Russia and the Western Balkans Geopolitical confrontation, economic influence and political interference

The Western Balkancountries have emerged as a frontline in Russia's geopolitical confrontationwith 
the West. While the Russian Federation has strong historical ties with the Western Balkans, and holds 
a certain soft-power attraction for the region, its influence and economic impact there are declining.
Meanwhile, the EU and NATO presence in the region is advancing, and investment and aid fromthe 
EU-27 and other players, such as China, have been dwarfing Russian investment.
Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine has put the Western Balkans on the spot again, pushing their 
governments to take a clear stance towards their historical ally, while the EU has tried to give new 
impetus to the enlargement process and has reinforced its presence in the region. While polls show 
considerable support for EU membership across the Western Balkans, a large majority of Serbian 
citizensin particular continue to consider Russia to be their true ally, despite the EU being Serbia's 
major financial supporter.
The legacy of the Yugoslav Wars − a complex political architecture with precarious balances 
between fractious ethnic and religious communities − has proved fertile ground for the Kremlin's 
influence and interference, especially since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia has used 
the media and information sphere, stepped up its political and economic influence and mobilised 
proxy organisations to project its narratives, protect its interests and slow the region's integration 
into Western institutions.

Geopolitical confrontation

The Western Balkans, a term used to refer to six countries in south-eastern Europe that are covered 
by EU enlargement policy (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo,
1 North 
Macedonia, and Serbia) have emerged as a frontline in Russia's geopolitical confrontation with the 
West. Some academics argue that this confrontation is deeply rooted in shared geography 
(Robert Kaplan); others, that it is an expression of different politicalsystems, values and ideologies 
(ZbigniewBrzezinski). Brzezinski believesthat the US's failure to engage with Russia after the end of 
the Cold War backfired, giving Russia the energy to focus on consolidating its authoritarianrule over 
its own territory and on restoring its influence in the former Soviet Union states and beyond.
The influence of Russia as traditional partner for the Western Balkan countries has grown, reflecting
a certain 'enlargement fatigue', as a realistic path towards EU membership has proved rather slow. 
No new members have joined the EU since Croatia in 2013. Disillusionment with slow progress 
towards EU accession and economic stagnation have created an opening for other geopolitical 
players. At present, all six Western Balkan countries are still on track tojoin the EU, and four of them–
Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – are actually in accession negotiations, which 
have, however, been stalled for years. The 2022 Balkan Barometer showed, however that support 
for EU membership had declined slightly across the Western Balkans, with 60% of the population 
of the six Western Balkans countries endorsing EU accession in 2022 (compared with 62% in 2021).
Russia's war on Ukraine has put the Western Balkans back in the spotlight, pushing their 
governments to take a clear stand on Russia. In parallel, the EU has been under new pressure to 
move the enlargement processforward, openingenlargement negotiations with Albania and North 
Macedonia in July 2022, approving candidate statusfor Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2022 
and nearly doubling the size of the EU peacekeeping mission in that country (EUFOR). Neither the
2020 accession methodology reform nor the stronger political steer, reflected not least in the EUWestern
Balkanssummit declarations, seem however to have been able to rekindle the enlargement 
flame. Some experts point to a shift from 'enlargement fatigue' towards 'enlargement resistance'.
War in Ukraine has also increased immigration from Russia and Ukraine towards the Balkans. More 
than 104 000 Russians and 18 000 Ukrainians have movedto Serbia since Russia invadedUkraine on 
24 February 2022. Russians are welcome in Serbia: nearly 80% of Serbsreportedly oppose sanctions 
against Russia.
Furthermore, Russia's war on Ukraine seems to have tipped EU-27 public opinion in favour of swiftly 
granting EU accession to Ukraine (which, together with Moldova, became a candidate for EU 
accession in June 2022), but not to the countries of the Western Balkans. Despite successful 
EU-Western Balkans summits (most recently in Zagreb, 2020, Brdo, 2021 and Tirana, 2022), there are 
still issues and political agreements, regarding regional cooperation and normalisation of BelgradePristina
relations, that have not yet been fully addressed or implemented, despite EU mediation 
efforts. Experts point out that the recent Ohrid Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia on the 
Implementation Annex of the Agreement on the path to normalisation of relations could remain 
without practical follow-up, like the 2013 Brussels Agreement, as the parties gave only tacit consent 
without actually signing it. The main point agreed between Belgrade and Pristina, the setting up of 
an association/community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo,remains unfinished, 10 years 
after the Brussels Agreement while, in an interview in February 2023, Kosovo Prime Minister 
Albin Kurti said that 'Belgrade wants another Republika Srpska' and that 'the bitter experience in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Republika Srpska should not be forgotten'.
For Serbia, in particular, the conflict in Ukraine has not changed the country's pro-Russian stance. 
Analysts have stressed that, according to recent polls, 'Putin is the world leader that Serbs admire 
the most and 95% of Serbs see Russia as a true ally, compared to only 11% who see the EU that 
way, despite the EU being Serbia's major financial supporter'. Furthermore, 68% of Serbs statedthat 
they believed 'NATO, not Vladimir Putin, was responsible for the war in Ukraine', with 82% opposed 
to Serbia imposing EU sanctions on Russia. Historic grievances, simmering ethnic tensions, high unemployment, a youth exodus, and shaky constitutional arrangementsin countries such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), are creating an opportunity for Russia to leverage its already substantial 
influence in the region.

Russia's soft power, energy investment and economic 
influence
Cultural and historical ties give Russia considerable soft power, particularly among the Serb
population, concentrated mainly in Serbia,the Republika Srpska (one of the two entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) and Kosovo.Historical ties go as far back as the pan-Slav movementof the 19th century 
and Russia's supportfor Serbian independence from the Ottoman Empire. Russia entered World War I 
on Serbia's side. In the Kosovo conflict, Russia condemned the NATO bombing of Serbia and firmly 
opposed Kosovo'sindependence. Russia uses its status as a permanent UN Security Council member 
in Serbia's favour. In 1994 and 2015, Moscow vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions 
condemning violence by Bosnian Serbs, the latter resolution qualifying the 1995 Srebrenica 
massacre as genocide. During the pandemic, this soft power manifested as 'vaccine diplomacy', 
supplying both medical material and vaccines.