Ukraine Needs European Forces Immediately
The continent’s leaders must act decisively to prevent a bad peace that could undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, embolden Russia and menace NATO allies.
By engaging in direct negotiations with Moscow, openly criticizing Ukraine, and protecting Russia at the United Nations, the US is sidelining its European allies. How to respond? By immediately deploying forces to Ukraine to ensure its security and shift the balance of peace negotiations, even without a US military backup.
Past Western hesitation and division has emboldened Russia, with strategic dithering focused on avoiding escalation rather than securing Ukraine’s future. Europe must now match its rhetoric with action by mobilizing forces, enhancing military readiness, and ensuring sustained investment in weapons and munitions.
US Vice President JD Vance’s criticism of Europe at the Munich Security Conference and subsequent administration comments, have heightened concerns about Washington’s future commitment to collective security and further emphasized the need for Europe to go it alone.
If European leaders fail to act, the Trump administration’s negotiations with Moscow could compromise Ukrainian sovereignty and the long-term security of Europe.
Early last year, French President Macron’s proposal to send European forces to Ukraine was met with resistance from key European nations, particularly Germany. However, the Trump administration’s diplomatic approach has shifted European perceptions and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s declaration of readiness to send troops as a so-called reassurance force has highlighted the urgency of the situation.
Some European leaders, including Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, are deeply hesitant about the idea, but nations unwilling to send combat forces are prepared to offer logistical and political support.
Most of Europe has helped train Ukrainian forces through the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) and UK-led initiatives, strengthening their ability to resist Russian aggression. More than 73,000 Ukrainian troops have received training from EUMAM, and 51,000 with the British, but training alone is insufficient.
And talk of deploying a 30,000-strong, European-led multinational peacekeeping force to Ukraine to maintain the stability of any ceasefire agreement isn’t enough. Europe must act in Ukraine, with or without American support.
As European leaders discuss military commitments, the Trump administration’s February negotiations in Saudi Arabia underscore the need for the continent to urgently assert its role in ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.
Moscow has repeatedly violated past agreements, such as Minsk I and II, and the West has failed to protect the security of Ukraine. Both sides reneged on the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which gave security guarantees from Russia and the West in exchange for Kyiv giving up its strategic bombers and nuclear weapons.
A robust European military presence is essential to enforce any new ceasefire, and it must be equipped with air, land, and maritime capabilities, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, along with strong electronic warfare defenses. Several of these capabilities would normally be provided by the US, however given current circumstances, Europe must be prepared to generate these resources as they can no longer be totally reliant on US support against Russia.
While the US has ruled out deploying troops, Washington might provide some but not all the backup that Europe seeks. France and the UK in particular, would be best placed to assemble a “reassurance force” in the form of an Enhanced Stabilization Force in Ukraine (ESF-U).
Clear rules of engagement would be important to a successful deployment to bypass differences between nations. While a NATO officer was joking when he said German forces in the Baltics would “have to drive back to Berlin to ask permission” before resisting a Russian invasion, it reflected variations in approach that could be avoided by pre-agreed rules.
Lessons from past failures, such as the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, also highlight the dangers of under-equipped and under-resourced peacekeeping forces.
A potential ESF-U should include five armored and mechanized combat brigades, backed by squadrons of attack helicopters, transport aircraft, and fighter jets. This force would serve as a deterrent and support Ukrainian troops along a demilitarized contact line, minimizing direct Russian provocations while signaling European willingness to take on the burdens of defending Europe, with or without America.
The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is the most viable framework. Consisting of 10 European nations, it could respond swiftly to crises without requiring a NATO-badged direct engagement.
The EU should also mobilize forces to provide logistics, intelligence, and combat support. Extending EUMAM into Ukraine would mark a crucial step to ensuring Europe’s strategic autonomy and speed up training timelines. Given American reluctance to send ground forces, Washington could still contribute with ISR capabilities.
The ESF-U would not be expected to protect the entire 1,200km (750 mile) contact line, and Ukraine would need to ensure enough personnel were available to deter Russian probing activities, with the option of calling in ESF-U support. Within this framework, most of the contact line might become a demilitarized zone, like the one between North and South Korea, with outposts, sensors, mines, and observers across the entire front to limit the escalation of hostilities.
A European-led no-fly or air-policing zone over key Ukrainian territories would further deter Russian aerial attacks. Enforced by European airpower — including F-35s, Typhoons, and Gripens — this would protect Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. An integrated air defense system, incorporating US-made Patriot and Franco-German SAMP/T systems, long-range radar, and counter-drone technology, would ensure comprehensive protection against Russian missile and drone strikes.
Failure to act would embolden Russia and destabilize Europe’s security landscape. The Helsinki Commission has recorded nearly 150 Russian hybrid attacks on European infrastructure since 2022, illustrating the persistent threat.
Deploying Western forces to Ukraine is not merely a symbolic gesture — it is a strategic necessity. If the US no longer upholds the international order, Britain and its European allies must lead the effort to save Ukraine and whatever will be left of the post-war rules-based system.
The alternative is a return to 19th century great power politics, where European security is dictated by the balancing of powerful states, nationalism, heavily armed powers, and a scramble to secure resources.
To bolster the effectiveness of the ESF-U, European nations should integrate additional measures, such as reinforced military aid packages, defensive alliances, and hybrid warfare deterrents.
Establishing cyber defense networks and increasing intelligence-sharing will also be vital to countering Russian disinformation campaigns, while long-term commitments to military-industrial cooperation will ensure sustainable force readiness.
European leaders must also push for Ukraine’s NATO integration or, at a minimum, EU membership, to provide security guarantees under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union. While this article is considered weak, Brussels could toughen the language to give Ukraine an almost-sufficient security guarantee.
Decisive action in Ukraine will not only safeguard Europe’s sovereignty but also reaffirm the West’s commitment to deterring aggression. The deployment of Western forces would set a precedent for future European-led security operations.
As Ukraine fights for its survival, European leaders must ensure they are not merely spectators but active participants in shaping the security of their region. Without immediate and sustained military commitments, the very foundations of Europe are at risk. The time for debate has passed — Europe must act.
Ben Hodges is Senior Advisor to Human Rights First, a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in New York, Washington DC, and Los Angeles. Prior to joining Human Rights First, he held the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
G. Alexander (Alex) Crowther, PhD, is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He has published in a variety of formats and locations since 2005, mainly on cyber and European security issues.
Lieutenant Colonel Jahara ‘Franky’ Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the US Naval War College, fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, and fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy. He has published two books and over one-hundred articles on strategy and warfare.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.