The Impact of Sanctions and Alliances on Russian Military Capabilities
Sanctions have hindered Russia's military capabilities by raising procurement costs, increasing reliance on allies and straining its economy – despite Moscow’s evasion efforts.
This article addresses the disagreements surrounding the efficacy of sanctions regimes imposed on Russia by numerous countries. To achieve this aim, satellite imagery was purchased from Maxar through European Space Imaging (EUSI) and used in tandem with open source documents. Trade data, particularly for exchanges of microelectronics and weapons systems and platforms, was used alongside reporting by subject-matter experts. These sources helped me determine which countries acted as the main partners for Russia, and what this could indicate about the impact sanctions have had. The findings show that while Russia has been able to reroute microelectronics from the US and EU through regional allies (particularly Kazakhstan and China), this has raised the prices of supplies and components, which in turn has caused severe damage to Russia’s ability to properly maintain its military capabilities to the extent one would expect of a modern military superpower. Instead, it has been forced to prioritise the procurement and repair of armoured vehicles and drones, since these have proven to be more tactically relevant than its aircraft, which it has been unable to maintain sufficiently.
Data obtained from UN Comtrade shows trade patterns indicative of sanctions evasion; Kazakhstan, which serves as a regional strategic Russian ally, is a key player in routing export-restricted items (most notably semiconductors and other microelectronics) into the Russian economy. For instance, between June and July 2022, Kazakhstan’s exports of microelectronics (HS Commodity Code 8541) to Russia increased from $791,890 to $2,285,227. Pre-war monthly averages (January 2020 to January 2022) were $210,681; averages from February 2022 to February 2024 were $1,405,244, representing a 567% increase.
This raises the question of where Kazakhstan is obtaining the microelectronics. The answer, alarmingly, appears to be largely from Russian adversaries. Exports of these semiconductors from the EU were $719,977 in 2021, but rose sharply to over $4.1 million in 2022 (in 2023, they sat at almost $5 million). The UK displayed a similar trend, with 2021 export figures at $21,666, which increased by roughly 1,469% to $339,861 by 2022.
Far less surprising is the role that China has played in supporting Russia’s war efforts, without officially supplying it with munitions. Chinese exports of semiconductors to Russia rose by over $75.3 million from 2020 to 2023, demonstrating the “no-limits” partnership that the two countries announced 20 days before the 2022 invasion began.
These clear efforts to evade sanctions have permitted Russia to import the components needed by its defence sector, allowing for the expansion of relatively high-paying jobs producing, procuring and repairing the munitions, equipment and weapons platforms and systems that drive its war effort. This increased demand for high-paying labour has led to an impressive growth in real gross domestic product, with the Russian economy growing by 5.4% in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the same period of the year prior.
Russia isn’t solely relying on loopholes to avoid sanctions in order to prop up its defence procurement. Moscow has been relying heavily on its strategic partners and allies to support its war effort, strengthening ties and engaging in technology exchanges to assist in meeting the demands of its armed forces. According to Sipri, Russia ordered 7 Tiger AV armored patrol vehicles from China. According to the Financial Times, both Russia and China deny these transfers. An image that surfaced from the recent resurgence of conflict in Syria also suggests that China has supplied Russia with counter-UAV weapons systems (as seen below), damaging the credibility of its denials of aiding Russia’s war efforts.