Three scenarios for Belarus: What the future holds

The goal of the first group (the pro-Russian one) is quite clear. It is the maximum expansion of Russia's political and economic influence over the post-Soviet space: first, over the CIS countries (which remained in Russia's sphere of influence after the collapse of the USSR), and then over the Baltic states (which, by a tacit agreement between the Russian leadership and the West, moved into the Western sphere of influence). And from there—we shall see.

Apparently, Russia does not intend to limit itself exclusively to the post-Soviet space. Currently, its goals include expanding influence over Central European countries and beyond. The ultimate goal is not just to turn into the "gendarme of Europe," a role Russia played in the first half of the 19th century, but to become the "dictator" of Europe.

The tasks of the second group, accordingly, are to prevent these plans from being realized, although members of this group may not understand these tasks as clearly as the first group understands its own. Several factors stand in the way:

 

1. A habit of focusing more on the economy than on defense;
2. The significant role of democratic institutions and the orientation of the political establishment toward public opinion;
3. A tendency to view Russia not as a threat, but as the cradle of a great culture;
4. A reluctance to fight. Therefore, when Ukraine faced direct aggression, the reaction was not as decisive as it should have been.

 

Russia interprets these factors as the weakness of its opponent, which is already a risk factor. Western countries have already forgiven Russia for many things—from the shelling of its own parliament to the invasion of Georgia. Even the seizure of Ukrainian territories in 2014 did not lead to an adequate reaction in line with the principles of the inviolability of borders.

The migrant crisis that overwhelmed Europe the following year in connection with the war in Syria (where Russia played a far from minor role) demonstrated the confusion of Europeans in the face of unexpected challenges. If Russia had attacked Europe then (in 2014–2015), it is unlikely the latter would have withstood the attack, and the world would be quite different now.

But Russia missed the opportunity then, not least because of its own indecision caused by uncertainty in its own strength. For that confidence, it lacked the Ukrainian resource.

Therefore, although many considered the attack on Ukraine in 2022 an illogical act, for Russia, such a move was fully justified, as the path to the main goal—political dominance over all of Europe—is only possible through the resolution of the Ukrainian problem.

However, it soon became clear that the opponent's weaknesses were simultaneously its strengths. The focus on the economy provides a great advantage in financial, material, and technological terms, which allows for aid to be provided to an ally and, to some extent, restrains aggression toward itself.

Democratic institutions provide protection against sliding into authoritarianism and form—in contrast to dictatorship—a good example of the effective protection of human rights and well-being. Finally, Russia's behavior itself forced a discussion on the extent to which Russian culture is truly "great."

Here, for Russia, the task of acquiring the Ukrainian resource became locked in a vicious circle with the task of neutralizing the European resource.

In fact, Russia is now forced to fight on two fronts: in Ukraine and through hybrid methods against Europe.

The role of the Lukashenka regime

The Lukashenka regime occupies a special position here; it is an integral and active participant in Russian plans. But there is also an artificially created reputation of an "independent player" who is allegedly "vitally interested" in preserving the independence of Belarus.

In reality, such an interest exists, but not only or primarily for Lukashenka. Russia is, first and foremost, interested in this.

Firstly, a formally independent Belarus is an additional voice in favor of the aggressor in international organizations. Secondly, Belarus is a convenient proxy for promoting Russian interests where it is inconvenient for Russia to do so itself (for example, in complex regions of Asia and Africa). Thirdly, Belarus provides access to those goods that are prohibited by the international community for supply to Russia.

Even if these are not directly military goods, but luxury brand clothing and cars, it already provides some relief to the Russian population and relieves a certain part of internal tension. Therefore, the lifting of sanctions on the Belarusian regime, which some Belarusian politicians abroad speak of so persistently, would be a window for Russia, which finds itself in an extremely unpleasant economic situation.

An "independent" Belarus gives Russia another advantage: the ability to manufacture goods necessary for the war in close proximity to the theater of operations (TVD). Ukrainian drones and missiles can now fly deep into Russian territory. At the same time, there is no formal basis for attacking Belarus; on its territory, one can safely "churn out" drones and shells, train military personnel, and prepare a bridgehead for a repeated attack toward both Ukraine and Europe. Any hint of Belarus's involvement in combat operations could sharply put an end to this "safe house" for Russian plans.

Therefore, the words of Valfovich about a "company that is fighting" are not a confession that Lukashenka's troops are participating in combat operations against Ukraine. They are more likely reminiscent of military slang that can denote the active participation of a particular military unit in exercises.

But this by no means means that Belarus has been assigned the role of a "peaceful shelter" forever. In Russian plans, it is assigned the role of a bridgehead for an attack on Europe, as the "Belarusian balcony" looks very convenient, from which it is easy to reach Kyiv, Vilnius, Warsaw, and beyond.

Therefore, new bases are being actively built on the territory of Belarus, the ground is being prepared for the import of long-range weapons, and there is talk of deploying nuclear warheads. Although the latter is likely an element of hybrid warfare for now, intended to affect the nerves of Western politicians and societies.

Active work is also being carried out, on the one hand, to intimidate Belarusian society and foster anti-Western sentiments, and on the other, to militarize Belarusian society (especially among children and adolescents). Thus, Russia and the Lukashenka regime seek to use the resource of Belarus and not give it up to the West.

Future scenarios

What scenarios are seen for further events? There are two main ones:

 

1. Russia in the near future (the element of surprise and the opponent's unreadiness is very significant for it, so it will not wait until 2028–2030) attacks Europe from the territory of Belarus. The goal will likely be to seize part of the territory in order to increase pressure on European politics and societies;
2. The Russian economy does not withstand the war and sanctions, and, according to the scenario of the German Empire of 1918, the Russian front in Ukraine collapses, and a political crisis and mass unrest (possibly with the disintegration of the state) begin in Russia itself.

 

In the second scenario, the Lukashenka regime will have no chance of holding on. No external invasion, armed uprising, or partisan movement will be needed to overthrow it. A mass expression of the people's will, like what was demonstrated in 2020, will be sufficient.

 

It is only necessary to have a unified political center (so that the country does not plunge into long-term squabbles over who has the longer rifle) and police forces that will eliminate any attempt by any group to demonstrate their own governing body (in the form of that same rifle).

 

This political center, having returned to Belarus (since there is and will be no other legitimate center), will organize, as promised, free and fair elections. Everything else will depend on Belarusian society—which path to the future it chooses (and, of course, on politicians: how attractive the options they manage to offer to society will be).

 

The first scenario (that Russia will go to war from the territory of Belarus) does not, in fact, exclude the second. It will eventually lead Belarus to freedom, but with great material and human losses. The task of building a new Belarus will become significantly more complicated, as the political center will return, literally, to ashes.

 

There is, of course, a third option. This is when China intervenes in Russia's war in Europe. It could either directly provide aid to Russia or start a war in the Pacific region, which would distract the resources of the U.S. and other democratic countries of the region from helping European democracies. In that case, predicting the result will be almost impossible.