Putin still has 12 months left: what the owner of the Kremlin expects in Ukraine in 2024

 

At the end of November-December, major international media almost unanimously wrote about the "deteriorating mood in Kyiv". Here is an example of such an approach. This is primarily an attempt to look at the situation in Ukraine in order to try to forecast its future.

So let's try to look at the year 2024, using not a natural desire to be optimistic about the success of Ukraine, but facts, analysis and a dynamic approach to forecasting. The events of 2024 and the development of the war will depend on five components, which are discussed below.

 

Putin has 12 months left

 

Vladimir Putin has approximately 12 to 13 months of reserve resources - human and material - to maintain the current intensity of hostilities and pressure on Ukraine and Ukrainian cities, villages and towns. The mobilization in September-October 2023 was extremely unpopular in Russia, where Putin, given the need to be "re-elected" for another presidential term in March 2024, is limited in attracting mobilization resources in the largest cities - Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The entire burden of mobilization falls on Russia's poorer regions and ethnic minorities.

Economically, the situation does not look much better. A third of the Russian state budget, which traditionally has huge social obligations, for 2024 is earmarked for the army and armaments. But it is one thing to plan these expenses, and another to finance them with income. Currently, the Kremlin has no plans to raise any additional revenues – beyond those collected this year. The external borrowing market is closed. Russia should increase financing of Belarus by buying Belarusian bonds. The middleman in this business is the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which actually forces Russian banks and investment groups to lend to Alexander Lukashenko's regime.

Putin recently met with 80 oligarchs at his residence in Novo-Ogarjevo, announcing the tax hike. Neither oil and gas earnings, nor income tax, nor value added tax are enough to fill the budget.

 

The Kremlin hopes for the victory of Trump, the right in Europe and China

The Kremlin's plans for 2024 depend on the results of a whole list of important international events scheduled to take place next year. Only if all these results meet Moscow's expectations, it will be able to count on something in terms of international support for its interests. But even that is not something that is guaranteed, but rather unlikely. Here's what Putin is counting on in 2024:

Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential elections. It is far from certain that Trump, even in case of victory, will in some way ease the situation for Putin and Russia. No American analysis shows an increase in pro-Russian sentiment, let alone sympathy for Putin. In 2016, Trump managed to win, because the American agenda was dominated by economic issues, and Trump promised tax reform, new jobs for American citizens and investments in infrastructure. It is not 2016, and therefore it is not very realistic to believe that Americans will want to find themselves in the current difficult international situation that Trump is leading with his disregard for the advice of professional diplomats, experts and his unpopularity among US military personnel.

More mandates for representatives of right-wing radical parties in the elections for the European Parliament in 2024. Putin's calculation is that right-wing radicals will start telling Europeans about the fatigue of Ukrainian refugees and the need to spend European taxpayers' money to support Ukraine. However, it is not so much about Ukrainian refugees as about Ukraine's entry into the EU, where Europe shows that it is not only ready to accept Ukrainian citizens on its territory, but is ready to have a common labor market with Ukraine, despite all the risks. And if we talk about money for Ukraine, while Brussels promises Ukraine 50 billion euros, Italy receives a program of 194 billion euros to fight the consequences of the corona virus pandemic. And at the expense of taxpayers outside Italy.

From 2022, the Russian press promises Russian society about China's military, diplomatic and economic support. On the pages of Russian newspapers, Russia's friendship with China is experiencing an unprecedented boom. News of new Chinese weapons developments appear every week in the Russian news space - reports of "the best drone in the world", "the longest-range drone" - and for good reason. But unlike Russia, China's ties to the global economy are much deeper. The Chinese economy simply will not be able to survive sanctions - such as those of Russia, because it is structurally much more integrated into the international market. If China supports Russia, the stock markets in Hong Kong and Shanghai will crash the very next day - and the Chinese leadership understands this very well. It is absurd to talk about Chinese or North Korean soldiers joining the Russian army.

 

Cementing Putin's regime

 

Like Joseph Stalin, Putin is paranoid. Any major problem that may arise in 2024 will only exacerbate this paranoid state and prevent Putin from making at least some effective decisions. The breakthrough of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the front line, the deep internal economic crisis in Russia (unemployment, inflation, mass bankruptcies), any manifestations of dissent within the Russian political class, any protest potential, even if quiet, in Putin's eyes are the beginning of his end.

He will have to focus on consolidating the regime - and even his goals in the war against Ukraine will be put on the back burner. It will become even more embarrassing for Putin, both for his entourage in the Kremlin and for the generals and his army. In his eyes, they already look like losers who have not coped with the "magnitude of the SVO mission". Russian oligarchs are already afraid of Putin ahead of next year's budget meetings, but Putinism has always stood with one foot precisely on the support of the oligarchs, who cemented the stability of the economy. At the same time, Putin has nowhere to complain, there is no appellate body or system of checks and balances in Russia.

 

Hopes for destabilization in Ukraine

 

Vladimir Putin is seriously counting on internal destabilization in Ukraine, when Ukrainians begin to be disappointed in the actions of the country's military-political leadership, in economic realities, and begin to publicly demonstrate fatigue from war, from daily explosions and the need to serve in the Armed Forces. Putin deliberately dragged the war into a situation where Ukraine had to carry out additional mobilization, which Russia itself had already carried out in the fall of this year. The calculation is logical: the Russian population is more numerous, and therefore longer able to fill the ranks of the army. It is obvious that the Kremlin will use all methods of propaganda and information special operations to increase pessimistic feelings in Ukraine. For that, bloggers from social networks can and will be involved, because, unfortunately, there are no information filtering methods in Ukraine yet.

First, the satisfactory state of the Ukrainian economy is guaranteed at a serious level by international partners - the EU, the G7 and the United States. This does not mean that it will be easy, but the Government will be able to meet all its financial obligations. There will certainly be enough funds for security and defense. Secondly, to put it bluntly, at the moment our strength is the not very developed level of the Ukrainian economy - Ukraine is not used to a rich life, so it is not so difficult for millions of citizens to survive another year of economic trials in wartime.

The credit level of the population is low, the banking system works stably, pensions are paid, the internet and communication work, there is still energy, and food in retail chains. This is enough to survive at least another year of war without unnecessary complaints and someone's attempts to organize a conditional "protest of the poor". A year that will be much more difficult for Russia to survive.

 

Third, Ukraine is a politically mature country. Everything Putin wants to cause internal destabilization and frustration in Ukraine is called the growing political demand for a quick victory. And that's normal. It's normal to want to win sooner rather than later. Ukrainian society formed this demand - and the military-political leadership will satisfy it. Although there is no talk of any elections yet, in the future there will surely be that popular politician who will say for electoral purposes: "I would rather win this war". Therefore, the desire of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to work with shorter deadlines than pessimistic forecasts suggest should not be underestimated.

 

About negotiations and diplomacy

 

We hardly have any reason to talk about the readiness of Ukraine and Russia to conduct any peace negotiations, but we should prepare for the fact that diplomacy will play a much bigger role in our war in 2024. Having a bloody massacre in the very heart of Europe, and not even trying to achieve something at the level of diplomacy - something like that does not enter the brains of either European or American politicians.

If before the war, Putin seemed to the West as a leader who really had an influence on the post-Soviet region, now he looks a bit like Muammar Gaddafi - a very specific dictator who interferes in everything, does not inspire confidence in anyone, but no one knows for sure how he bring the end closer. We have an interesting memory of William Burns, the current head of the CIA, in his book "The Return Channel." When Burns visited Gaddafi in his tent in the Libyan desert on the eve of the Libyan civil war that killed Gaddafi, he was already in a very strange phase where he considered himself the most powerful politician in Africa and the Middle East. Accordingly, Gaddafi expected to be treated accordingly and gave Burns a two-hour lecture in which he detailed his view of all major events in the region, sincerely believing that it would be of interest to someone. But the fact is that Gaddafi's thoughts about Israel, Palestine, Egypt or Saudi Arabia no longer interested anyone. The same is happening now with Putin. He genuinely thinks his position is important on the international stage, but no one cares about his vision, comments, or even threats. And just as none of the big names in international politics wanted to meet with Gaddafi, no one now has a burning desire to talk to Putin.

Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan can take on the role of mediator in an attempt to reach at least some agreements - he has already offered his services several times. Finnish President Sauli Niinisto has the experience of talking to Putin. Besides them, there are also politicians who are not burdened with the responsibility of official positions - for example, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former US National Security

Adviser John Bolton, former US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Or someone else. In theory, they could offer Putin a classic carrot-and-stick approach – a long-term plan to get out of the pressure of sanctions in response to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Maybe gradually. It should be expected that in the process of these negotiations, the idea of introducing a UN peacekeeping contingent to the demarcation line will come up again.

In this case, Putin will be able to tell the Russians that he "destroyed the most radical Nazi elements in Ukraine, achieving the objectives of the SVO and demonstrating Russia's military power." The forms of diplomacy around our war in 2024 may be different, but they will certainly be - and we should get used to the fact that it will not be possible to reject them.

 

*****

 

These five theses show how we can imagine the events of 2024. For now, in the coming weeks and months, Putin has a rather pragmatic goal of showing that the Russian military is capable of fighting NATO weapons - he needs that for the future, however he does it. he imagines. Putin doesn't really have a Plan B, or even a Plan A – he can simply continue down the same path he's on now.

It is very important to remember that the February 2022 invasion occurred after the authorities of President Zelensky announced the intention of large-scale construction in Donbass and southern Ukraine - a large modern hospital in Kramatorsk, an airport and a technological university in Mariupol, the renovation of the Kherson seaport and the development of the airport in Kherson, which already started receiving international flights before the war. Putin could not allow the quality of life in Ukraine and the territories to which he brought the "Russian world" to be dramatically different.

Now we see that Russia can give the occupied territories nothing in the way of investment, jobs or prospects - only prisons, arrests, robberies, Russian passports and military service. The only argument Russia could theoretically have in international discussions is the argument about a better quality of life in the occupied territories than in the territories controlled by Ukraine. But it is absurd to even talk about it.

Before the war in Ukraine, the book "Why Nations Fail" by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson was popular. The conclusion in this book, which is based on the analysis of hundreds of years of development of various countries, was quite simple: countries with a deficit of freedom will surely fall into the abyss. There is no historical example of a totalitarian state becoming successful. Lack of freedom has programmed Russia to fail – and 2024 could be a chapter in the book of why another unfree nation has fallen.