This is death for the Kremlin

The situation on the ground. Here is an unchanging piece of advice – read/watch Konstantin Mashovets, you will come to a common understanding.

1.

In general: the situation is different in different areas. There are problem zones, there are areas of intense fighting, where the enemy suffers heavy losses, but is unable to advance.

Therefore, when you see some decadent/euphoric generalizations, specify – which area is being talked about? What are these or other conclusions a consequence of? And learn how tactical differs from operational and strategic.

 

Then the daily news about the capture of "strategic" landings and the taking control of the ruins of the strategic hut can be adequately interpreted.

 

• 2 •

 

Russian strikes on peaceful Ukrainian cities in the rear (formally explained by Moscow’s attempts to crush the Ukrainian defense industry, which is getting back on its feet) are clear evidence that Russia cannot deal with Ukrainian forces directly at the front.

It has to resort to extremely unpopular bloody measures that cause negative resonance and encourage decisions in the West that the Kremlin would like to prevent.

The dynamics at the front do not really affect the mood abroad, because war has become routine. But footage of fires in Kiev or human tragedies continues to haunt.

 

• 3 •

 

Russian attacks on the CCC are a demonstration of a certain hopelessness on the part of the Kremlin. Despite all the mobilization problems described a thousand times, despite all the real ugly stories that Russian propaganda further inflates to the sky, mobilization and conscription in Ukraine provide a level of troop replenishment that is infinitely far from ideal, but at the same time does not allow Russia to break through the front. See paragraphs 1 and 2.

That is, the front bends in places, stands in places. The Ukrainian defense industry is causing Russia more and more pain and damage. And even the most disgusting sphere minimally solves the task.

If you decompose each block into components (problem areas - what measures? Defense industry - how to strengthen? etc.), the picture of complete betrayal and shame disappears, a palette of tasks appears. It is not much easier, because the scale is colossal, but both terrible and acceptably bad scenarios can be seen immediately.

It can be said with certainty, because we know that anti-aircraft "anti-shahed" drones are being tested and slowly increased. The good news is that there will be them, the military expects a sharp drop in the effectiveness of Russian attacks. The bad news is that this will not happen tomorrow. The main risk is if the Russian Federation wants to collapse the energy sector.

If you write everything in a column, then the main bad conclusion is that "all this" can be dragged out. For months at least. Slowly and in 2026. But the facts are piling up that convince us that the result will not necessarily meet Moscow's expectations. Quite the opposite. A slightly more general view of the related plots helps here.

What will ultimately affect the course of the war (time and nature of its end).

 

• 4 •

 

The thesis "China will not allow Russia to be defeated" is the key event of the last few days. It no longer matters whether Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said it or not, whether the context is distorted or not - this thesis has reached the masses and is being discussed as a fact here, in Russia itself, in Europe and the USA.

A series of events - statements by EU leaders, rumors about the curtailment of the EU-China summit program on July 24, etc. - indicate that the essence of the Chinese attitude is perceived in this way.

This is a turning point.

Let's recall May 9, when Emperor Xi hosted a military parade in Moscow. We were not the only ones who noticed at the time that China was now determining the fate of the war. Under certain conditions, Beijing can end it quickly. But the above thesis shows that China is doing well for now.

In this sense, the mood of the Russians is interesting. The Kremlin is publicly sending a signal and assuring people that now the Russians will definitely win. In private, the mood is different.  

We have been quietly present in a number of industrial and regional web communities in the Russian Federation for some time, and these groups are quite a useful reference for assessments. So, here are two main assessments.

First: why is China suddenly talking about some kind of defeat? Is everything really that bad? There is a general consensus that the Russian authorities are lying, but the scale is incomprehensible. There is a growing feeling that the scale is tragic.

Second: now China will not let Russia out of this war alive, we will bleed in Ukraine, and they will take everything into their own hands!

This idea that the Russian Federation will not be able to get out of the "victorious" war of its own accord is gradually taking over minds.

• 5 •

 

Illustrative posts about the situation in the Russian Federation were specially made. Not everything is as terrible there as we would like, but there are a number of trends that may encourage some of the Russian "towers", and even the current owner of the Kremlin, to try to jump out of the war.

The point here is not in the linear relationship between Ukraine and Russia. The point was mentioned earlier: being bogged down in the bilge of war and de facto losing the opportunity to act independently, Moscow begins to lose strategic positions to play above the regional level. And that is death for the Kremlin.

In the Baltic, the Russian Federation has been thrown back to the 18th century, a little more and it will find itself in the time of Ivan the Terrible.

The loss of positions in Syria is a redrawing of the imperial conquests of the 19th century and the Soviet legacy. Now the contemporary participants in various parties a la the Palestinian Imperial Society look like a group of old clowns. Tsar Alexander III, whom Putin is trying to resemble, would die of disgust looking at this offspring.

Upheavals in the Caucasus are also returning the Russian Federation to the positions of the 18th century.

The line of Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East is here again falling into Ivan the Terrible.

For Ukraine, there is little that is pleasant in the short term. If the war drags on, we will lose people, time and some perspective. But that's only partially our fault.

Even if we get some bonus as a result of the attack on Ukraine, Russia loses more and finds itself in a situation where it can regain its positions only through wars. Not through soft power, not through economics, but through a lot of blood.

That is, Putin has brought the Russian Federation into a situation where a parallel war in the Baltics, the Caucasus, against Kazakhstan and an increase in power from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean are necessary. Which can cause everything to fall apart.

But some 11 years ago, Putin was the most popular politician from Belgrade to Vladivostok, easily able to win democratic elections in Ukraine.

The talk of involving the North Koreans and even Laos is all China's game. And where is Russia here? Where are the Russians here?

And this time it becomes frighteningly obvious to the most powerful.

 

• 6 •

 

After Wang Yi's "answer", a new alignment is observed in the maneuvers of the three zones: the US, China and the EU. It is precisely as a derivative of the interests of these powers that the prospects for war will be formed.

In the spring, the EU demonstrated its readiness to rely on China to strengthen its positions in the main battle - on tariffs with the US. China has also made it very clear that it is ready for alliances with Europe against the American hegemon.

In the past month and a half, a certain evolution has taken place.

First, a non-resistance formula was found, according to which European countries indicated their willingness to spend more on defense (the legend of "five percent of GDP" in NATO). De

facto, this is an anti-Chinese gesture, as it frees up US capacity. And China will do everything in its power to "entangle" these capacities.

Second, the Europeans' rhetoric against Beijing intensified. In Brussels and other capitals, they expect Washington to become more lenient and not have to make extravagant alliances.

Also, Trump has already calmed down with Canada and temporarily calmed down with Greenland, which saves a lot of time and energy.

 

• 7 •

We perceive Trump's latest statements with personal attacks on Putin and statements about his readiness to increase support for Ukraine not as a sudden insight and a surge of sympathy for Ukraine, but as a reaction to "Wang Yi's words" in a general context. And this is much more serious and positive for Ukraine.

In essence, China has publicly indicated that all of Trump's efforts, all of his kisses and praising of Putin to distance Russia from Xi's imperial throne, have ended in failure. Beijing will not tolerate any liberties here.

Accordingly, there is no need to constantly call a fool a fool, and you can add harsh notes to the public discourse about Russia.

The Kremlin's reaction is very indicative: they are trying to joke, saying that Trump changes his position once a week, let's wait and see where he will stop.

It seems to me that the process should not be considered irreversible. Trump can really do something harsh towards Russia, but as a one-time measure. To show how it can be done and that it is no longer ready to tolerate Putin's wanderings. At the same time, without completely driving Moscow into a corner.

Russia can try to soften and postpone these measures at the expense of some next round of imitation of "good will". Putin's main task now is to hold out for three weeks until the holidays in the USA and Europe. Then he will have a break until September to concentrate. Although August promises to be nervous both in terms of tariffs and in the light of OPEC's thinking.

We do not exclude that now the discussion of a ceasefire in the air will intensify. Ukraine has shown what it can create with Russian aviation. Putin has a motive to avoid a repetition of such an embarrassment, and at the same time to blur the picture of the ruins of residential buildings and killed civilians in Ukraine (especially since they need to undermine the shock weapons).

And since Trump promised as many as (!) 10 missiles, this will look like a decisive factor and a winning story for Washington.

 

• 8 •

 

On the Ukrainian side, as before, the main ally is Russian stubbornness. It is quite realistic that Putin will cross the border, and in August we will receive such assistance that will allow us to thwart the Kremlin's offensive plans. That is, in August Russia will not gain anything, it will only burn resources. And in September Putin will be collectively asked the question: has he matured?

Another practical consequence of “Wang Yi’s remark” may be the creation of a framework for what will be labeled as “Russia’s invincibility”. Senior comrades will discuss this and prove it to Moscow. And if Moscow does not have the “reality on the ground” to expand these frameworks, it will have to agree. China will have a new option: to drag out the war or exchange the cessation for some bonus.

So, now we are looking at the dynamics of US-China-EU relations and the practical content of August.

The worst-case scenario for Ukraine is the accelerated “North Koreanization” of Russia. When the last room for maneuver disappears.

But this is not the worst scenario for Ukraine only, but for the entire Russian perimeter and the entire European continent. And here we will look the most ready.

And for some, this is also a sentence.