Mapping Russia’s War Machine on NATO’s Doorstep

Based on high-resolution satellite images, a regional investigation maps developments in Russia’s military bases bordering Poland and the Baltic countries. While Russian GRU special forces in Kaliningrad are trained for sabotage attacks, a new nuclear threat is building up in Belarus.

Just an hour and a half by car from the Grzechotki border crossing (Poland) lies Parusnoye village (known in Lithuanian as Gaudikai). A specialized Russian GRU intelligence unit is stationed here, only a few kilometers from the naval base in Baltiysk. The unit trains saboteurs before dispatching them to conduct attacks on Poland and the Baltic states.

According to security and military sources, interviewed by LRT, up to 120 military personnel work at this base, including support staff. These are commandos, experts in underwater, maritime, land, and airborne operations. When the Nord Stream pipelines exploded at the bottom of the Baltic Sea in September 2022, divers from Parusnoye were initially suspected as being behind it (it’s now known that the trail leads to divers from Ukraine).

Men—and only men—are selected from the ranks of contract soldiers and so-called active reserves (excluding conscripts) to join the special unit in Parusnoye. Requirements? According to LRT’s sources, minimum height of 172 cm (roughly 5’6 feet), no phobias (e.g., claustrophobia), and exceptional physical fitness. Knowledge of foreign languages is considered an additional asset.

Satellite images of the Parusnoye area reveal significant investments in the base over the past decade. These include the construction of a new training building; a helipad; and an underwater training pool illuminated at night. According to sources familiar with the Russian military investments, interviewed by our Lithuanian partners at LRT, divers are also training in the Curonian Lagoon. They also have training sites in the Russian part of the Curonian Spit, in the towns of Lesnoy (Šarkuva), Rybachy (Rasytės), and also close to the Lithuanian border in Morskoye.

Fire, Fear and Sabotage

In early 2024, Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) detained Sergei S., and in doing so prevented a planned attack on a large chemical plant (Dekoral Center) in Wrocław. Sergei had received instructions for the arson attack on Telegram from a mysterious contact named Aleksei. According to case files described by Gazeta Wyborcza, Sergei’s phone was registered in Kaliningrad before arriving in Lower Silesia (and even in the U.S.); however, he denies ever being in Kaliningrad.

Despite this, Sergei admits that Russian services were behind his operation. In October, in response to this case, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski announced the closure of the Russian consulate in Poznań. “We have seen similar arson cases across Europe, and we are aware of Russia’s plans for further attacks,” the minister said.

According to a European intelligence source, NATO has obtained intelligence of Russian plans targeting critical and civilian infrastructure—including in Poland. Experts suggest these attacks are designed to pressure the West into restricting Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets.

Could the trail of saboteurs setting Europe ablaze lead back to Parusnoye? Our sources within Polish government services and Lithuanian intelligence neither confirm nor deny this connection: “It cannot be ruled out that Russian intelligence and security services based in Kaliningrad are involved in planning and executing attacks in the region,” Lithuanian intelligence said in response to our request for comment.

Lithuania: They’ve Been Here Before

In 2016, Artūras Paulauskas, then head of Lithuania’s Parliamentary National Security and Defense Committee, sounded the alarm. Just two years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and amid the ongoing war in Donbas, Paulauskas disclosed in a high-profile interview that Russian saboteurs had possibly crossed the Lithuanian border near a Juodkrantė resort the previous year as part of exercises. Prior intelligence reports from Lithuanian agencies had already warned of Russian infiltration.

Paulauskas explained, “I wanted to make it clear to the other side that we are aware of their actions—that we are not asleep… I emphasized to everyone that the era of détente was over, that we had to strengthen our intelligence and defense, and invest more money in this.”

Sources familiar with the investigation told LRT that, in 2015, saboteurs from Russia’s 561st Naval Reconnaissance Station (later renamed the 390th) might have landed in Juodkrantė. This region includes the port at Klaipėda and strategic sites along the Baltic coast, which are vital to NATO operations—and to Russian intelligence and sabotage efforts. 

Klaipėda’s strategic location makes it indispensable for NATO’s supply chains, for Baltic operations, and for regional defense in the Baltic Sea. Klaipėda is an ice-free port, operational all year round, handling bulk cargo, energy resources and military equipment. Palanga Airport is also nearby.

GRU unit members are trained to operate on foreign territory, identifying key locations for sabotage and monitoring NATO logistics and supply chains. This marine special ops team from Parusnoye is, theoretically, capable of infiltrating Lithuanian territory and, for instance, destroying port infrastructure. 

How? By using medium-sized submarines such as the Piranha or diving transports, the 390th unit is able to carry out clandestine landings on the outskirts of the harbor, neutralize security forces and take control of key areas in readiness for larger-scale operations. The unit can combine cyber warfare with physical attacks, disrupting port operational systems while conducting covert sabotage operations to delay or weaken NATO capabilities.

“If we are talking and preparing for day X when Russia decides to attack NATO, then this subversive group will have done its job by day X,” says one of LRT’s sources who assisted the investigation into Russian sabotage activity.

The Russian saboteurs’ training plan, as described by LRT’s intelligence source, drawn up in 2015 at the very time of the alleged Juodkrantė landing, specifies that the reconnaissance/diversion group is to concentrate first on the Lithuanian border. The document instructs the saboteurs to cross the Lithuanian border undetected within 10 to 12 days; to then cross through Lithuanian territory equally undetected; and then to concentrate at a certain location on the Baltic coast and set up an observation post.

The GRU unit from Parusnoye is considered by experts to be one of Russia’s most dangerous units near NATO’s borders.