The next mobilization in Russia may not be so simple. There were two good reasons

But if you switch this image to the "layers" section, you can see that the contradictions between the regions are piling up. War acts as a catalyst. Therefore, all important processes and consequences must be prepared at the federal and regional level. Then interesting stories appear.

Roughly speaking, there are now several main groups of regions based on the "involvement in war" criteria:

1) "Capital" of the region - everything is more or less ok there, they generate management decisions, set the agenda and control the media.

 

2) Raw material regions - in charge of supplying money for installment payments.

 

3) Regions with a developed military industry - responsible for the supply of weapons.

 

4) Those who are unlucky (no raw materials, no military equipment and other critical infrastructure) – apart from cannon fodder, they have nothing useful.

 

When you add the "mobilization" variable to this picture, interesting trends emerge.

The other day, RIA Novosti published the traditional credit rating of the population in the regions. The report is made in such a way that it does not reveal the whole situation (for example, they do not compare figures related to debts and regional GDP to hide which regions are drowning in debt, where lending is more or less a normal element of the economy). Russian statistics are fake, but they provide certain clues on the basis of which conclusions can be drawn.

 

According to official data, at the beginning of last year, every economically active Russian owed banks 54 percent of their annual salary. At the beginning of 2024, the credit ratio increased to 57.1 percent.

 

In the Russian Federation itself, this will probably be explained by the fact that people began to live better, have more confidence in the future, and therefore began to take more loans.

There have already been such explanations. Last year, the number of Russian borrowers servicing three or more loans rose to 28.6 percent. Compared to the end of 2021, the number of people with five or more loans has almost doubled – from 4.7 percent to 8.6 percent. This was explained by the more active distribution of credit cards, with only a passing mention that the share of borrowers with an "increased debt burden" is growing. That is, people in slavery.

The latest rating showed that every economically active resident of Tuva now owes banks 149.4 percent of their annual salary. At the end of 2021, an economically active resident of Tuva owed an average of 87.4 percent of their annual salary.

In Kalmykia, which has traditionally been the leader when it comes to debt, the debt now stands at 133.9 percent. By the end of 2021, it was 100.1 percent.

In Bashkortostan, the credit ratio increased from 80.1 percent at the end of 2021 to 84.8 percent at the beginning of 2024.

In the Republic of Altai (also one of the leading regions when it comes to debts) from 69.3 percent to 79 percent, etc.

For a number of subjects of the Russian Federation, the debt figures (especially when correcting data on the economic situation) do not look rosy.

A number of questions are raised.

As we know from captured Russian soldiers and from statements in the Russian media, one of the most important motives for Russian mercenaries to go to war is to pay off loans. At the same time, Russian data shows that someone somewhere is deceiving someone.

For example, Tuva leads by a wide margin in terms of relative confirmed losses: for every 10,000 men of military age, the region lost at least 50 residents (in fact, more). That is, war means more corpses and more debts for the inhabitants of Tuva.

In the Republic of Altai - the same, as clearly as possible.

Such dependence is not an isolated case, it is a trend.

 

Many residents of Russia's troubled hinterland appear to have taken out more loans in anticipation of high salaries as mercenary soldiers. They will theoretically be able to repay these loans:

1) in case of the death of an engaged worker and receiving a one-time payment;

2) in the case of a long war and mercenary survival;

3) if the debts are forgiven (the state will cover them).

 

The end of the war without a mechanism for debt forgiveness and the return of mercenaries to their homes is a sudden increase in the number of debtors, a social conflagration, savage crime.

In general, the war deepened the inequality between the regions of the Russian Federation to the extent that it is increasingly difficult to talk about the "situation in Russia" in general.

The Russian Federation sells oil, the federal center redistributes the profits to regions with a developed military industry. Non-raw materials regions without an industrial complex are sliding into the abyss. As long as Moscow has the opportunity to give them some money, the situation can be managed.

 

But the money is running out. Attacks on refineries also contribute to this.

At the same time, regions with military industries absorb labor, reducing the mafia's available resources. The structure of confirmed losses points out that some regions can no longer supply either paid or mobilized soldiers.

"Mediazon" had material with an officer-carrier of corpses, where he referred to the words of numerous military commissars of Buryatia: people are physically running out, there are no mafia resources.

Our numbers show that Buryatia, which has long been in the top five for the number of confirmed losses in absolute terms, has dropped to eighth place. This indirectly indicates that the number of occupiers from Buryatia in the army is decreasing.

So. The number of regions of the Russian Federation capable of waging war is inevitably decreasing. Some regions are no longer touched for social reasons, fearing unrest (Caucasus). Somewhere because they are close to exhaustion of physical resources. The new wave of mass mobilization, if carried out, could sharply worsen the situation in parts of the Federation, which have fared much better so far in the war.

Technically, Russia can muster another 500,000 people. Especially if it actively includes Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow and Leningrad regions. But it is practically and politically not so easy, it is much more difficult than in 2022.

Probably the hysterical pressure on Ukraine in connection with "negotiations" and nuclear ultimatums connected with the accumulation of that imbalance.

 

That is, tomorrow nothing will fall, but the mechanism of how it can fall, in Russia itself, has obviously moved from abstract categories to some more concrete ones. That is why the Russian government is taking measures.