Ideology and the ruble are equally dangerous: How much influence does Russia have in Montenegro today, and how much was it during the DPS era?
Today, the influence is predominantly ideological and political, and does not necessarily have to be directly commanded from Moscow to be effective. During the time of the DPS, it was primarily of an economic and investment nature, says Mladen Grgić
It is hypocritical that the DPS is now acting as a bulwark against Russia. Under them, the influence was deeper and more dangerous because it was not only propaganda, but also financial and political, says Boris Bogdanović
Those in power who boast of good relations with Russia and who announce that Putin is their president. The DPS worked to suppress Russian malignant influence, claims Jevto Eraković.
While the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) was in power in Montenegro, Russian influence was primarily economic in nature, and Russian companies and capital then played a controversial role in the so-called transition. Today, after the fall of the DPS government, Russian influence is dominantly ideological and political, manifesting itself through alignment with certain local political and religious entities, but as such it can be effective even though it does not come directly from the Kremlin.
With these words, Mladen Grgić, a teaching associate at the Faculty of Political Sciences (FPN) in Podgorica, answers the question of “Vijesti” - how much is Russia's real influence in Montenegro today, and how much was it during the three-decade rule of the DPS.
The authorities claim that under the DPS, Moscow's influence was much more dangerous than now, when, they say, it is mostly indirect, while the opposition assesses the opposite - that the Kremlin is more present in Montenegro today than when they ruled it.
The ruling Europe Now Movement (PES) and DPS argued in parliament last week about how much Russia influences Montenegro today, and how much it used to. When asked by the head of the DPS parliamentary group, Andrija Nikolić, whether Prime Minister Milojko Spajić (PES) would resign if Montenegro did not close all negotiation chapters with the European Union (EU) by the end of the year, the prime minister responded by claiming that there is a "secret" version of the agreement between the DPS and Vladimir Putin's United Russia, by which the DPS allegedly committed the country not to join the EU if Russia's interests were contrary to those of that community.
After the DPS provided the media with a facsimile of the agreement (signed in 2011), which contained no items that would confirm what Spajić was saying, his party colleagues spoke out instead of the Prime Minister, but in their statements they did not refer to the "secret" version of the document, but to the one provided to the media by the DPS.
Russia is the third country to recognize Montenegro after the restoration of its independence in 2006. Russian investments in Montenegro are measured in billions, according to a referendum, and tourists from that country always top the list in terms of arrivals and overnight stays. However, official relations between the two countries have been poor for years. This is mainly because in 2014, Montenegro, aligning itself with the EU, imposed sanctions on Moscow over its annexation of Crimea. Montenegro also imposed sanctions in 2022 over Russia's aggression against Ukraine. After introducing these measures four years ago, Moscow declared Montenegro an "enemy state".
It is not the same to cooperate before 2014, after 2022 or today
Mladen Grgić told the editorial office that it is difficult to precisely quantify Russia's direct influence on the situation in Montenegro, because, according to him, today it is predominantly manifested through ideological and political alignment with certain local political and religious entities.
He stated that, in such circumstances, the influence does not necessarily have to be directly commanded from Moscow to be effective.
"... It often feeds on identical narratives and value systems. This influence is often also through intermediary states and their institutions," said Grgić.
Such and similar assessments can be found in reports by domestic and international organizations on Russia's activities. Among other things, in the analysis of the Digital Forensic Center (DFC) from Podgorica on Russian influence in the Western Balkans, from December last year. The document states that, given Russia's increased and sophisticated activities, and Serbia "as a permanent vector of Russian hybrid activity," Montenegro remains a target of foreign malign interference.
Grgić stated that he believes that the claims about the decisive influence through the agreements of the opposition parties with United Russia from 2011 are quite frivolous, and that they serve exclusively for daily political purposes and a kind of shifting of the burden of proving the "Russian connection" from the coalition partners to the opposition.
"A spin that can hardly be successful. Such a narrative may have the goal of possibly justifying the slowdown of Montenegro's EU path - but even in that case it seems to me to be on very weak legs", the interlocutor underlined.
He stated that it is crucial to understand the context, and that it is not the same to maintain relations with Russia before 2014, after 2022 or today.
"Each of these phases carries a completely different political and security connotation, so it is anachronistic to view old party agreements as relevant evidence of today's actions. Even those in power bear the burden of closeness to Russia, increasingly establishing contacts with some other addresses in the West", assessed Grgić.
An example that could support this claim is that of the head of the Assembly and leader of the New Serbian Democracy (NSD), Andrija Mandić. Although his party has a signed declaration with Putin's United Russia, Mandić, since becoming the head of the Assembly, has been working intensively to create contacts in the West - primarily in the United States and Israel.
Constructive during the referendum
Grgić said that during the DPS rule (until August 2020), Russian influence was primarily economic and investment in nature - and most of all in the period after the 2006 referendum.
“Russian companies and capital played a significant but controversial role in the Montenegrin transition. Unfortunately, these investments most often had negative consequences for our economy because they were implemented in a non-transparent manner, leaving behind problematic business relationships that cost the state dearly,” he said, recalling the case of the “failed” guarantees for the Aluminum Plant in Podgorica (KAP).
“They (investments) did, however, play a key role in creating crony capitalism through problematic privatizations and real estate sales. They also contributed to the economic boom that occurred after independence, but this also resulted in the bursting of the real estate bubble and the creation of an extremely unfavorable economic structure,” Grgić added.
In 2009 and 2010, when Milo Đukanović (DPS) was at the helm, the government issued guarantees for the operation of KAP. In 2013, the Russian VTB and the Hungarian OTP Bank activated the guarantees because KAP, then under the management of the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, could not repay the loans, and the citizens of Montenegro paid about 126 million euros directly from the budget for the “failed” KAP guarantees, while with interest and costs included, this figure is estimated at over 137 million euros.
Despite the controversial investments, Grgić notes that it is important to emphasize the constructive political role of Russia at the time during the process of restoring Montenegrin independence - which Moscow did not dispute at that time - noting that the international circumstances were significantly different.
But when it comes to the situation today, he says that Russia's influence is predominantly ideological and political, without large direct state investments. However, he notes that Russian citizens remain significant factors in the real estate market, and that they have also been among the leading applicants under the economic citizenship program, which, according to him, shows that Russian capital is still circulating in Montenegro, but through private, and no longer exclusively state, arrangements.
“And not all of that capital is necessarily tied to political circles close to the Kremlin,” he stressed.
The European Parliament (EP) has repeatedly warned of Russia's influence in Montenegro. In 2022, MEPs expressed concern about "attempts by the Orthodox Church in countries such as Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the entity of Republika Srpska, to promote Russia as a protector of traditional family values and strengthen relations between the state and the Church".
The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) rejected the allegations in the document, saying that the claim was "completely contrary to the facts and the Church's commitment in everyday life".
A 2023 EP report stated that in Montenegro, Russian interference was driven by "pro-Serbian sentiments" and the SPC.
Eraković: We suppressed the malignant influence
DPS MP Jevto Eraković told "Vijesti" that the Montenegrin public knows what the relations were like between DPS and Russia during the last government (Duško Marković), whose headquarters was DPS, and that they "well remember the statements of Russian officials", especially when Montenegro permanently opted for its path to the EU and NATO membership.
"Today we can see how important NATO membership is for Montenegro, especially in light of the Russian aggression on Ukraine, and today it is more than clear that it was a state interest", assessed Eraković.
Senior Russian officials, including the country's President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, criticized Montenegro's decision to join NATO in 2017, and Lavrov called the move "artificial".
"On the other hand, today's government is largely comprised of those who boast of good relations with Russia and who announce that Putin is their president. It is clear from this that Russian influence is more pronounced and dangerous today. Although Milojko Spajić, wanting to absolve himself of responsibility for the fact that Montenegro will not close the chapters by the end of 2026, resorted to shameless lies and subterfuge that DPS, at the expense of Russia, is blocking the closing of the chapters...", the interlocutor concluded.
Eraković claims that the extent to which the DPS, led by Đukanović, worked from a position of power to suppress “Russian malign influence” in Montenegro is supported by “the fact that it was the Russians - and this according to the admission of the President of Serbia (Aleksandar Vučić) - who wanted to kill the current honorary president of the DPS”.
Eraković alludes to the “coup d’état” case, in which, in addition to Montenegrin and Serbian citizens, Russian citizens were also accused of attempted terrorism on the day of the 2016 national elections. The Court of Appeals upheld the acquittals in that case at the end of February.
Bogdanović: Minor Today, Once Systemic
The head of the Democratic Party parliamentary group, Boris Bogdanović, told “Vijesti” that the real Russian influence today is not direct, but mostly indirect - through disinformation, “proxy” networks and remnants of capital.
He stated that the Democrats have never had any contact or connection “with those who try to exert unauthorized external influence, including the Russian Federation”. He assessed that under the DPS, this influence was deeper and more dangerous, because, according to him, it was not only propaganda, but also ownership, financial and political.
"In 2011, DPS concluded an agreement with United Russia, which it hid from the public for 15 years, and committed to exchanging information of strategic interest to the Russian Federation with them. In 2016, Russian owners held 32 percent of foreign companies in Montenegro, and one study estimates that Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) was then just over 30 percent of gross domestic product," he claims.
Bogdanović said that after 2006, Russian buyers invested up to a billion euros in real estate, and another 500 million in tourism and industry, as well as former military property and other strategic locations for the defense of the state, which were “dismembered and strategically sold to Russian oligarchs,” were sold to the Russians.
“That is why it is hypocritical for the DPS to act as a bulwark against Russia today. It was during their time that Deripaska entered KAP, and 800 million of our money came out of KAP, while (high-ranking Russian state official Sergei) Shoigu demanded 300 million Russian,” he emphasized, adding that Deripaska claimed in the arbitration that followed in the KAP case that promises were made to him by the highest state officials, including then-Prime Minister Đukanović, while the public subsequently listened to a released recording of a conversation between (former Foreign Minister) Milan Roćen and Deripaska about the political influence of Russian oligarchs on the political situation in Montenegro.
Bogdanović says that while today there is talk of Moscow's indirect attempts at influence, during the DPS rule it had influence both externally and internally, through money, real estate, oligarchs, Roćen, (high-ranking DPS official) Brano Gvozdenović, Milo Đukanović and other political channels.
"Today's influence is minor, during their time it was systemic," Bogdanović said.
Grgić: Influences from neighbors are more direct and effective
Mladen Grgić assessed that Russia, not only in Montenegro, but also throughout Europe, applies methods of "hybrid warfare", and that this implies a wide range of actions - from direct support for certain political structures, to the strategy of "spoil the game", to outright sabotage.
"For us, the danger of this influence lies in undermining social cohesion and slowing down democratic processes, making society more vulnerable to external pressures. However, it could be said that the influences of neighboring countries are much more direct and effective."
Investments and tourism
The fact that Moscow is present in Montenegro is also shown by the figures on direct investments from that country, as well as the number of Russian tourists.
Although it took only eighth place on the list of FDIs last year (almost 34 million euros), Russia has been listed at the very top for years. According to data from the Central Bank of Montenegro registry, these investments amounted to 100 million euros in 2024, 112 million in 2023, 127 million in 2022, as much as 191 million in 2021, 101 million in 2020, almost 70 million in 2019...
As for tourism, Monstat data shows that the record number of Russians was in 2019 (384 thousand), and that year they accounted for almost a quarter of the total number of overnight stays. After the coronavirus pandemic and the introduction of sanctions on Moscow in 2022, the number of Russian tourists declined, but last year it again exceeded 200,000, accounting for about 16 percent of the total number of overnight stays.