Synch and swim: How escaping Russia’s electricity grid can strengthen Baltic energy security

Tomorrow, 8 February 2025, is switch-off day for the Baltic states. For many years, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been slowly disentangling themselves from the Russian energy system and integrating into the EU energy market. Following independence, the three countries remained part of the post-Soviet “BRELL” electricity network. In 2018, they reached an agreement with the European Commission and Poland to synchronise with the continental Europe UCTE grid. Desynchronisation with (effectively, disconnecting from) BRELL is now imminent.

Since 2022, they have ceased to import electricity from BRELL, but this nevertheless represents a momentous change that will provide the Baltic states with greater independence and energy stability. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius have long lacked full control over the grid they are  now exiting—the headquarters in Moscow has oversight. Moreover, the Russian and Belarusian infrastructure is outdated and prone to failures. The Baltic states lack access to information on the state of the system and plans for its modernisation and development.

The challenges to Baltic energy security

While the synchronisation of the Baltic states with the EU electricity system marks a significant step towards deeper energy market integration, it also places crucial responsibility on the European Union and its member states to address the energy security challenges this transition brings.

Energy infrastructure security

After synchronisation, the EU and member states must ensure the security of the energy infrastructurethrough which the Baltic states are connected to the EU electricity system. This includes the need to patrol and protect the physical connections that enable synchronisation. These connections include: offshore electricity links between Estonia and Finland (Estlink 1, in operation since January 2007 and Estlink 2, launched in February 2014); the NordBalt connection between Lithuania and Sweden, which entered into operation in December 2015; and the onshore LitPol Link interconnector between Lithuania and Poland, launched in December 2015.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has heightened the need to protect energy infrastructure, as seen with the numerous acts of sabotage reported against such infrastructure in the EU. The most recent example is the damage to the Estlink 2 cable in December 2024. Damage to Nord Stream 1 (both lines) and Nord Stream 2 (one line) can also be counted as acts of sabotage.

Maintaining a “balancing” act

The EU must now also guarantee stable frequency and voltage for the Baltic states once they lose access to Russian grid balancing services. “Grid balancing” means ensuring there is always as much energy as consumers need by balancing electricity supply and demand in real time (and thus preventing power cuts). Once desynchronised with BRELL, the Baltic states will have to rely on neighbouring states and their own modern back-up power plants, energy storage and flexible demand management. Europeans have prepared for this moment, but it is nevertheless the case that the Russian-Belarusian system is very large. Therefore, making up for this puts particular responsibility on the smooth operation of domestic and neighbouring sources of supply. They will have to closely monitor the security of offshore and onshore connections; damage to these could lead to grid disruptions. After desynchronisation, Moscow may become especially interested in acts of sabotage to cause blackouts.

Beware Russian disinformation

A third challenge is Russian disinformation. This has lately gone into overdrive targeting domestic Baltic state audiences to claim desynchronisation will push up prices and threaten the stability of supplies. Such claims are unlikely to be borne out, given most of the necessary investments have taken place, co-financed by the EU or funded through technical measures hidden from consumer view. Additionally, key factors influencing electricity prices—such as local production, fuel prices, weather conditions and network availability—remain unchanged. Indeed, the region has already successfully adapted to operating without electricity imports from Russia.

A Kaliningrad spark

Russian disinformation has also focused on the supposed threat to the Kaliningrad region of Russia. In fact, Moscow has taken steps to prepare Kaliningrad to operate in an isolated system—it has expanded gas and coal-fired power generation capacity, developed gas storage facilities and installed a floating liquefied natural gas terminal. However, there remains an outside chance that Moscow could make energy supply problems to Kaliningrad a pretext for some form of aggression in the region.

How to address these challenges and strengthen EU energy security

Tackling these challenges as part of synchronisation will help the Baltic states and the EU strengthen energy security in the bloc. They should pursue the following main policies.

Invest in Baltic energy infrastructure

First, the Baltic states—together with their EU neighbours and with the support of the EU institutions—should continue to develop their energy infrastructure. They should further expand transmission lines and modernise and invest in new interconnectors to increase the resilience of the system to possible outages and overloads. Of particular importance will be the implementation of the Harmony Link project, a new connection between Poland and Lithuania. The initial launch of this link is planned for 2030, and it is important that the parties complete the project on time. It will also be important to build additional sources of power system flexibility in the Baltic states to ensure adequate balancing. In particular, this requires further investments in energy storage, pumped storage power plants and the expansion of system balancing capacity within the three Baltic states. Increasing renewable energy generation is one way to achieve this. Expansion of the renewables sector will not only increase the flexibility of the system, but will also reduce dependence on importing fossil fuels and thereby strengthen the energy security of the region.

Improve Baltic-EU cooperation

Second, grid stability and frequency control require deeper cooperation with otherEU countries. The Baltic states will need to be able to access power reserves in emergency situations through solidarity mechanisms and cooperation with Poland, Sweden and Finland. This will require greater regional energy cooperation, in particular through the development of common power system management strategies with the Nordic countries and strengthening energy exchange mechanisms in the European market

Strengthen cyber-security

Finally, the EU and member states must consistently strengthen their cyber-security systems to protect against cyber-attacks that could destabilise the electricity system. It will also be important to strengthen cooperation to defend infrastructure against physical threats. Further developing EU-NATO cooperation on critical infrastructure protection will be central to this. The establishment of the Baltic Sentry at the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki in January 2025 is a clear step in the right direction. The Baltic Sentry would comprise a wide range of assets, including frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and a small fleet of naval drones. Improving cooperation within the EU for the military protection of energy infrastructure will enhance the energy security of the bloc as a whole.

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Taken together, these actions will neutralise the challenges and threats from Russia in this arena. But, more importantly, they will contribute to better cooperation between EU member states, thus deepening integration and strengthening the EU energy market.