23.11.2023.

Ukraine in two years. Three scenarios of the development of events in and around the war

Analyst Valeri Pekar describes three possible scenarios for Ukraine's near future. He sees victory among them - but says that, given all the circumstances, it will be very difficult to achieve...
 
It is necessary to understand, at least in general, the possible scenarios of the future. At least this is what companies need to plan their activities. So, the scenarios of the development of events at the moment, in my opinion, look like this. Here we take a time limit of at least two years to account for the consequences of elections in key countries. You won't like everything that follows, but someone has to say it. If you prefer not to know, stop here and read no further.
 
What we know so far:
 
Positional warfare does not lead to significant changes in battle lines. According to military analysts, each side's defensive capability exceeds the other's offensive capability.
The West currently does not consider the scenario of a Russian defeat for itself acceptable, with all the consequences in terms of the quantity and quality of its weapons stockpile.
Putin has chosen a strategy of attrition, in which authoritarian Russia has a better chance than Ukraine, which depends on democratic allies whose positions can change after elections (in which Russia will certainly interfere for that purpose).
From this emerge three main scenarios for Ukraine.
 
1. Continuation of the exhausting war.
 
At worst, things are heading that way for now. A shift in power in the West will lead to a reduction in support to the point that Ukraine will not be able to
continue the war and will be forced to negotiate peace on Russian terms. Even if political support remains at the current level, the number of places of tension in the world will increase, which will divert attention from Ukraine, and the ability of the West to supply weapons will begin to disappear, and no one will be able to put the American or European economy on a war footing (Ukraine is not capable of securing itself with modern weapons, although it must take all possible steps in that direction). In fact, this scenario means the defeat of Ukraine, which leaves no chance for economic recovery (at the same time, it is a defeat for Russia, but they are satisfied with ending the war with a mutual defeat). Ukraine also has problems in internal politics, because it is impossible to hold elections in an endless state of war, and if they are held, they will preserve the current government in the worst possible way, which gives the West reasons to finally leave Ukraine as an undemocratic country, or lead to mass protests that will have extremely negative consequences during the war.
 
2. Freezing the war.
 
This scenario gives the West a way out of the current trap of "defeat, victory and procrastination are equally unacceptable". In this scenario, the Allies ensure support for Ukraine at roughly the current level, to prevent the defeat of Ukraine and the defeat of Russia. Realizing the impossibility of achieving success, the Western allies are putting pressure on Ukraine to negotiate a freeze on the conflict, while at the same time putting a lot of pressure on Putin. The initiator of the negotiations will be either Biden in the spring or summer of 2024 (he should look like a winner or at least a peacemaker in the elections), or the winner of the American elections in the spring of 2025. After the signing of the peace agreement, both sides (Ukraine with the help of the West, Russia with the help of China) begin to intensively prepare for the next war, which will take place in five years (minimum three, maximum seven). As the peace agreement leads to the lifting of the state of emergency, democratic elections are held in which new faces win, setting the course for comprehensive modernization, while Zelenski accepts defeat and withdraws from the political scene (refusal to hold democratic elections in peacetime will have even worse consequences for him). During the preparations, Russia has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of 2022, and Ukraine has the opportunity to significantly modernize (not only in the technical sense, but also in the institutional sense; I will also note in parentheses that it is worth starting now). At best, Ukraine is modernizing so well that Russia is wary of attacking. In the worst case, Ukraine prepares poorly, and a second invasion leads to a complete defeat and the establishment of a pro-Russian regime (see the first and second Chechen wars).
 
3. Victory.
 
Ukraine manages to convince its allies that the defeat of Russia is an acceptable (and even desirable) scenario. The aid is rapidly increasing to a level that enables the successful execution of the spring-summer counter-offensive, the liberation of the south and the Crimea, the significant shortening of the front line, the freezing of the occupied part of the east until better times and, in this format, entering into negotiations under Ukrainian conditions. After signing the peace, Ukraine joins NATO and receives a lot of money for economic recovery and modernization. The victorious Ukraine attracts the attention of the world in different aspects. The security situation is favorable for economic growth, unblocked seas are open for export. Zelenski easily wins the democratic elections as the winner of the war. Meanwhile, the defeat of Russia leads to the accumulation of factors that lead to political changes, as has always happened in its history after military defeats. These changes (in the soft format of refederalization or in the more likely hard format of decolonization) prevent further Russian aggression. The "Victory" scenario is the least likely, as it assumes a level of strategic and negotiation skills that Ukraine currently lacks. At the same time, he alone ensures the survival of the leading political team, and it is good that the interests of society and the political elite coincide.
 
Two final remarks.
 
There can always be some "black swans" or even "gray rhinos" (a long-awaited event). For example, Putin may die, and the possible duration of concealment of this information is much shorter than necessary to determine a successor and consolidate power. But betting on such events is pointless.
Trump is an eccentric and completely unpredictable character, so there is a non-zero probability that due to certain factors, he will suddenly turn in the direction of maximum support for Ukraine. But obviously betting on it is equally pointless.
I want to emphasize once again: the future is not predetermined. Better scenarios are possible, you just have to implement them, not just believe.