The war of nerves and the nuclear threat: 6 shades of the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the winter of 2025.

War of nerves, nuclear strike and conventional war.

 

A brief analysis of what is happening now

 

1. Putin failed to conduct an information blitzkrieg and scare the West with a nuclear war. A few days after the use of a ballistic missile on the Dnieper, it finally became clear that the Kremlin's calculation failed, and Ukraine's use of British and American missiles does not (at least for now) pose a nuclear threat to the world and Ukraine.

 

2. We have now entered the second phase of this battle (I would call it the "pre-negotiation battle"). And this stage is a war of nerves. How long will this phase last? All in all, at least a few weeks. The Russians have amassed enough weapons for the exhausting shelling of Ukraine and are sending all the manpower at their disposal to the front lines. It is also worth paying attention to the fact that now at least two positive factors for the Kremlin have coincided in terms of manpower and its accumulation. After Kursk, when mobilization without compensation was threatened, the number of soldiers under contract with the Ministry of Defense who were previously on hold and waiting for an increase in contract prices increased slightly (they were simply afraid that mobilization would occur and the money would not be paid). In addition, the fall round, which provided additional funds for contract soldiers, is now complete. There is also a third, so far theoretical factor — the collapse of the ruble. It could probably lead to another small jump in the number of people who still consider trading life for money. Therefore, unfortunately, the predictions that the Russian people should end up with matches in November-December were somewhat wrong. Now it can be said that until March-April the enemy can carry out assault attacks.

 

3. Before moving on to the analysis of Putin's further actions, we must repeat what has been pointed out several times before. There are three reasons for this war: 1) Russia has ceased to be the third pole of the world; 2) Russia lost unlimited police functions in the post-Soviet space; 3) Putin believed that by annexing Ukraine, he would stop the de-Slavization of Russia. The Kremlin believed that a quick three-day war would allow all three issues to be resolved. It is now clear that Putin will not be able to solve any of the three issues. But these are still the main factors why Putin wants to continue the war. Moreover, he realizes that under any circumstances he has the money to wage war for another year and a half to two years, and maybe a little more (it all depends on the oil situation). The following factors speak against the continuation of the war: 1) Russia is becoming technologically dependent on China in the economic sectors of the 21st century, and they have a maximum of two to three years before they turn into a state whose economy cannot be built without China at all; 2. Russia is afraid of the collapse of the oil price, which Donald Trump scares them with, which can cause internal problems, because there will not be enough money for anything. Simply put, Putin has a dilemma in the negotiation process: continue the war and try to achieve the goals set in 2022, which is practically unrealistic, or take a step back and achieve the lifting of sanctions. For now, there is no answer to this question, above all from Putin himself.

4. The nuclear strike, about which various Russian politicians have spoken so much, is becoming a factor in today's political rhetoric (despite the ballistic strike on the Dnieper) for several reasons. It seems the following: around Putin there is a group of radicals (Patrushev, Kovalchuks and partly Chemezov and Vaino) - old men (except Vaino) who want to be more radical than Putin and play hawks. And they sincerely believe that a nuclear strike will prolong their political life and restore Russia's greatness. And they begin to publicly cajole Putin (the main speaker is Kovalchuk, Putin's partner in historical debates and, just as importantly, the Kremlin's chief gerontologist, who proves to Putin that one can live to be 130 years old). Unfortunately, it seems that, unlike the Caribbean crisis, when there was one public opponent of Khrushchev (Mikoyan), now there may be no public opponent (apart from Medvedev's statement that "we are not crazy", we haven't heard anything). A nuclear strike in the heads of these old men will solidify their power and the power of their children. Although this is also a myth. There is another character — Putin's deputy head of administration Kiriyenko, who watches all this silently and believes that Putin's post-nuclear isolation will turn him (Kiriyenko) into a de facto president.

 

5. Who is against it? As strange as it sounds, Putin himself. Or, more precisely, his fear. Putin is afraid not only for his life, but also for two other things: first, he is very afraid of final isolation. And a nuclear strike will most likely lead to just that. Second, he fears losing his chapter in history. And these two things are the main limiting factor, at least for now. And that's why it should be repeated: the nuclear threat is minimal today.

 

6. Trump will try to solve the issue of freezing the conflict in Ukraine before his inauguration (the probability that he will succeed is still small, but the situation is changing almost every day). It can already be said that the Ukraine issue will be resolved as part of Trump's big deals around the world. In the same way, we can say that Putin will postpone real negotiations until he realizes that the front line has stabilized. But we are sure that not negotiations have already begun, but an exchange of views at a lower level.