Russian Regions Lack Money To Hire And Retain Officials To Fulfill Moscow’s Orders – Analysis

• A growing number of Russia’s federal subjects lack funds to hire and retain staff for mandated services and Moscow’s special tasks, such as military-contract bonuses and war-related payments, with the shortage especially acute in economically stronger regions where military-industrial jobs pay more.
• Analyst Konstantin Kalachyov argues that rising central demands and reduced support create risks to administrative quality, program delivery and corruption controls, forcing Moscow into more frequent interventions while the Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” veteran-hiring preference is unlikely to solve the skills gap.
• The piece concludes that the cadre deficit will accelerate governance decline, intensify public and elite discontent, and likely prompt greater repression, particularly during any post-Putin succession.

A growing number of Russia’s federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain the personnel they need to do the jobs they are mandated to do. These jobs play a key role in the government’s overall functioning. The lack of funds prevents these federal subjects from fulfilling Moscow’s orders to perform special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts or making one-time payments to those who lose loved ones in Russia’s war against Ukraine (Vazhniye Istorii, September 2, 2024; Federal Press, June 4, 2025; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 8; Regional’nye Kommentarii, October 12; Odessa Journal, October 20; Radio Svoboda, October 22).

While this pattern holds across the board, somewhat counterintuitively, it appears especially acute in the regions and republics doing well economically. People can work for higher pay in the military-industrial sector rather than in government bureaucracies. In poorer regions and republics, working for the state is often the only game in town (Reuters, November 28, 2024; Regional’nye Kommentarii, October 21).

Consequently, what might seem to a casual observer as a problem restricted to the regions is becoming an all-Russian one. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime is exacerbating the situation by demanding more efficiency and consolidation. It has few good options otherwise—as long as it continues its war against Ukraine—to provide essential services via the federal subjects and stem popular and even elite anger about the loss of such services (7×7, June 9 [1], [2]; Posle.Media, August 26; Window on Eurasia, August 29).

Even as the Russian media becomes ever less free, there has been a growth in the number of articles about the problems Russia’s far-flung federal subjects are having in meeting both their traditional tasks of providing education, healthcare, and other basic services and doing Moscow’s bidding as far as special tasks are concerned. One of the first discussions about how these difficulties are connected with the inability of regional governments to attract and hold staff has now been offered by Konstantin Kalachyov, the head of the Moscow-based Political Expert Group.

In the Regional Comment portal, he says that increasing demands on the governments of the federal subjects and reduced support from Moscow have created a situation in which these essential components of the Russian government lack the funds needed to hire people in the first place or even hold those they have hired in the past (Regional’nye Kommentarii, October 21). 

In that article, Kalachyov focuses on Tatarstan. This republic is doing well in its military-industrial segment, but he suggests that other federal subjects, including those almost equally well-placed, are now losing out in the competition for cadres. As a result, they lack the personnel to carry out either their own mandated responsibilities or the tasks Moscow assigns them, often with unfunded mandates. Specifically, he argues:

The deficit of qualified cadres in state service in Tatarstan really is creating risks for the quality and effectiveness of administration, preventing the timely fulfillment of state programs and may even be accompanied by a growth of threats of corruption. As such, this problem is not just a republican one but a problem for the country as a whole (Regional’nye Kommentarii, October 21).

Addressing these problems, the regional analyst says, will require boosting salaries and improving working conditions for those employed by the federal subject governments. The Putin regime shows no sign of being ready or able to make these moves given its ever-increasing spending on the war against Ukraine. Until it does so, however, Kalachyov argues regional governments will lose staff to favored businesses, and both regional and all-Russian state tasks will not be addressed effectively.  (For others who have made similar, if perhaps less sweeping, points, see Centre for Eastern Studies, June 27, 2024; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 13.)

In the short term, the growing shortage of key officials in the regions also means that Moscow has to intervene even more often than it would otherwise. It cannot count on the regional bureaucracies to carry out its will—or the center must be willing to see a decay in governance across much of the country (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 13).