Three years of war in Ukraine: the Chinese-Russian alliance passes the test
China’s support for Russia in its conflict with Ukraine and the West equates to it investing in Putin’s Russia. Beijing cannot afford for Putin to fail, as this would threaten the stability of the anti-Western regime in Russia. The war in Ukraine ties up a portion of US resources and those of its European allies. For this reason, contrary to its propaganda narratives, China has little interest in pushing for a swift, negotiated end to the conflict.
For Russia, the war has become a test of its alliance with China – and the outcome has been positive. Despite intense Western pressure and it formal distancing itself from the conflict, China has provided Russia with tangible support which, particularly in the economic sphere, is absolutely crucial and irreplaceable for the Kremlin. The positive outcome of the de facto alliance with China will encourage the Kremlin to further extend the cooperation aimed at weakening the West’s position and to continue working with China to build a new international order that would be ‘friendly’ to both regimes.
China’s calculations
China believes there is a growing likelihood of a confrontation with the United States and this has shaped and continues to shape its approach to the war in Ukraine. China’s decision to support Moscow and to maintain this support for nearly three years stemmed from its assessment of China’s strategic situation, driven by deepening competition with the US. In this context, China needs security and stability along its northern border and a partner to push back against Western influence in Central Asia. For these reasons, Beijing is willing to invest political and economic capital in Russia’s authoritarian, anti-Western and China-friendly regime. Due to Russia’s aggressive revisionism, China can count on it to tie up some of resources which the United States and its allies have in Europe and the Middle East. The course of the conflict in Ukraine thus far has not altered this calculation.
Nevertheless, China’s support for Russia has not been automatic, particularly after it became clear that the intended Russian ‘blitzkrieg’ had degenerated into a war of attrition, with Russia facing the might of the Western alliance – even if, due to a lack of political will, the West has only utilised this potential to a limited extent. Nor is China’s support unlimited, as both the government and economic operators, undoubtedly acting under discreet instructions from the authorities, have been striving to mitigate the economic and political costs of their backing for Russia, particularly those stemming from US secondary sanctions.
Neither China nor Russia has ever disclosed whether Vladimir Putin gave Xi Jinping advance warning of his intention to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it is highly likely that, at the very least, he signalled his plans to undertake radical actions against Ukraine. This is demonstrated, for example, by shifts in Chinese propaganda narratives.[1] In addition, the content of the joint statement on international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development’, issued on 4 February 2022 during Putin’s visit to Beijing,[2] suggests that he secured Xi’s support for such radical steps. However, Putin most likely presented the Chinese leader with a scenario he himself believed in – a swift and relatively bloodless operation rather than a protracted, full-scale war. This would explain Chinese diplomacy’s lack of preparedness for the evacuation of Chinese citizens.
China’s dilemmas and responses
Like the Kremlin and Western observers, China was surprised by the effectiveness of Ukraine’s resistance and the transformation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict into a prolonged conventional war. This unexpected development created several challenges for China.[3] Firstly, it had a negative impact on its relations with the West, which stepped up its efforts to reduce its economic dependence on China. This effect was particularly pronounced in Europe, where China increasingly came to be seen as a strategic rival due to its material and diplomatic support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, the US responded by renewing and strengthening its alliances in the Indo-Pacific region while NATO stepped up its engagement with its partners there.[4] Thirdly, Chinese operators conducting business with Russia faced the threat of US sanctions. Fourthly, particularly during the first two years of the conflict, the Chinese government feared that Russia could expand the war to other countries or resort to using weapons of mass destruction. From the perspective of the Chinese leadership, this risked triggering an uncontrolled escalation that could draw China into an open conflict with the West before it was prepared for this. Finally, as the war unfolded, Russia took assertive actions in the post-Soviet sphere, making a number of territorial claims against Kazakhstan and thus threatening regional stability.
In this situation, China has adopted a dual strategy combining tangible support for its ally with rhetoric and gestures designed to create the impression that it has been distancing itself from Russia while projecting a façade of Chinese neutrality. The primary goal was to help the Russian economy withstand the Western sanctions and ensure that the Kremlin could sustain its war effort. At the same time, the two sides have been working to develop mechanisms that would make their economic cooperation more resilient to Western sanctions, such as conducting transactions in renminbi and exploring alternative settlement methods.
China has also undertaken several initiatives to establish red lines for Russia’s actions. Most notably, during the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Samarkand in September 2022, Xi Jinping expressed unequivocal support for the independence of Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics.[5] Moreover, China has issued several public and private statements (for example, in October 2022, March 2023 and November 2024) that reaffirmed its opposition to the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons.[6]
A further tightening of Chinese-Russian cooperation...
China has supported Russia’s war effort by importing Russian energy resources and filling the gaps in the Russian market caused by Western sanctions and the voluntary withdrawal of some Western companies. Crucially, this includes the supply of dual-use civilian-military products, such as electronic integrated circuits (with exports increasing by 140