Russia’s Cultural Diplomacy in Armenia and Azerbaijan to Counter the West and Turkey

Executive Summary

This report focuses on recent developments in the geopolitical dynamics between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, with a particular emphasis on Moscow’s efforts to reinstate its cultural influence in the South Caucasus.

Key events such as the discussions regarding the reopening of the Russian House (Rossotrudnichestvo) in Azerbaijan, and the Kremlin’s attempts to strengthen cultural cooperation with Armenia, illustrate Moscow’s strategic response to the shifting regional balance.

Russia’s waning influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan’s increasing alignment with Western powers provide the context for understanding these actions.

Key Takeaways

• Russia seeks to renew its cultural and diplomatic presence in Azerbaijan by reopening the Rossotrudnichestvo centre.
• Moscow is strengthening its cultural ties with Armenia, seeking to counterbalance Yerevan’s growing alignment with Brussels and Washington.
• Azerbaijan’s growing relationships with Turkey and Armenia’s western pivot threaten Russia’s long-term strategic position in the region.

Background Information

The South Caucasus has long been a region of strategic interest to Russia, owing to its geographical location, energy routes, and ethnic compositions. Historically, Moscow has maintained significant cultural, economic, and military influence over both Yerevan and Baku, albeit through different avenues.

Russia still considers the Caucasus as the other regions of the post-Soviet space, as part of its blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad) and lebensraum (vital space) where the Kremlin aims at exercising its influence.

For Armenia, Russia has been a key ally, providing military support and economic cooperation, primarily within the frameworks of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). However, Yerevan’s strengthening ties with Western institutions show a recent shift in its foreign policy.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has been diversifying its foreign relations, strengthening its alliances with Turkey, Israel, and NATO. Baku engagement with Moscow has increased since Putin and Aliyev signed a Declaration on “Allied Interaction” on 22 February 2022. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s military victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by Turkey, has empowered Baku to adopt a more independent foreign policy.

In this context, Russia’s soft power initiatives, such as the possible opening of the Russian House (Rossotrudnichestvo) in Baku and the increasing cultural cooperation with Armenia, are pivotal in maintaining influence.

On April 6, 2025, Russia’s Special Representative for International Cultural Cooperation, Mikhail Shvydkoy, stated that Moscow is open to expanding cultural ties with Yerevan, depending on Armenia’s participation. He plans to meet with Armenian officials to explore collaborations in film, theatre, performing arts, and art education.

On April 7, 2025, Yevgeny Primakov, stressed that Rossotrudnichestvo’s leadership continues negotiations with Azerbaijan to find a compromise regarding the operation of the Russian House in the country, with the main issue being the legal difficulty of registering the federal agency as a legal entity, though both sides remain optimistic about reaching a solution.

Geopolitical Scenario

Rossotrudnichestvo’s potential reopening in Azerbaijan is a significant development in Moscow’s strategy to maintain its cultural and diplomatic influence in the region. The Russian agency, responsible for promoting Russian language and culture abroad, has long been a cornerstone of the Kremlin’s soft power efforts in post-Soviet states. The February 2025 closure of the Russian House in Baku, however, signifies a step backward.

The primary issue surrounding the closure of the Russian House is legal. Azerbaijani authorities argued that Azerbaijani law prevents registering the Russian agency as a legal entity, thus restricting its operation as a formal diplomatic institution. Rossotrudnichestvo, as a federal body, faces significant hurdles because it is not a commercial or independent organisation, thus complicating its registration in Azerbaijan.

However, Russian authorities have persisted in negotiating with Azerbaijan to find a solution. A broader strategic concern influences Baku: Azerbaijan’s desire to limit Russia’s cultural and political influence, particularly as it strengthens its relationships with Turkey.

Russia is also working to enhance its cultural and political ties with Armenia, seeking to mitigate the effects of Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union and the United States. Armenia’s March 2025 adoption of a law to formally begin the EU accession process marks a major change in its foreign policy. Even so, Yerevan remains dependent on Moscow in key areas, especially military security and cultural diplomacy, considering also that Armenia is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

The Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy in Armenia remains crucial in this context. Russian cultural institutions in Armenia bolster Moscow’s influence, which Yerevan’s frustration over Moscow’s lack of decisive support during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has partly eroded. Russia’s soft power initiatives, including cultural exchanges, language education, and media outreach, are being leveraged to maintain a positive relationship with Armenia and present Moscow as an indispensable partner in Armenia’s cultural and security spheres.

Risk Assessment

1. Potential Diplomatic Strain with Azerbaijan. The legal and political obstacles surrounding the Rossotrudnichestvo’s potential reopening in Azerbaijan could cause prolonged diplomatic friction between the two countries. Azerbaijan’s limits on Russian cultural presence risk worsening relations between the two countries, particularly given Baku’s relations with Ankara.
2. Challenges to Russia’s Cultural Influence in Armenia. Armenia’s move closer to the European Union and the United States presents a major obstacle to Russia’s traditional dominance, even as Moscow maintains its cultural sway. If Armenia deepens its ties with the West, it could reduce the effectiveness of Russia’s cultural diplomacy, even as it seeks to maintain security cooperation through the CSTO and EAEU.
3. Internal Instability in Armenia. The growing domestic unrest in Armenia, particularly among the displaced Nagorno-Karabakh population, could complicate the country’s ability to balance its foreign policy commitments. The Pashinyan government’s inability to resolve internal issues may lead to more instability, hindering its ability to work effectively with Russia and the West.
4. Regional Realignment. As Azerbaijan moves closer to Turkey and Armenia strengthens ties with the EU and the US. Russia’s regional influence is waning, reflecting a wider geopolitical shift. If these alliances become formal security and economic partnerships, Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus could be further limited.

Conclusion

Geopolitical shifts challenge Russia’s power in the South Caucasus, since Azerbaijan and Armenia’s new alliances weaken Moscow’s regional influence despite cultural diplomacy efforts.

The potential reopening of the Russian House in Azerbaijan, coupled with Moscow’s attempts to strengthen its cultural ties with Armenia, highlight the Kremlin’s efforts to maintain a foothold in these key countries. However, regional realignment away from Russia might continue if Moscow will not better conditions and opportunities for both Yerevan and Baku