Mobilization, children of Donbas and a lot of Putin. What was spread by Russian propaganda in the occupied territories of Ukraine in 2024.
Russian aggression against Ukraine has been going on for more than a decade. The main weapon of the Russians, along with grenades, missiles and drones, remains propaganda. Like a real weapon, it changes depending on the conditions, improves with experience and is used according to a certain strategy. This strategy in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) of Ukraine during 2024 was monitored monthly by the School of Political Analysis of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences.
Monitoring local occupation Telegram channels revealed five main theses, most often promoted by the Russians through their resources, designed to distort reality for residents of the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine.
Propaganda thesis no. 1: Mobilization into the Armed Forces is a one-way ticket
Telegram channels in the occupied territories of Ukraine paid the most attention to the mobilization in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the year, it has been recorded as one of the main topics during the eight-month monitoring. Local sources regularly described cases of "criminal capture of people on the streets of Ukraine", demonized territorial centers for recruitment and social support, using the method of "framing" - only selective publication of content necessary to create an image necessary for propagandists, such as adding direct calls to active opposition to mobilization.
The main goal is to intimidate people and undermine the authority of the Defense Forces of Ukraine among the residents of TOT. In addition, such publications are part of Russia's long-term information campaign to undermine the ability of the Ukrainian people to defend themselves. In contrast, the Russian army is presented as a collection of highly paid volunteers. In this way, the aggressor tries to motivate the inhabitants of the occupied territories of Ukraine to join the occupying army in order to wage war against their country.
Propaganda thesis #2: Vladimir Putin is a strong leader
The Russian dictator is the main character of local propaganda. Its mention was regular and divided into two types: event and image. The main event of the year that was directly related to Putin in 2024 is the election of the president of the Russian Federation, which was illegally held in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
In January and February, Telegram channels actively campaigned to participate in these pseudo-elections and vote for the current occupation government. In March, resources solemnly reported on Putin's victory, in May they rejoiced at his inauguration, and in October they congratulated him on his birthday. In the intervals between the election "fever", Telegram channels created a positive image of the dictator by regularly quoting his selected statements, as well as by advertising the activities of the occupying public organization "Putin's Team", which held public events in the settlements of temporarily occupied communities or covered the implementation of infrastructure repairs in these territories Accordingly, the name of the Russian president is constantly presented in a positive light.
Propaganda thesis no. 3: Armed forces of Ukraine fire on civilians
The news about the shelling of occupied settlements by the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been a traditional topic of Russian propaganda since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine in 2014. This year, too, it had the usual character, and the emphasis on this issue was especially intensified in the spring. Accusations of shelling and civilian deaths were constantly followed by the labels "Nazi" and "terrorist" using the classic method of mirroring for the Russians, i.e. accusing the enemy of their own actions. The main goal remains the same - to incite hatred against Ukraine and its army that is defending itself against the Russian invasion.
Propaganda thesis no. 4: The Russian Federation restores temporarily occupied territories
This year, not only representatives of "Putin's team", but also of certain Russian regions, which took the occupied regions of Kherson Oblast, Zaporozhye, Luhansk Oblast and Donetsk Oblast "under their wing", promoted repairs and restoration of the infrastructure of cities and settlements in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Their investment in the repairs and restoration of the destroyed, including the Russians themselves, is maximally highlighted in order to portray the Russian Federation not as an occupier, but as a country that cares for its citizens.
Propaganda thesis no. 5: "new regions" ever closer to Russia
The positive image of Russia on Telegram channels was also created with the help of the often repeated message about the "integration of new regions". Most often, this referred to the transfer of education in schools to the Russian system, the introduction of Russian norms in the tax or medical sphere, public observance of Russian public holidays. For example, Russia Day, Flag Day, and even the recently named July Day of Remembrance of the Children of Donbass, which was widely "celebrated" in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The main task of such news is to convince the entire population of the occupied territories of Ukraine of the irreversibility of the occupation by the Russian Federation and to maintain such an informative background that would force citizens to get used to the new order as soon as possible.
Additionally. Reaction to events
The work of Russian propaganda usually takes place according to certain methods with sets of messages and the agenda of the Telegram channel on confirmation of the extent of the occupied territories of Ukraine. This was especially evident in March 2024, when there was a shooting at the Crocus Hall center in Moscow. All Telegram channels, and even the local news of the city of Tokmak, reported in detail on the course of events, and then on the reaction of the Russian authorities.
After that, in August 2024, the information chaos in the first days of the operation of the Armed Forces in the Kursk region was synchronized with the Russian federal media. It was only after some time that recommendations regarding public behavior appeared, and, for example, the channels of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions began to sympathize with the Kursk region, because, they say, "since 2014, they know what Ukrainian crimes are."
Therefore, we state that Russian propaganda in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine continues to perform two main functions. The first is to demonize Ukraine, its government and army and to sow despair among the
residents of the central and eastern territories of Ukraine regarding the possibility of returning the blue and yellow flag to their towns and villages. The second is to improve the relationship with the Russian Federation as much as possible and for the inhabitants of the occupied territories to adapt to the new Russian rules of life. For Ukraine, it carries the threat of losing those citizens who succumb to Russian propaganda, who hate their country and renounce their own identification as Ukrainians.