Drones in Ukraine: Four lessons for the West
Sve kremaljske manifestacije u Srbiji imaju isti cilj – kako na hiljadu načina opravdati neprihvatljivo i normalizovati nenormalno, odnosno kako prikazati agresivnu, zločinačku politiku Putinove Rusije kao odbranu tradicionalnih vrijednosti, vrline i dobra.
Drones have become a central weapon of the Russo-Ukrainian war, with the number of uncrewed systems—mostly airborne but not exclusively—reaching astonishing levels. In early 2024, Ukraine aimed to produce one million drones within the year. In March, that goal was revised to two million, and in October, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced the country was now capable of manufacturing up to four million drones annually. Russia is reportedly matching this pace of production. It is estimated that about 100 different types of drones are in use in Ukraine, ranging from toy-sized systems to larger models with wingspans of almost 20 meters.
Intelligence gathering and strike operations, as well as target support for other military systems, are crucial functions of drones. But they also play diverse roles, such as serving as decoys (to mislead or deplete enemy air defences), acting as relays for signals, transporting equipment, and laying mines. Both Ukraine and Russia build these systems themselves, acquire them from allies, or use modified civilian drones.
The nature of the war in Ukraine has favoured drones. It is fought over land. Crewed aircrafts were for extended periods neutralised by air defences. Civilian drones are widely available, even if they’re not always the most effective option: a dedicated anti-tank weapon is usually more suitable for engaging a tank than a drone with first-person view. But when the former is not available, the latter might be a good enough alternative. And with Ukraine struggling with shortages of ammunition and military equipment for its artillery, drones have in part helped to fill this gap.
The number of non-aerial systems has also grown considerably: Ukraine has used naval drones (surface and underwater systems) to attack Russia’s Black Sea fleet, resulting in the sinking of several ships. Ukrainians want to create what they describe as “the world’s first fleet of naval drones.” Uncrewed ground systems have also entered the battlefield. While they are still less sophisticated than their naval and aerial siblings, they are capable of transport, intelligence gathering, and even attacks.
Western armed forces and governments can draw four lessons from Ukraine’s drone experience.
Lesson one: It will not always be like Ukraine
Every armed force in the world today seeks to harness drone capabilities. Unlike only a few years ago, any state, as well as non-state actors, can readily acquire drones. Currently, the main exporters of military drones are China and Turkey. But drones can also be built domestically with comparatively little funding and expertise. Meanwhile, civilian drones are freely available to everybody in large quantities. These systems can, within limits, be adapted for military operations. Of course, a modified civilian quadcopter bears little resemblance to a multi-million uncrewed warplane. But both have military utility, and in some cases, mass production and low cost can compensate for lack of advanced capabilities. Western armed forces thus need to prepare for future conflicts in which drones will be omnipresent and used for various roles. They should be able to operate such systems, as well as be able to defend against them.
However, Ukraine could also just be a peak moment for drone warfare. The factors that made drones relevant in Ukraine might look different in future wars. The overall number of drones could be lower if civilian drones cannot be used—due to weather conditions or longer distances, such as in a maritime confrontation. Civilian drones might also not be as readily available in confrontations involving China, which produces virtually all civilian systems (see lesson three below). Other weapon systems might be available, thus decreasing the need for drones as substitutes.
Russia and Ukraine are playing a cat-and-mouse game, with fast innovation cycles for both drones and counter-drone technologies
Drone defences are another element of uncertainty: even in Ukraine, drones have become less useful in some areas due to counter-drone systems. Russia and Ukraine are playing a cat-and-mouse game, with fast innovation cycles for both drones and counter-drone technologies. Often, a new technological development only provides a temporary advantage before the other side adapts.
This means that one needs to be careful in extrapolating scenarios from Ukraine. Arguing that the war in Ukraine has shown the dominance of small and cheap drones over larger, more sophisticated and more expensive systems could be a dangerous miscalculation.
Lesson two: Scale up and adapt quickly
A natural conclusion for Western armed forces might be to stock large quantities of equipment. Replenishing depleted arsenals in Europe is certainly an urgent task. However, drones require a different approach.
Drone types can lose their usefulness quickly. If the combat situation changes, or if defences are developed to counter them, a drone system that was vital yesterday can become obsolete today. During the initial assault on Ukraine, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were so crucial in fighting back Russian troops that they inspired a popular war song. By 2024, Bayraktars were no longer important, largely due to air defences. Bayraktars were not the only system to suffer this fate; it has become increasingly difficult to take stock of the drones used in Ukraine because of their fast turnover. Systems need to be adapted fast.
The impressively fast innovation circles—from cardboard drones and tethered drones to increased autonomy and the use of AI—is thus not just a result of the ingenuity of Ukrainian, Russian, and Western engineers. They are an imperative to avoid defeat.
Hence, had European nations procured some 100,000 quadcopter drones in 2023—an approach that seemed sensible at the time—it is very likely that these systems would now be largely useless. Instead, the European defence industry must be positioned to scale up production and modify systems and processes as needed. It should be encouraged to build modular systems with interchangeable components.
Lesson three: The dependence on China must be countered
When the civilian drone market took off in the early 2010s, Chinese firms quickly came to dominate it. Their low prices pushed Western competitors out of the market and, by 2016, DJI accounted for two-thirds of all consumer drones produced worldwide. Today, Chinese firms hold a monopoly on the hobbyist market, offering highly capable systems at affordable prices. And not only China produces the majority of commercial drones but it also manufactures most of the components needed to assemble them. As a result, while Ukraine will likely come out of the war as a drone power, its industry is dependent on Chinese-made parts—from cheap plastic components to motors and video transmitters.
This dependency is particularly concerning in light of the growing geopolitical competition between the West and China, alongside the Sino-Russian cooperation. In Ukraine, there are complaints about defective Chinese components, sparking rumours of sabotage. Amid a trade war with the US, China is now restricting exports of components and materials critical to drone building, a move that is already affecting Ukraine. Kyiv has recently begun to onshore component production, but this will be a long process and will require European support.
Policymakers have long known that China is outbuilding the European—and even the American—military industry. China’s positioning on the war in Ukraine is already problematic; it would be even more concerning in a military confrontation involving the country. Europe must strengthen not only its defence industry but reshore manufacturing if it does not want to be caught unable to produce even basic systems needed in a conflict.
Lesson four: Drones enable greater civilian involvement
First-person videos of drones dropping grenades into an open tank hatch, or of soldiers pursued or guided to safety by a drone: these images have been ubiquitous in the war, fostering a feeling of closeness with the public. This has led many people, both from Ukraine and abroad, to participate in crowdfunding initiatives—many of which, strikingly, aiming to buy drones.
Being cheap and easy to modify, drones have enabled civilians to be directly involved in the defence efforts. Volunteers began tinkering with drones since the 2014 Russian aggression. The hobbyist drone unit Aerorozvidka developed its own drone system which by 2022 was being used by the Ukrainian military.
The growing involvement of civilians in warfare is a phenomenon that Europeans must contend with. This is an important challenge, especially for democracies. While engaged citizens can be a positive force, it can contribute to polarisation, be exploited by opponents, or create pressures that could hamper international diplomacy.
Any lessons taken from a war that is still ongoing should be considered with care. But it can reveal vulnerabilities and larger changes in warfare tactics. A war on European soil is a crucial moment, and opportunity for Europeans to learn the right lessons for their defence.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.