Si can't trust his own army.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is believed to have ordered the armed forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027 if necessary, increasing the chances of a catastrophic military conflict in the coming years, which would almost certainly involve the United States.
However, Xi's purge of the highest military ranks is underway, which casts doubt not only on that deadline, but also on whether he can trust his generals to successfully lead the war in the long term.
Over the past two years, two defense ministers and a number of senior officers of the People's Liberation Army of China have been replaced, including leading cadres in the Rocket Force, which controls China's nuclear weapons.
Heads continue to roll, including, according to the latest reports, one of the most high-profile dismissals yet: that of General He Weidong, the country's second-ranking officer, who reported directly to President Xi and was deeply involved in planning a potential invasion of Taiwan.
It is impossible to say for sure whether these changes are related to corruption, a persistent and serious problem in the People’s Liberation Army, ideological differences, or some other reason. Nevertheless, the turmoil raises serious questions about the competence and reliability of Xi’s military commanders. It is likely to weaken his appetite for war, giving Taiwan and the United States time to strengthen their defenses.
There is no doubt that China's military has made significant progress. Once obsolete, it is now the world's largest armed force, rivaling the United States in air, naval, and missile power. The Chinese military has been practicing for years to invade or blockade Taiwan, including military exercises in April, and has faced challenges such as transporting tens of thousands of troops across the Taiwan Strait.
However, equipment and logistics alone do not guarantee victory. Military effectiveness depends largely on battlefield commanders - experienced officers who can make tough decisions quickly in the "fog of war." China has not fought a war since 1979, and the current generation of Chinese officers, unlike their American and Russian counterparts, has no combat experience, a fact that Xi himself has lamented.
An even bigger problem, accentuated by internal unrest, is that neither Xi Jinping nor the Chinese Communist Party may have firm control over the military.
Unlike the US military, whose members swear an oath to the Constitution and are supposed to be politically neutral, the People's Liberation Army is the army of the Chinese Communist Party. Officers swear an oath to the party, of which they are members, and take orders from Xi, as party president and chairman of its powerful Central Military Commission. In theory, they should be under tight party control, but that is not the case.
The People's Liberation Army, with its combined land, naval, and air forces, occupies a powerful position in China. This has been embodied since the time of Mao Zedong, who said: "Political power grows on the barrel of a gun."
Because of this power, party leaders granted the military a high degree of autonomy to preserve the loyalty of the generals, essentially allowing them to control themselves.
As the military budget has grown over the years, so have the opportunities for corruption. Party leaders, some of whom have themselves been accused of corruption, have often turned a blind eye. But since Xi took power in 2012, he has launched a major anti-corruption campaign within the party, removing scores of corrupt or potentially disloyal senior military officials. He has also initiated the largest reorganization of the armed forces since Mao’s time.
However, the prolonged purge indicates that Xi is still trying to assert control.
Most of the recent dismissals appear to be corruption-related. But like his predecessors, Xi knows that he needs the military’s support to stay in power, and he cannot go too far in his fight against the culture of corruption. A sign of the severity of the problem is that many of the officers dismissed in the past two years were his own cadres.
Corruption seriously undermines combat readiness. It can favor the promotion of officers who are more skilled at taking bribes than at commanding troops, and it can lead to the purchase of substandard equipment. A report last year by the U.S. Department of Defense said corruption in China's Missile Force may have been so severe that some missile silos required urgent repairs.
Perhaps more importantly, the wave of changes could mean that Xi cannot fully trust what his military advisers are telling him about China's readiness for war.. General He's case has particularly raised concerns about Taiwan, an autonomous island that China claims as its territory. As the former commander of the Eastern Military Region, General He was responsible for planning a potential invasion of Taiwan until Xi promoted him to vice chairman of the Military Commission in 2022, making him his closest advisor on operations against Taiwan.
All of this is happening while there is another key problem characteristic of the militaries of authoritarian states: political interference..
Chinese officers and soldiers spend a great deal of time on political indoctrination, including studying Xi's speeches. Ubiquitous political commissars ensure that party orders are carried out, which can slow down decision-making and stifle individual initiative. In democratic countries, by contrast, officers have greater freedom to make decisions and learn from their own mistakes.
None of this means Taipei and Washington can afford to be complacent..
China's vast military would fight if ordered to do so, even if it was not fully prepared, especially if China assessed that Taiwan was moving toward full independence.
Yet Xi is unlikely to seek conflict. The disastrous invasion of Ukraine launched by Russian President Vladimir Putin showed the world that mere military might does not guarantee victory over a smaller but determined adversary.
Regardless of victory or defeat, a war with Taiwan could devastate China's economy, which is already experiencing sluggish growth and bearing the brunt of high US tariffs, and a military failure could threaten Xi's rule.
Taiwan should use this time to drastically increase investment in weapons that are particularly useful for repelling invasion, such as anti-ship cruise missiles, sea mines, and drones.
The United States should deploy more long-range missiles and other equipment to the region to deter China from attacking the island. It could also use American military creativity to devise innovative methods to thwart an invasion, exploiting the inexperience of Chinese commanders and their inability to react quickly to unforeseen situations.
The biggest risk today is that the fear and tension fueled by aggressive Chinese behavior and rhetoric will lead to miscalculation and war. Chinese threats will continue. But leaders in Taiwan and the United States must avoid overreacting and understand that, for the foreseeable future, Xi will be reluctant to send a scandal-tainted army into battle..
The authors are experts on the Chinese military at the National Defense University in Washington.