What awaits Wagner, Prigozhin, Lukashenko
Several lines about Prigozhin's mutiny are worth keeping an eye on.
Putin's speech was the most vague and weak in the history of his presidency. No decisions were voiced. That means the system remains the same. Changes in the power bloc will not be immediate but a little later. Putin was afraid to make substantive personnel changes.
The situation worsened after a meeting with the security forces, about which the Kremlin had nothing to say. Instead of motivational footage, the population was shown the confusion within the security bloc.
The blame for the event is primarily attributed to Prigozhin himself. No surnames, not even from his inner circle, were mentioned. In other words, there will be an attempt to leave the Wagner PMC units on the front line, reassigning them to the Ministry of Defense. The question is only about the format. After all, part of the PMC signed a "contract between a volunteer unit and the Ministry of Defense." That is, maintaining their integrity and legalizing payment for services from Shoigu. In this case, the announced "personal" contracts are a desire, at least partially, to "spread out" the remnants among other units. But, most likely, part of the units will remain.
Shoigu retains his position but receives confirmation of his meager authority in the army, which has already manifested itself in demonstrations of disloyalty by separate units. Now, after the incorporation of the Wagner PMC, he will receive additional "agitators." This is especially true if the main format will be the "personal contracts" of militants with the Ministry of Defense, without preserving the integrity of their units.
Prigorzin's speech shows that this politician remains in the public view. In addition, the first comment, "and that's all," "Russia is kaput," began to be dispersed by Prigorzin's TG channels after Putin's speech. Then the others picked it up. That is, we have a demonstration of influence on the media space.
In the morning, Prigorzin’s two aircraft landed in Machulishi. Again, his personal business jets. The information that some Telegram channels tried to disperse about the procession of PMC columns to the territory of Belarus is also not yet confirmed.
Lukashenko paused in his address and waited for a public expression of gratitude from Putin. This is extremely important for him, as the Kremlin's policy towards neighboring states was built on the premise that neighbors (both as states and as politicians) are "obliged" to Russia - economically, diplomatically, and militarily.
For the first time in the last 30 years, the situation is entirely opposite - Putin is indebted to Lukashenko.
More precisely, considering the public "gratitude" for resolving the Russian crisis, Russia owes Lukashenko a favor. Partially, this has already been played out in fixing gas prices until 2031. Most likely, Lukashenko will receive some assurances of Russia's non-involvement in the electoral campaign that has started (parliamentary and local elections). But the comrade from Minsk will need more. The situation (especially the expectation of "what he will say") allows for playing on the contrast with the behavior of the Russian elites.
The plans for the future
1. Prigozhin and the Russian elites.
The critical question, which currently has no answer, is Prigozhin's African assets. Even when it comes to securing the assets of Rosneft and Gazprom, no one has replaced the Wagnerites yet. Lukom-Aleksperivskaya private military company has strengthened since 2022, but it is only enough for Lukoil's assets.
At this stage, Prigozhin likely maintains control over the aforementioned part of the Wagner PMC. He will probably retain it because the Kremlin simply has no one to replace the mercenaries in Africa. A formal replacement of the "coordinator" is unlikely since no single command exists throughout the continent (the tasks are different). And even the appointment of several new people does not solve the issue of Prigozhin's personnel loyalty.
However, it can be assumed that by the end of 2023, thanks to Russian companies' expansion of security services and the strengthening of private military companies created by them, Prigozhin's fighters will begin to be replaced, at least in the protection of the oil and gas industry.
From another perspective, Prigozhin maintains connections with the Russian military elite and some of the "Kremlin's towers." There has been no clear hostile position taken by either the "Rosneft-Lukoil" group (Sechin) or the "Russia" bank group (Kovalchuk). Not a word has been said about high-ranking officers who served in the PMC "Wagner." In other words, they may retain their positions and influence.
2. PMC "Wagner" in Ukraine.
It can already be understood that PMC "Wagner" ceases to exist as it once did. At the very least, it is divided into two parts - the "African" and the "Ukrainian" (those who fought in Ukraine). Moreover, each piece will further splinter. For Prigozhin, it is essential to create several autonomous structures (easier to maintain control), and for Shoigu, it is crucial to disintegrate the "Ukrainian" Wagnerites
Part of the "Ukrainian contingent" will be distributed among other units. Some networks are likely to be sent for disposal—thrown into battle on the most dangerous parts of the front. Repression is quite possible for some commanders. The question is only in terms of quantity. A quick wave of repression, theoretically, can demonstrate determination and punishment. In other words, to instill fear. But in the conditions of the low authority of the army leadership, it looks risky. Therefore, it is quite possible that punitive measures will be applied after partial personnel changes.
3. Personnel in the power bloc.
There will be no immediate personnel purges—Putin does not want to demonstrate concessions to Prigozhin's demands. But new appointments are quite possible after a month or a month and a half.
4. Media and new media.
The Kremlin is trying to intensify its work with new media owners. It is enough to mention Putin's meeting with owners of telegram channels ("war correspondents" and others whose work is about Ukraine). This task becomes even more relevant, as Prigozhin's media group "Patriot" is unlikely to be reliably loyal. The Kremlin needs control over this segment of the information field
5. PMC Wagner, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko
It is doubtful that Lukashenko would agree to accept the detachments of PMC Wagner. It goes against his policy of maintaining maximum control over the security bloc. The "Wagnerites" may be allies, but it is challenging to bring them under control. Therefore, the likelihood of "training camps" appearing is there, but the possibility of a permanent deployment of even ten thousand is minimal. It will most likely be the maximum format of "Prigozhin + several hundred people." Lukashenko needs people who "have nowhere to retreat." But as individuals, he’d rather they be employees of his security structures. The long existence of a parallel army is doubtful - it will scare PapuKoli too much.
In addition, preserving the publicity of Prigozhin (as a critic of Russian law enforcement) in the future stages will create additional tension in relations with Putin. It is worth noting another interesting aspect - the criminal case regarding the "coup" has not been closed. And the main suspect will stay in Belarus for some time.
Information resources and the experience of Prigozhin's media.
This direction is extremely interesting for Lukashenko in terms of internal political processes. His propagandists have not achieved parity with opposition resources in social networks, video services, and Telegram. Many followers are no longer reliable, especially as seen in subscription statistics (most are from Russia). Lukashenko needs Prigozhin's resources (or consultants) to build his own network. And also to influence the Russian information field.
African Lukashenko's business. In this direction, there is an acute need for security at all stages - the supply of goods and weapons, the safety of contracts, and the extraction of minerals. Prigozhin can provide this.
And finally, an interesting about Russia.
Russia has worked with neighboring countries while relying on several myths. Among the key ones are: The strength of the Russian army (as a possible security guarantor and a threat in case of conflict with Russia); the consolidation of Russian elites, which prevents attempts to destabilize Russia; the Kremlin's constant readiness for quick and harsh steps in response to threats; the strength of the Russian special services both inside and outside of Russia; and the consolidation of Russian society.
The first myth has already been debunked in Ukraine for a year and a half. And here, the crisis with elites, the weakness of special services, the repressive apparatus, and the vulnerability of Russia are demonstrated now. At the same time, Russia's neighbors do not fully realize this fact. But the fact remains - this country can be destabilized with relatively few resources. And finally, the issue of Russian society. The Kremlin’s thesis of "the tsar is good - the boyars are bad" as a pitch to broader society works well in relatively peaceful times. But in the case of a "revolt against the boyar" accompanied by "the silence of the tsar," society is ready to support the "rebels." This is not about revolution but rather a Russian uprising, a senseless and ruthless rebellion. That is the most apparent possibility for destabilizing the situation in Russia.