From the eternal waiting room to multiple speeds

Due to significant geopolitical and economic upheavals, including the increasingly malicious policies of the United States and the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare, the European Union is initiating a transformation of its own enlargement model, as well as a redefinition of the very concept of European integration. The previous approach was based on a linear logic, according to which a candidate country undergoes a lengthy process of reforms, opens and closes negotiation chapters, harmonises domestic legislation with European practices and awaits a consensus of member states, in order to achieve full membership in the final phase. It is clear to everyone that this Godovian model no longer works in an era when the average person's attention span has shrunk so much that something said last year is already perceived as a distant past.

The irreparable problem of the current model is recognized when the described process lasts long enough that the very prospect of membership loses the capacity to maintain the political momentum of the necessary reforms. Therefore, Brussels is currently considering a fundamentally different approach, according to which the candidate country would not be conditioned by the completion of the entire negotiations in order to become part of certain European economic and institutional structures, which, of course, provides certain privileges. Access to parts of the single market, research programs and industrial cooperation could be enabled even before achieving full membership, while clearer roadmaps would be defined for the most advanced candidates, with a precisely determined sequence of reforms, concrete stages of the process and indicative deadlines for their completion.

A NEW PHASE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

At the same time, the European Union is forced to transform its own decision-making rules in order to enable the admission of a larger number of countries without the additional risk of institutional blockage. In this way, both the enlargement policy and the internal architecture of the Union itself are changing simultaneously. This is the essence of the new phase of European policy: enlargement is no longer a purely administrative procedure at the end of which the doors to full membership open, but it is becoming an instrument for the successive inclusion of countries in the European economic area. In this, membership remains the ultimate goal, but the period spent in the accession process is used for concrete integration, thus eliminating the risk of the entire process going into a tailspin.

The most obvious evidence of this transformation can be seen outside the immediate European neighbourhood, that is, the continent itself. The European Union and Canada already implement the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, but both sides are currently pursuing a much broader concept of bilateral relations through the so-called “Alliance for the Future”. This format is designed to encompass economic security and advanced industrial production, as well as the development of clean and quantum technologies, as well as cooperation in the field of the defence industry, artificial intelligence and strategically important raw materials. At the same time, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has put forward a proposal according to which Canada could become the first “associate member” of the EU. Since such a status does not legally exist in the current founding acts of the Union, this is an initiative to introduce a whole new form of institutional relations. Even if the future close relations between Canada and Europe are not defined by the given phrase, it is clear that new models of the Union’s enlargement are on the horizon. Canada thus becomes the first concrete example that the European space can function through different levels of integration, where full membership is not the only way to establish deep political and economic ties.

The candidate countries should be offered tangible benefits during the negotiations themselves. The idea is that the accession period should not represent an administrative vacuum, but a phase of gradual integration into continental economic flows. Earlier inclusion, according to the plan, should open up new opportunities for economic entities, strengthen supply chains and reduce dependence on external markets. Therefore, the common economic area has been set as a priority for economic convergence, while the opening of individual areas will directly depend on the country's ability to implement the adopted rules and meet security criteria. In this regard, special focus is placed on strategically sensitive sectors, from the semiconductor industry and biotechnology to the space program.

Enlargement is no longer an administrative procedure at the end of which the doors to full membership open, but rather becomes an instrument for the successive inclusion of countries in the European economic area.

This model is also characterized by the principle of reversibility, according to which the benefits achieved are not permanent. Accordingly, a candidate country that deviates from its commitments risks losing access to certain programs or market segments. When evaluating cooperation in sensitive sectors, foreign policy coherence, control of foreign investments and exports, the implementation of restrictive measures, as well as the protection of advanced technologies are taken into account. The new strategy, therefore, conditions progress more directly on measurable results. Instead of a long-term promise of full membership and the benefits that will follow, candidates are offered concrete advantages during the process itself, which can be revoked in the event of deviation from the defined European course. This mechanism represents an important lesson learned from the example of Hungary, where a full member of the Union recorded a democratic setback and entered into direct cooperation with Russia, Europe's geopolitical rival.

ACCELERATION FOR THE MOST ADVANCED

For Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova and Albania, specific strategic plans were taken into account, which would unambiguously define the order of reforms and the indicative deadlines for the completion of individual stages for the candidates who are at the forefront of the integration process. The aforementioned plans were designed to contain time frames for the closure of negotiation clusters, but also to create obligations for the member states in terms of supporting the progress made. In this way, predictability of the next steps in the process is ensured. When it comes to Ukraine and Moldova, this transformation has additional weight due to the current political moment. After the Russian invasion in 2022, the enlargement to the east ceased to be solely a matter of administrative coordination, but was positioned as a key element of a broader geopolitical strategy with the aim of preventing the creation of a security-unstable zone between the European Union and an expansive Russia.

However, the new logic of eastward enlargement cannot be fully applied to the Western Balkans. In our region, ever since the end of the military conflicts of the 1990s, European integration has had a different function. Approaching the European Union framework was supposed to be accompanied by the improvement of bilateral relations, regional cooperation and the gradual resolution of political disputes arising from the wars. Two decades later, only Croatia and Slovenia achieved membership, while the others were stalled by both the lack of reforms in the region itself and internal stalemates within the Union. Enlargement was repositioned as a priority only after 2022, this time under the influence of new geopolitical circumstances, although old regional problems have not been eliminated. Serbia, of course, remained at the back of the aforementioned changes, that is, it once again missed the proverbial train, which, to tell the truth, it is not waiting for with sincere enthusiasm.

This is where the biggest test of the new policy begins. It is logical that the EU wants to show that the enlargement process can produce results and that the most advanced candidates cannot remain indefinitely without a clear perspective, so Montenegro and Albania have a more realistic opportunity to accelerate the process that concerns them. This provides a clearer path for the most advanced candidates, but it raises the question of what happens to those who face more complex obstacles: Bosnia and Herzegovina is dysfunctional to the extent that it can hardly be called a state, Macedonia is entangled with Bulgaria in a traditional Balkan struggle over the interpretation of historical figures, and Serbia is persistently trying to earn the label of “Little Russians” in the Balkans. For bad students and eternal scoundrels, there will be neither full nor half-full membership; the glass will remain, as expected, empty.

MULTI-SPEED MODEL

The transformation of enlargement policy cannot be carried out without reforming the European Union itself, since the admission of a larger number of members would exacerbate the current problem of unanimity in strategic areas. For this reason, a wider application of qualified majority voting is being considered through so-called passerelle clauses, which allow for a transition from unanimity to qualified majority in certain areas, while unanimity would be retained only for key strategic issues. In parallel with these changes, in the event of a setback in terms of democratic and judicial standards, as well as collusion with Europe's rivals, increased monitoring, financial sanctions and the suspension of voting rights in the Council of the European Union are envisaged.

The key point of the entire model is that membership remains the ultimate goal, but no longer serves as the only moment in which a candidate becomes part of the European system. For the Western Balkans, this brings new opportunities, but also a new kind of pressure, since it is no longer enough to simply repeat that membership is a strategic goal. The assessment will be continuous, and slaps will follow each insufficient response. Europe thus ceases to be a waiting room and moves to a multi-speed model, and it is up to us to decide whether we will, like Montenegro, throw in the towel or argue about various referendums on negotiations and swear allegiance to Russia.