The Beijing-Moscow Axis: Evolving European Perspectives

With the war in Ukraine dragging on and its two-year mark on the horizon, European views of the China-Russia relationship are almost uniformly negative. While the West remains united on the need to maintain economic sanctions against Russia, China’s position has been neutral at best, and its leadership has often shown support for Vladimir Putin’s aggressive policies.

This is causing consternation in Europe, where recent public surveys have showed a relative detachment with respect to China — on average, according to a 2022 poll, 43% of Europeans see China as a "necessary partner." However, China’s relationship with Russia is now coming under scrutiny by European policymakers. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow in March 2023 seemed to confirm the growing sentiment in Europe that China has moved closer to Russia in the past 18 months. Europeans took note of Xi’s statement that "right now there are changes the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years, and we are the ones driving these changes together," including the will to pursue closer economic cooperation between China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow also have a shared goal to bend the international system to their advantage, particularly in important regions such as the Arctic and Central Asia, where European interests are at stake. Scientific cooperation between China and Russia appears to be increasing as well. On the business front, some European transport and logistics companies face a tough choice between the risks of defying economic sanctions against Russia and the long delays involved in using China-built train routes across Eurasia.

With these developments in mind, this paper analyzes the bilateral relationship from a European standpoint. Based on interviews with European policymakers and experts, as well as multiple European sources, this paper finds that most European Union (EU) states are alarmed by the stronger partnership between the two countries and condemn China’s support of Russia. In addition, in some areas, such as the Arctic and maritime affairs, Europeans feel they should prepare themselves for a greater Sino-Russian challenge in the future. European disillusionment with the war in Ukraine could impact the EU’s long-term relationship not only with Russia but also with China.

Although there is a sense across the EU that the China-Russia relationship has become strategic, the degree of awareness depends on historical, geographical, and sociological factors. There is some divergence of opinion between EU countries that were part of the Socialist bloc during the Cold War and those in Western Europe.

Europeans have a long history of dealing with Russia, and previously the Soviet Union, including occupations in Eastern and Northern Europe, military interventions, economic coercion, forced labor, and human rights violations. To many European countries, the Russian ambition of domination is a long-established fact. These realities add up to a negative image of Russia in parts of Europe. China, however, has been a relatively remote power, although it is now the EU’s top trading partner.

China’s relations with Eastern and Central Europe peaked during the Cold War, when some countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, enjoyed fairly good relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially in the 1960s. This "special relationship" faded after the fall of the Berlin Wall and remained dormant until 2010–2016, when Beijing tried to create a specific forum to foster relations with Eastern and Central Europe, known as the 16+1, with the aim of promoting Chinese investments in the region and the Belt and Road Initiative. However, this scheme was viewed critically by the European Commission, which saw it as a diversion from its own China policy.

But as China’s promised investments in Eastern and Central Europe failed to appear, the 16+1 forum began to lose momentum. Above all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has seriously affected Beijing’s standing in Eastern Europe, where many see a rapprochement between the two authoritarian regimes as a threat to their democratic systems.

Interviews with officials and experts in Warsaw, Tallinn, Brussels, Paris, and Berlin reveal nuances in the way Europeans understand the Sino-Russian "friendship without limits." Perceptions in Europe vary depending on the country’s background and prior relations with China and Russia. A 2022 poll showed that if China were to supply ammunition and weapons to Russia, that would constitute a "red line" for many Europeans (although no official definition of "red line" has ever been given in Brussels or any other capital). On average, 41% of Europeans would support sanctioning Beijing in that event, even if it meant seriously damaging Western economies. A minority of 33%, on average, would oppose sanctions.

Poland

When it comes to the conflict in Ukraine, Poland represents Europe’s front line, and its relationship with China has been deeply impacted by the war and other factors. Even though the Polish government says that it wants to rebalance its trade relationship, "recent economic and political developments in China, such as the process of China closing up during COVID-19, the announcement of the 'dual circulation' concept and increasing PRC global assertiveness have affected Poland’s perception of China."¹ Experts say that Poland has modified its stance toward China, especially because of China’s deepening ties to Russia — a country that is seen in Poland as the most serious security threat. (This perception significantly predates the Russian occupation of Crimea and Donbas and the ongoing war in Ukraine.) Alongside those in the EU, Polish attitudes toward China have been evolving from "enthusiasm" to "increasing vigilance" since 2017. Beijing’s support for Moscow has further weakened Poland’s perception of China.

On several occasions, Polish authorities have called on China to condemn Russia’s aggression, including during the telephone exchange between Presidents Andrzej Duda and Xi Jinping in July 2022 and during the visit of Chinese special envoy for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui to Warsaw in the spring of 2023. But as long as China supports Russia in its endeavors, the Sino-Polish relationship will continue to deteriorate.

The Baltic States

An even worse scenario can be observed in the three Baltic states, which joined the EU in 2004 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Originally part of the 16+1 format (now 14+1), these countries have loosened their relations with China in recent years. Lithuania pioneered the shift in 2019 when it left the body and approved the establishment of an official Taiwan government presence in Vilnius. This provoked a furious Chinese reaction with trade sanctions against not only Lithuania but also European companies trading with the Baltic state. In return, the EU filed a case against China with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva.

Lithuania’s policy was nurtured domestically as members of its political elite became critical of the Chinese regime. Following the imposition of Chinese sanctions, Vilnius somewhat benefited from the Chinese boycott and therefore was able to develop new ties with Southeast Asia and Taiwan.

Latvia and Estonia have taken slightly different approaches. According to scholar Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, "Latvia does not have a China strategy: it needs to address China’s position with regard to Russia and the war in Ukraine, re-cast Latvian interests within a broader Indo-Pacific narrative and balance Latvia’s infrastructure needs with concerns about China."² Originally, Latvia’s "unofficial code of conduct" included treating China as a prospective export market — balancing politics with economics.

Baltic experts acknowledge that China’s pro-Russia stance in the war in Ukraine could feed a "sentiment of discontent" toward China. Latvia has been calling for Beijing to take a more determined and responsible position against Russia’s war.

Like its neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has dismal economic ties with the PRC. It fully backs the EU’s position on China and chose to withdraw from the 17+1 group alongside its two Baltic neighbors. Having provided nearly €400 million — more than 1% of its GDP — in military assistance, Estonia has been on the front line of European support for the Ukrainian struggle against Russia’s invasion. For that reason, it is highly suspicious of China’s close ties to Putin’s regime.

Germany and France

In Western Europe, Germany has had to reassess its relations with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Many debates have taken place in Berlin, especially within the ruling coalition. A few days after Russia attacked Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a member of the Social Democratic Party, delivered an important speech, promising a new approach to defense and security and offering an extra €100 billion to be spent on reinforcing Germany’s armed forces. In May 2023, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new €2.7 billion package of measures for Ukraine (including 30 Leopard tanks), adding that "Germany will provide all the help it can, for as long as it takes." Two months later, Germany published a China strategy in which it reassessed its relationship with a more assertive Beijing. One aspect covered in the strategy is the Sino-Russian relationship:

China’s relationship with Russia, in particular since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, is an immediate security concern for Germany. In their joint declaration of 4 February 2022, China and Russia committed to significantly intensifying their cooperation in all spheres … Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is a fundamental violation of the UN Charter. China is not credibly defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, while at the same time it does support Russian narratives that are directed against NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization). We remain engaged in a dialogue with China and urge China to clearly declare its opposition to Russia’s war of aggression.

Still, some members of the German policy establishment do not believe that Russia "wants to follow the Chinese way." Russia has a readiness to escalate against the West, while German experts believe that Beijing does not want to appear confrontational with Europe in particular. Despite obvious economic discrepancies, Russian elites consider their country and culture to be superior to China, according to several European experts interviewed for this paper. They estimate that it would be hard, if not impossible, for China to pull out of the special relationship with Russia. "China is carefully showing Russia that she is the big fish," said Jakub Jakóbowski of the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW).

As for France, Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna has called on China to leverage its relationship with Moscow to convince the Kremlin that "Russia is [at] an impasse and should return to reason." France worries about the growing Chinese convergence on a number of issues, from their rising interest in the Arctic to dual-use technologies, and a potential Sino-Russian collaboration in the Global South. But Beijing has remained relatively quiet on French requests, apart from a telephone conversation between presidents Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelenskyy on April 25, 2023. A few weeks later, President Emmanuel Macron criticized Russia for employing "a form of vassalization with regard to China," cutting ties with Baltic states and pushing Sweden and Finland to join NATO, "which would have been unthinkable two years ago." The statement led to furious comments from the Kremlin. As a leader who has attempted to engage Putin on several occasions — even just days before the war in Ukraine began — Macron can observe that Europeans are now rallying behind NATO, somewhat putting aside his ambitious, prewar "European strategic autonomy," a concept that refers to the ability of European countries to act autonomously and independently of others in strategically important areas. European strategic autonomy has taken a backstep.

The “Asymmetric” Partnership

In many European countries, the Beijing-Moscow axis is seen as an "asymmetric" partnership between two authoritarian regimes preoccupied with their own survival in an international environment that both view as unfriendly. This has been the case, especially since 2012, when Xi Jinping ascended to power and Vladimir Putin had already concluded (in his 12th year in the Kremlin) that the United States’ ambition was to contain — or to overthrow? — his regime. Even though China and Russia have different political cultures and differ in their assessments of one another’s motivations, "they are fundamentally unified by a similar perception of international relations and their approach to foreign policy," according to a 2021 OSW report on the Beijing-Moscow axis.

Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian context and the threat posed by Russia, Eastern and Northern European countries are now under no illusion when it comes to Moscow; their assessment of China is also getting gloomier. They see NATO as the only option to defend their borders. Driven by their own national interests, larger countries such as France, Germany, and Italy are willing to maintain a fairly close dialogue with China — even under such circumstances. No matter what, China is a major power whose decisions will continue to impact the global order. Paris, in particular, sees no option but to build up European defenses rather than rely exclusively on NATO and the United States, and it wants to continue to engage with major powers around the world. As for German multinationals, they see China remaining a fairly attractive consumer market and sometimes a resource center for innovation. The German economy cannot afford to close the door to China.