strategy between the West and Russia. The shift was further reinforced by increasing authoritarian tendencies within Georgia, which generated domestic tensions, adversely affecting relations with the EU. Reducing GD to a ‘pro-Russian’ party is to significantly oversimplify its behaviour. The label not only fails to acknowledge GD’s overwhelmingly pro-Western policies prior to 2022 but also overlooks the external and internal pressures that led to a recalibration of Georgia’s geopolitical orientations. Georgia’s relationship with Russia is a revealing exemplification of realist theory and one that will continue to be illuminating in an increasingly volatile world where small states wrangle with great powers.