Trump, Putin, Xi and peace in Ukraine

Even before the official announcement of the election results in the USA, several statements could be heard from Donald Trump's entourage about possible scenarios for the end of the war in Ukraine. More precisely, freezing in the current phase. And if during the election race it was about, conditionally, two versions of the plans - about the "theses of the Heritage Foundation" with increasing aid to Ukraine and forcing Putin to make concessions and the "theses of the Institute for Politics in the First Place", which consist in freezing the conflict along the line contact - then the latter has been actively discussed in recent days. At the same time, both conditional "plans" assume the beginning of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia without implementing the "1991 border" thesis.

The only difference is that a more active position implies achieving a change in the balance on the front line and then talking to the Kremlin from a position of strength. This allows for a return to borders within the political track. The second approach involves freezing the conflict here and now with the awareness (but not necessarily the recognition) of the impossibility of returning the territory in the near future. As an illustration, we can cite the already discussed theses "forget about Crimea" or "wait for changes in Russia".

In this context, the Russian Federation is significantly increasing the pressure on the front. Despite rather large losses, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, although they did not break the Ukrainian front, but in the last three months they achieved the most significant successes since 2022. And Putin, speaking in Valdai, once again mentioned the "Istanbul Agreements" - read - the Russian ultimatum to Ukraine. At the same time, despite the harsh rhetoric, Russia has room to rush the issues of starting negotiations. Among the main ones (and those recognized by the Kremlin):

— The growing technological gap between the Russian Federation and the developed countries of the world. It is not only the countries of the conventional "Western world", but also part of the countries of the conventional "global south".

— Increasing dependence of the Russian economy on the People's Republic of China. Here it is worth paying attention not only to the trade balance, but to the increasing technological and financial dependence of the Russian economy on China. In fact, Beijing is doing to Moscow what Moscow has been trying to do to Minsk for the past 30 years. But the Chinese Communists do it better and faster.

— Russia is losing its geopolitical influence. Central Asia is no longer the "backyard of the Russian Federation" and is becoming part of the conditional "Chinese world". In the Caucasus, Turkey's influence has increased sharply, in the Balkans, Russian interests are decreasing, giving way to the above-mentioned interests of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Turkey.

— Within the Russian Federation, demographic processes are taking place that are colossal in terms of their future impact - the conditional "Russian component is dying out", and the population is supported by the increase in national autonomy and migration.

All this already led to the fact that, after losing leadership in the SCO, the Kremlin could not impose (or confirm) its leadership status in the BRICS. Moreover, if we analyze the basic report of the Valdai club and Putin's recent speech, we can conclude that the attitude has changed. Even on its platform, the Russian Federation no longer acts as a leader and "locomotive" of change. Russian-speaking speakers (especially the president) talk a lot about the multipolar world, but refer to collective "non-Western" formats, where they do not emphasize the exceptional role of their country. In fact, Russia is forced to start positioning itself as a regional and no longer a global leader.

 

The latter — Russia's self-positioning is one of the key factors in understanding the policy of key world players in the matter of ending the war in Ukraine.

Putin started this phase of the war as an element of the policy of preserving Russia's status as one of the world leaders. After all, economically, the Russian Federation has long since fallen out of the world's leading countries. Technologically, too. Political influence gradually eroded. The only remaining trump card was military power. Putin exposed this trump card in the hope of quick success. And if "Kiev in three days" were to happen, the Russian Federation would regain its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia and would dramatically strengthen its position in the Balkans and Africa. In fact, he would force himself to be perceived as one of the unconditional architects of the new world order.

But "Kiev in three days" did not happen. Moreover, Russia encountered resistance from the state, which it itself positioned in the world as a failed state. That is, Putin has shown that his "last trump card" in the dialogue on geopolitical leadership is not such. And if in 2021, during the analysis of possible changes in the world system, the Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangle was often discussed, then at the end of 2022, the dialogue between the PRC and the USA was discussed. Russia was kicked out of the process. And that is why Putin's words from January 2023 that the war was being waged "for the future of Russia" were true. Defeat, or even a conditional "draw" in the Russian-Ukrainian war deprived the Russian Federation of its conditional status as a key geopolitical player.

This situation was quite satisfactory for Beijing and Washington. After all, if we put it in simple words, it is much easier to start a conversation about the formation of a bipolar world than to conduct a complex dialogue in a tripartite format. This situation also pleased the European Union, for which the weakening of the Kremlin's influence on the continent created additional opportunities. Especially in matters of subjectivization of the Union on the world stage. The weakening of Russia was no less useful for the new regional leaders. Starting with the founders of BRICS (except the Russian Federation, of course) and ending with Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Thus, the total defeat of Ukraine was not beneficial and remains harmful to most countries of the world. But "not losing" does not mean "winning".

Unfortunately, the total defeat of Russia and the associated risks of a deep crisis in the Russian Federation up to the threat of dissolution were (and largely remain) unfavorable for the key players:

— For the USA, the collapse of Russia means destabilization in several regions at once. Which will lead to either a multiple strengthening of China's influence or force the US to return to the "world policeman" spending policy without guarantees of its success. Which will lead to increased security risks and a new level of escalation with the People's Republic of China.

— For the People's Republic of China, Russia is important as a single, well-governed country. In the status of a regional (but not global) leader with a fairly high degree of dependence on China.

— For a number of European Union politicians, Russia's vision is close to China's position — a single state, quite powerful. The difference is only in the assessment of the risk of Chinese influence on the Russian Federation. Of course, such a development is undesirable for the EU.

— For most non-Western states (primarily regional leaders), it is desirable to preserve a fairly strong (but, again, without ambitions for geopolitical leadership) Russia.

Therefore, for a significant number of world powers, the defeat of Russia also seems "unprofitable". This position is changing, by the way. After all, two years ago, the word "unprofitable" could be used instead of "unacceptable". But the rate of change is extremely low. And there, in particular, is the fault of Ukraine, which communicated very little about the issue of "post-war" in the external field. That is, what will happen after the end of the war and how the risks of the Russian crisis can be leveled in the event of the defeat of the Russian Federation.

This brings us back to the US-China pair. Both countries do not want the defeat of Ukraine, but neither do they want the complete defeat of Russia. Therefore, from their point of view, the war should be stopped somewhere between the mentioned extreme points.

The question is where? And here it is appropriate to mention the American-Chinese confrontation and the process of dependence of the Russian Federation on the People's Republic of China.

— For Beijing, the ideal moment to end the war would be the start of negotiations after the Russian economy passes the "point of no return" in its technological and financial relationship with China. Simply put, in conditions where even the lifting of all sanctions will not allow Russia to return to the predominant use of European and American technologies and financial instruments.

— For the US, the Russian Federation becoming so dependent on the PRC is a nightmare scenario. After all, then Beijing gets at its disposal not only the raw material base of Russia, but also, for example, logistics in the Arctic, a sudden increase in the Middle East, on the African continent. Therefore, for Washington, the ideal moment to end the peace talks (or freeze the war) regarding Ukraine is the period "five minutes before the point of no return" when Moscow falls into the arms of Beijing. What will make it possible to maintain a profitable level of Russian-Chinese competition for spheres of influence by intensifying cooperation with the Kremlin (perhaps not directly, but through intermediary states).

Therefore, the positions from which external players will approach the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war partly depend on the level of American-Chinese relations. Today, these countries are on the brink of a full-blown trade war. But the economies of both countries are interdependent - this can be verified by analyzing the volume and structure of mutual trade. Given China's growing economic and political influence, conflict and competition are inevitable. Moreover, in the field of new technologies, they are "incurable" - in the conditions of the transition to the "knowledge economy", the state that has retained (or gained) a technological advantage turns it into an increase in political and economic influence. On the other hand, both the USA and the People's Republic of China are aware of the need for a format for future coexistence.

And here it is appropriate to mention the role of Trump. Especially since the fierce phase of confrontation between Washington and Beijing began precisely during his reign. Contradictions have been piling up for years, and one of the drivers of 2017 was... China's green transition. Just this year, the PRC announced that it would stop accepting plastic waste from the US and the EU for disposal (which is 60 percent of US plastic waste). Donald Trump then quickly organized a trip to Asia (repeating it in 2019, by the way). After that (the fruitless meeting with Xi) the Chinese Communists became the threat and the Vietnamese (Vietnam agreed to work with the waste) the good guys. But the topic of waste, I repeat, was only a "trigger" - contradictions and the basis for technological wars were already more than enough.

Today, paradoxically, Trump can play his favorite "shuttle diplomacy" again. But already with another message. Of course, it is not about returning the relationship to the level of 2010-15. Rather, it is about developing the boundaries of cooperation while maintaining competition for technologies. Especially since a significant part of his sponsors can support such a format. Including Elon Musk. Musk is interested in Chinese products and materials, in the Asian market for his goods. After all, Tesla's "gigafactory" operates in the People's Republic of China, and the question of its expansion was put on hold by the leadership of the People's Republic of China until 2023.

So there is a high probability that Trump will quickly (after the inauguration) repeat his trip to Asia. And the position of the American president's administration regarding the end of the war in Ukraine will directly depend on its results.

A quick success (an extremely unlikely scenario) of the dialogue between Trump and Xi may trigger a joint pressure of the PRC and the USA on the Russian Federation, that is, Ukraine. Moreover, if Ukraine can competently build communication on both vectors, forcing Russia to make political concessions. For example, in the issues of the perspective of the political trail of the return of the territory. But, I repeat once again, without creating an "image of defeat" for Russia. In the case of Putin's stubbornness, it is very likely that the US will move to the logic of the Heritage Foundation theses mentioned at the beginning of the text, which are more often called Pompeo's position in the Ukrainian press.

 

Maintaining the level of confrontation between the US and Beijing, or increasing its level, will lead to the US trying to implement an algorithm of freezing the status quo to try to use the factor of restoring cooperation with the Russian Federation as an instrument of influence on the PRC. However, it is worth recalling here that the "defeat of Ukraine" is unacceptable for the US. And if Putin announces unacceptable conditions for the end of the war, Trump's transition to a more drastic position is also possible. Will such a format lead to greater involvement of Beijing in the war in Ukraine? It is doubtful: the PRC does not want to take on additional costs to maintain world security or engage in a war that could reach the level of military confrontation with the United States of America.

The prospect of an escalation of the war, by the way, scares both Beijing and Washington. And, for example, Russian activity in engaging the North Korean military creates potential challenges for both capitals. After all, the strengthening (due to new experience) of the North Korean army sharply worsens the situation on the Korean peninsula. Which puts China and the US on the brink of military confrontation. This is understood by Putin, who works in several directions at once: after all, in addition to the North Korean factor, there is also nuclear blackmail, earthquakes in the Middle East, activities in Africa. According to the Russian side, such a policy can lead to the fact that the US and the People's Republic of China will simultaneously decide to work on ending the war in Ukraine as soon as possible as one of the key factors of destabilization. For us, this means the worst-case scenario with major concessions to Russia.

But Putin's ideas, like those of 2022, may turn out to be far from reality, since for both Washington and Beijing the strengthening of Russia's geopolitical influence (which will happen in the event of a "victory" of the Russian Federation and the success of blackmail) is extremely undesirable . Therefore, attempts to "bend the stick" can lead to the opposite result - the inclination of the USA and the People's Republic of China to mutual agreements.

 

What does this mean for Ukraine?

 

The year 2025 will probably be the year of some kind of ceasefire agreement. The question - "under what conditions" - depends on our flexibility and ability to see the whole picture. Ultimately, it depends on whether the Ukrainian leadership will be able to offer its (adequate) vision of the post-war in the region and the positioning of Ukraine in relation to key power centers. There is time and opportunity for that.