14.06.2024.

The relationship between Russia and China, what is the true nature of their cooperation?

Strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has intensified significantly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now the weaker partner in the relationship as China exploits the Kremlin’s situation for its own purposes.

On May 29, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke to NATO representatives in Brussels about the seriousness of Sino-Russian relations. His words underline the true nature of the “borderless” agreement between Beijing and Moscow. It is not a partnership of convenience, but a concerted effort to shift the geopolitical center of gravity to Asia. According to Campbell, China does not represent the voice of reason in Russia’s eyes, as some Western leaders have claimed, but has a vested interest in destabilizing the West and distracting it from Beijing’s own goals in the Indo-Pacific.

The increased political, economic and social pressures caused by the occupation of Ukraine have brought the Russian agency to its knees on the international stage. As the rift between Russia and the West widens, the Kremlin is increasingly turning its attention to China and relations between the two states are becoming ever closer. In contrast to the West, Russia characterizes its relations with China as an alliance between two great civilizations. However, as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China has made clear, Moscow increasingly sees itself as hostage to China’s geopolitical aspirations.

Amid increasing geopolitical turmoil, the concept of multipolarity is gaining traction as a global trend. Russia and China have been quick to identify themselves as key players in this emerging world order, jointly pushing for the formation of a bloc that can compete with the West. At first glance, the relationship seems natural: two emerging authoritarian powers joining forces to challenge the prevailing order. However, when one delves deeper into the dynamics of the relationship, one realizes that Russia’s commitment to the war against Ukraine, its stagnant economy and its pursuit of external support for the West have led to its foreign policy goals slowly being incorporated into China’s vision of the future international order.

The new world order

Geopolitical constraints give Russia and China many reasons to work together. Their distrust of the West, authoritarian governments and similar political ambitions have fueled relations between Moscow and Beijing over the past political generation.

In their recent press conference, the two states agreed that civilizational differences shape spheres of influence; that international institutions are polarized against their own interests and require structural changes to accommodate “new realities”; and that there is no place for military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. The conversation focused in particular on the development of the trade partnership between the two countries, while comments on foreign policy remained limited in detail. In contrast to Putin’s usual chastising rhetoric about the collective West, the content of this meeting is indicative of the actual dynamics of the situation – namely that it is largely shaped by Chinese interests.

Cooperation instead of competition?

Despite exaggerated bilateral partnership declarations, the dynamic between the two states remains restrained, partly due to historical tensions. Putin’s reference to Russia and China remaining “forever brothers” seems to go beyond the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Soviet occupation of Xinjiang (1934) and the nuclear stance during the Sino-Soviet split, to name but a few of their “divisions”. . These memories are still vivid among much of the Chinese population, including scholars who note a discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese visions of a new world order. Despite the friendly façade, mistrust remains.

Russia’s realigned economy means that it is unable to incentivize greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition.

While Russia’s economy has focused on supporting the war effort in Ukraine, its exports have concentrated on the transportation of fossil fuels and other raw materials to eastern partners. Meanwhile, imports from China cover a wide range of industrial and consumer goods, providing essential resources to support the Russian economy and the conflict in Ukraine. It is predicted that this asymmetric balance will increase in the coming years as Russia struggles to survive with its war economy, and China will become an increasingly important lifeline for the Russian state as a result.

Complexity of Sino-Russian trade

This imbalance has led to unusual geopolitical concessions by Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s customs union – originally conceived in part to limit Chinese influence in Russia’s historical sphere of influence – comprises several states pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, including investment from the China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) global development project. Putin’s comments at the 2023 Eurasian Economic Forum, in which he supported the pairing of the EAEU and BRI, show both a concession to Russia’s dominance over Eurasia and a recognition of the nature of relations with China.

Development and investment have become the predominant tools for building influence in Eurasia; in this context, Russia’s economic integration with the former Soviet states offers only limited leverage over its neighbors.

Therefore, Russia is increasingly reliant on a partner that has both historical grievances and ambitions in its own backyard. If Russia continues to falter, it will either have to make further concessions regarding its geopolitical position in Eurasia or risk cutting off its life support mechanism.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between China and Russia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in the focus of the world media, especially after the frequent meetings between the Chinese and Russian leaders. Western countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia often point out that China indirectly helps Russia by exporting equipment that can be used for the production of military equipment.

However, what is regularly pointed out is that for China, the strengthening of relations with Russia is an overriding interest in achieving China's, primarily, economic, but also geopolitical goals. Russia is a good and reliable economic partner for China, when it comes to the supply of raw materials (oil and gas, primarily) at lower prices than those prevailing on the world market of raw materials. Russia is a major importer of machinery and equipment from China, which it can no longer buy on Western markets.

In addition, Russia is a reliable assistant to China in the realization of China's strategy of building a multipolar world, while it is more or less clear that Russia is a weaker partner, which can very quickly be replaced by someone else, at a given moment, a more necessary partner for China.

When it comes to the Western Balkans, China and Russia have more or less uniform political positions on key political issues (neither of these two countries recognizes the independence of Kosovo, for example).

As far as economic issues are concerned, while China is present in the countries of the Western Balkans mainly through infrastructure projects, Russia is present as an investor in the countries of the Western Balkans. Both countries use this position to achieve their political goals, in which they largely succeed. So these two countries can hardly be called stability factors for the Western Balkans.