03.10.2024.

To whom and why did Putin decide to divide the Crimean land

A new phase of redistribution of land in Crimea, which was occupied by Russia, has begun, with the aim of changing the demographic situation on the peninsula.
It is not only about the number of inhabitants, but also about its "quality". The essence is giving land to the participants of the war in Ukraine. Moreover, the applicant can be a resident of any Russian region. In parallel, the process of "confiscation" of real estate belonging to citizens of Ukraine continues. It is important to note that Aksyonov stressed already in the summer of 2024 that "the Crimean land should be assigned to the Crimeans". In August, things changed dramatically, and there are several reasons for this. I will try to dwell on some of them.
Background or population replacement policy
Since the end of 2014, the Russian Federation has started the process of replacing the population of the peninsula. It was about launching several federal programs. Among these programs, the following can be highlighted:
1. Construction of official apartments for soldiers who are transferred to the peninsula.
2. The "military mortgage" program, loans at preferential rates, which allowed soldiers to build their own housing units. It was later extended to the secondary market (this happened in Crimea in 2017), and in 2019 the criteria for participation were changed, which significantly expanded the list of categories of citizens who can apply for a credit line.
3. Program for the relocation of military pensioners (partly military mortgage, but usually payments from the Ministry of Defense), in which Crimea was already included in 2015.
4. Program for the resettlement of citizens from the regions of the far north. This primarily concerned pensioners. From 2014 to 2017, when it was necessary to "correct" the demographic picture on the peninsula, this state program worked quite actively. From 2019 to 2022, it practically stopped (in Crimea).
5. Payment of "raising fees" to young professionals who move to Crimea. It was primarily about teachers, doctors, managers.
All this together made it possible to already show the growth of the population on the peninsula compared to the beginning of 2014 according to the results of the 2016 census. That is, not only were losses from the migration of Ukrainian citizens who did not want to remain under occupation compensated, but growth was demonstrated. In reality, it was an old imperial policy of population replacement. On the one hand, they worked on "pushing out" disloyal residents, and on the other, bringing in those for whom the new place of residence became a "gift of fate". Or, in our reality, "a gift from Putin". By 2018, it was possible to talk about the replacement of at least 15 to 17 percent of the population of Crimea. Moreover, most of those who arrived experienced resettlement as a sudden improvement in their quality of life. Considering that a significant part of those who immigrated are military pensioners, the Kremlin has created the conditions for extremely active resistance to the return of the peninsula to Ukraine. At the same time, there is a general atmosphere of "pressure" on the pro-Ukrainian sentiments of the local population.
The policy, after all, is not new - it is enough to mention the "military cities" and the allocation of apartments to "pensioners", which the USSR actively built in western Ukraine, western Belarus and the Baltic states.
But every replacement program has its limitations. The extremely rapid arrival of "new inhabitants" can cause resistance from those who lived in the area before the arrival of the empire (even if they were expecting it). Therefore, such a policy has a wave character. After the first wave, a break. Then, a few years later, the second wave. The same thing happened in Crimea. The break started in 2020. The Kremlin and local authorities effectively used the theme of the pandemic. In fact (with the exception of the manager) there was a break. Funding from the federal budget was limited to certain categories of FSB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, investigative committee and managers. For the Crimean "authorities", this situation is perceived positively. On the one hand, even if it was about confiscated real estate, its realization was done "for real money". On the other hand, for the local population, a political show about "protecting Crimea and the inhabitants of Crimea from the influx of foreigners" has begun.
 
War, country and demography
Since 2023, there has been talk of allocating land to "SVO participants" in Crimea. Which, on the one hand, repeated the policy of a number of other entities of the Federation, and on the other hand, given the price of the land, made it possible to save on the payment of "raising fees". This is money that (especially in 2024) local budgets pay to citizens who have signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. There was little of their own money in Crimea (we remember "there is no money, but it holds on"), and payments of two million Russian rubles in the Kuban forced local potential "contractors" to ask Aksyonov and his entourage unpleasant questions. The way out was found in the allocation of land plots, especially near the sea. For example, in May 2024, local media reported on the allocation of land for plots for more than 600 participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war. An important detail: the land is distributed in the settlement of Stormove on the west coast of Crimea. At the same time, it was especially emphasized that only residents of the peninsula can apply for such properties.
 
But it happened - demographic laws intervened. If you actively financed the relocation of pensioners 10 years ago, it is logical to expect that this category of people will start dying sooner or later. That is, statistics began to record a colossal increase in mortality on the peninsula. Where the "properly Crimean pensioners" who died in the war were joined by recent settlers. This coincided with a decrease in marriage and birth rates (which is logical for a war-torn peninsula). As a result, Krimstat reported that in seven months of 2024, the population of Crimea decreased by 7,600 people. At the same time, only 8,927 children were born, and 16,500 people died. And as for the age structure (according to Rosstat data, as of January 2022, in Crimea there were almost 0.5 million people over the working age or 25.5 percent of the population. For comparison, the average Russian figure is 23 percent, and in Crimea and in Sevastopol significant distortion of data to the detriment of military personnel (especially conscripts), i.e., the actual structure (permanent residents) is even worse.
 
A new correction of the population structure is necessary. That is, a new wave of migration.
And there is another factor - the need to increase the volume of recruitment for participation in the war. At the same time, many regions have already reached the "ceiling" of "raising" payments. Thus, for example, the outflow of agricultural workers for mechanization was recorded in the Stavropol Territory. They went like tankers. Realizing that they can kill themselves, but only get a "raise" more than they have earned in a few years. Compare - the average salary in Stavropol at the beginning of 2024 was 23,600 rubles, the salary of a mercenary for a contract with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation – 1.6 million rubles (+100... 400,000 from the authorities of their settlement). That is, the person receives a five-year salary for signing the contract.
The way out is the distribution of "expensive and desirable" Crimean land. Getting a plot "by the sea" is an attractive prospect for a resident of a remote Russian region.
But there was Aksyon's policy of "protecting the Crimeans". It was, but it ended. Already in August 2024, the deputy head of the "Council of Ministers" of Crimea, Hanna Anjukhina, told reporters that people who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation can apply for plots in Crimea, regardless of their place of residence. Relevant norms " of the law" on the peninsula were immediately changed. Aksyonov confirmed this information a little later. And already at the end of September, such a possibility was announced as a specific feature of the "local self-government" policy.
And here it is worth dwelling on an interesting aspect. Already at the beginning of 2024, land in Crimea was allocated to those who had already passed the "SVO". That is, he fought for a certain time. Now the Crimean land is given as part of the "ascension", replacing the cash payment. Of course, not for everyone, but for valuable specialists, whose lack is felt by the Russian army. But on the scale of Crimea, it can be about 20,000 to 30,000 people a year. Which is very, very much.
Thus, the Kremlin, on the one hand, saves money, on the other hand, continues the policy of replacing the population in Crimea, stimulating the resettlement of those most hostile to Ukraine.
Given that the Crimean land is limited, there is a high probability that a similar policy will be launched in the occupied parts of Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts. In addition to gaining groups of loyal populations in these regions, the Kremlin creates additional leverage to maintain control (or destabilize the situation) in case it is necessary to leave these territories.