Putin's "Negotiations" and Reality

 

 

1. For Putin, a situation has developed in which he is losing the initiative in the "peace talks". Even the announced "truce for May 9" has not improved the situation. There have been negative signals (about lower expectations) from the US. And in Kiev, a meeting of the Ukrainian leadership with European partners was held to develop a negotiating position. The general condition is a 30-day ceasefire, followed by the start of the negotiation process. A simple refusal would mean that Putin is showing a principled unwillingness to negotiate.

 

2. The refusal of "peace talks" has significantly complicated attempts to negotiate with the United States. More precisely, simultaneous trade with the US and China. And this is in the context of the fact that Russia generously paid Xi for his visit on May 9 - in most positions the Russian leadership followed the path of satisfying Beijing's wishes.

 

3. The rejection of “peace talks” against the backdrop of an “obsession with victory” and an ideological construction of the population in which “Russia is fighting for peace around the world” would seem strange. Propaganda has created the myth that Putin wants peace, and Zelensky and his “curators” are sabotaging this process. A clear 180-degree turn, along with the militarization of the Russian budget, is a factor that would have to be compensated for by a new propaganda construction that the Kremlin does not yet have.

 

 4. Going for a 30-day ceasefire and then entering into negotiations is unacceptable for Putin. Given that this thesis is perceived as a "demand" by Ukraine and a number of European states, the Russian leadership perceives its implementation as a weak position. Moreover, "fulfilling the ultimatum of Ukraine and European curators" would also be perceived by the population as a defeat. Regardless of the results of further negotiations. Which poses a risk of internal political destabilization.

 

5. At the same time, Putin understands that the war must be ended in the next 12-18 months. Otherwise, the economic situation and the loss of political influence of the Russian Federation (especially in post-Soviet countries) could become a problem.

 

6. Putin understands that the goals of the so-called "SVO" are unattainable. Even with all the demands made by the Kremlin. There is still no holistic vision of how to get out of the war.

 

 

Putin does not support the idea of a ceasefire. But he states that he wants negotiations to start as soon as possible. On the basis of the 2022 negotiations. At the same time, Putin postponed his speech. Perhaps, waiting for the start of the Ukrainian drone attacks. Then there would be an ideal situation - a "case study". I did not wait. And he started speaking after the Russian Federation itself launched the "Shaheed" in Ukraine. However, with this statement, Putin pursues the following goals:

— To play on Trump's theses about the need for direct negotiations. And in a way, to play with the US president in his statements about reducing the US's efforts as a mediator. Simply put, give Trump a "victory story" so that he can say that he brought the parties to the negotiating table.

— Given that after signing the resource agreement (leaving its benefits for Ukraine "in parentheses") it would be difficult for the White House to take a position of soft dialogue with the Russian Federation, Putin's statement is important - it balances Trump's relations and allows for the intensification of the Russian-American negotiation path.

— To force Ukraine to agree to such a proposal and take the initiative in peace negotiations. For Kiev, a public refusal to travel to Turkey is politically unprofitable - the Kremlin receives arguments confirming its thesis that "Zelensky does not want peace".

— In this way, to try to destroy the construction of a possible framework (and subject) of negotiations, which is being built by the leaders of Ukraine and a number of European countries.

— And, most importantly, to try to create a rift among Ukraine's partners. First of all, between European leaders and Trump. Second, within the EU itself, because many countries will consider the Russian proposal and the negotiations in Turkey a real step towards peace.

— To drag Ukraine into a protracted negotiation process without the participation of European partners and the United States. That is, to divide the negotiating paths, trying to respect concessions from the United States and the European Union for the alleged

"progress" in the negotiations. In isolation from the real results of the process. An example of this is the agreement on cereals. When, in parallel with the development of mechanisms for ensuring supplies, the Kremlin negotiated with the United States on the suspension of sanctions on Russian fertilizers.

- Leave yourself the possibility of conducting active combat operations, presenting their positive outcome as an argument in the negotiation process. To understand what this looks like, it is enough to recall the Debaltseve operation of the Russian Federation and the conclusion of Minsk-2.

 

 

Negotiations will most likely begin. But rapid progress is questionable. Russia from the very beginning has been entering the process (and emphasizing this) on the basis of documents that were considered in 2022, when Russian troops were near Kiev. And Ukraine did not have any external military or economic assistance. Moreover, Putin emphasizes precisely the "continuation" of the process, stating that the draft agreement was "initialized" by the parties. But today it is 2025, and the positions of the parties differ sharply. Even relying on Putin's "negotiation based on the situation "on the ground", a look at the maps of combat operations of 2022 and 2025 leads to the conclusion that the Kremlin's demands are unacceptable. But Trump, and a number of European leaders, are unlikely to go into such subtleties. Or they will be discussed publicly. Which will allow the Russian Federation to actively conduct a propaganda campaign in the EU, the USA and a number of neutral states.

Therefore, there is a risk of delaying the negotiations. Moreover, each of the parties will be limited in its ability to exit the process - after all, this is a demonstration of "unwillingness to negotiate". Again, we have an example from history - the notorious "Minsk process" with its trilateral contact group.

In this context, Russia will try to extract positive results for itself from the summer campaign. And at the same time, it will actively try to reach a number of agreements with the USA. Offering Washington the Northern Sea Route, resource development and joint sales of Russian hydrocarbons on the European market.

But, even if the Trump administration is interested in "quick deals" with Russia, it is unlikely that they will be able to speed up the negotiation process. Especially in the context of active hostilities led by Russia.

On the other hand, Washington has realized that creating a "path of reconciliation" between Russia and Ukraine before the US-China summit is impossible. And they understand that the contours of peace in Ukraine will largely be determined by the results of negotiations between the US and the PRC. And, also, the US-EU. That is, not before the end of the summer.

For China, which has expressed its readiness to enter the negotiation process or the process of seeking peace, it also makes sense to wait. On the one hand, there is clarity regarding the American direction. On the other hand, the process of connecting the Russian economy with the Chinese is gaining momentum, and Beijing is in no hurry.

Therefore, new contours of the peace process and a peaceful solution may appear sometime in the fall. Then the results of the summer campaign will be clear. At the same time, the issue of natural gas trade on the European market will be extremely topical (and, if there are Russian-American agreements, peace in Ukraine will become necessary). Then the format of coexistence between China and the United States will also be clear.

For Ukraine, the task is to avoid pitfalls in the negotiation process with the Russian Federation (and here, unfortunately, in history since 2014, the Kremlin has often been successful). But this is understandable. Implicitly, task number 1 is to build a system of interaction with EU partners, as well as with a number of regional leaders (for example, Turkey, Arab monarchies, Egypt). And if possible, to create its own path of consultations and negotiations with China.