Russia's Undeclared War on the Northern Front

Northern Europe has long been confronted with a major war in our region; Russia has committed multiple acts of aggression in and around our territory: Ukraine, cyberattacks, infrastructure attacks, GPS jamming & spoofing, forced migration, and now drones buzzing around Europe’s airports and critical infrastructure. Warplanes have violated the EU and NATO airspace in Estonia for as long as 12 minutes. 

What have we done about it? What must be done to bolster Nordic, Baltic and Arctic security at the European level?

Let us have no illusions about our current situation and what’s coming: Russia’s posture towards the EU and NATO is becoming more offensive; time is scarce to build a European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). Major capability gaps remain unfilled.

Europe should not hope for the best from the United States. We must prepare for the worst and learn from Ukraine.

Should war come to northern front, Allies west of Poland would likely reinforce the Nordic-Baltic region, similar to their support of Ukraine. But unless the theater collapses, with large parts of territory taken, it is unlikely that NATO and the EU would engage in an all-out war. If push comes to shove, we are largely on our own, individually and collectively.

As one of Europe’s frontlines, the Nordic-Baltic-Arctic region has a special responsibility, and wartime urgency, to integrate and drive Europe’s defence within and beyond our region, as a coherent and collective one. Regional defence integration must meet the moment and become the blueprint for the rest of Europe. 

What example must we set for those behind the frontlines?

It starts with people: maintaining professional armies, conscripts and reservists, as well as keeping civilians informed and resilient in the face of rising security threats.

It is also about supply chains: Reinforcing Gotland as a hub for NATO control of the Baltic Sea is vital; the island needs to become NATO’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and a hub for resupplying NATO forces in the Baltic states.

The alignment of control and command systems of Joint Force Command Norfolk and Brunssen is also a must.

For the first time in history, EU and NATO key military capability targets align: air & missile defence, anti-drone systems, air-to-air refuelling, electronic warfare, military mobility. It is our duty to fulfil them.

This also means joint procurement and co-leadership of EU defence flagship projects in the scope of EU Readiness 2030 – such as the European Drone Defence Initiative or the European Sky Shield, and deepening defence integration with Ukraine.

The Nordics and Baltics must drive innovation forward. Around 70% of Russians fall to the ground not at the hand of a Ukrainian soldier, but drones and their electronic warfare enablers.

But defence initiatives alone are not sufficient. Given the nature of the adversary that we are dealing with, shaping the Nordic-Baltic-Arctic security environment to our military advantage is a must. To achieve deterrence we, in NATO and the EU, must raise our warfighting readiness.

A higher warfighting readiness means inflicting costs on Russia. We must reinforce Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to target military bases and infrastructure across Russia, especially in and around Moscow. According to Russian-American Professor Yuri Felshtinsky, Russia is a country of one city. Everything is concentrated in Moscow: around 10% of the population is in Moscow, with nearly all the country’s political and financial wealth.

Closer to home, higher warfighting readiness on the northern front means incorporating military forces, capabilities, infrastructure, wartime communications, exercises and a whole-of-society approach – to deter and if necessary defeat our adversaries. Achieving whole-of-society readiness would demonstrate to Moscow that our region’s population has the capability and political will to follow through with war, if Russia chose it.

Balance is key. Since the Nordics straddle both the Baltic and the Arctic, they need to articulate clearly and intentionally their interests in the two geographic spheres. Militarily bridging these two theatres in a coherent manner is perhaps our most important task today.

A delay in articulating objectives in the Arctic means risking being squeezed out by Russia and the United States. For instance, Russia and the U.S. are not preoccupied with climate change and sustainable development – yet they may use the Arctic as a bargaining chip against European arctic states.

In the Baltic, the discussion must shift from reacting to Russian hybrid attacks and repairing damaged infrastructure, to adapting our political and legal culture to wartime realities. This would allow designating hybrid attacks as crimes, with legal accountability, prosecution and even military action, if necessary.

The recent ruling by Helsinki district court on the “Eagle S” is a case in point. The courts concluded that Finland lacks the jurisdiction to prosecute sailors accused of cutting underwater cables in the Baltic Sea. If Finland cannot prosecute, you can forget about succeeding in the rest of Europe.

We should not wait around for a human-made disaster but adapt our political culture and legal processes to keep pace with reality.

As we prepare, the fundamental question we must ask ourselves is this: How is Russia assessing the readiness of the Nordics and Baltics in responding to the war in Ukraine and preparing for a wider war in Europe?

Russia’s own assessment is important. Deterrence is first and foremost about a psychological effect, playing out in the mind of the adversary. We should think about Nordic, Baltic and Arctic security not only as members of the EU and NATO. We must place ourselves in the mind of the aggressor: What would Moscow do?

If there is one thing that we have learned, it’s not to underestimate Russia’s extraordinary capacity to surprise. Those who do not want to defend themselves will happily believe Russian fabrications and narratives to excuse the Kremlin’s actions.

After 11 years of war in Ukraine and hybrid warfare against the EU and NATO, the greatest threat to Nordic and Baltic security is no longer stemming only from a more aggressive Russia and its partnership with China, North Korea and Iran. It is stemming from our inaction, disunity, and lack of political resolve.

Russia will not change – so we must.

The article was originally published by Stockholm Free World Forum here. It is based off remarks given at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Security Conference, held in Stockholm on November 5, 2025.

Maria Martisiute is a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre.

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