Putin will continue to fight - 2025 forecast
After 2027, Putin's strategic defeat in the war may occur
For Putin, this war has long since become existential, in other words, it is victory or death for him. He does not see the point of living with a geopolitical defeat in the end, so there are no compromises in which his victory is obscured or not obvious. This will determine his behavior in potential negotiations with Trump. But first, let's see what Russia's capabilities are for further fighting, which is determined by weapons and economy.
Armament
Everything is clear with the people, there are enough people, and despite the losses, the Russians even manage to increase their presence in Ukraine. However, the situation with weapons can be said to be catastrophic. According to various sources, the Russian defense industry can produce a maximum of 200 new tanks per year. According to OSINTer data, there are now about three thousand tanks left in warehouses, of which only 18 percent are in satisfactory condition, and the rest are in very bad condition.
Generally, according to various estimates, all reserves will be used up within 2025-26. This means that Putin can maintain the pace of the war for another two years. North Korea, which has already started performing the function of "Urals of the Soviet Army in the Second World War", will also come to the rescue. It is North Korea's military-industrial complex that supplies the Russian army with shells on a colossal scale.
In addition, Putin is shifting the economy to a military system. This means the transfer of large resources to military production. It is clear that in the next two years the production of new types of weapons should be established in order to compensate for the possible decline with the end of Soviet stocks. There is good reason to believe it will fail for several reasons.
The first is the implementation of large financial infusions into the military industry, which already has the negative consequences of high inflation. Another is the lack of workers and professional staff. It is clear that his team is actively working on solutions, but I am inclined to think that in 2027 it will be difficult for him to continue the war on the same scale. Moreover, it is not only necessary to maintain the tempo of the war, but also to restore the lost military potential.
Economy
The economy of the Russian Federation shows high resistance and ineffectiveness of Western sanctions. To this day, the average Russian feels only prosperity since the war. Wages are growing, the number of vacancies is growing, investments in infrastructure are growing, social benefits are growing, especially in poor regions where the most hidden mobilization has taken place. It is expected that the GDP of the Russian Federation will show a growth of four percent this year and this is one of the highest indicators for many years.
However, the economic outlook is not so good in the coming years. The Russian economy has entered stagflation – when inflation is high and production is falling. Although Russia manages to generate revenues from the sale of oil and gas to support current budget expenditures, it is clearly not enough to invest billions in the transition to military production and infrastructure.
The economy lacks private investments, access to capital markets, and such a model will not be able to exist for long. According to various forecasts, the Russian economy will decline by 2027, but the catastrophe will not occur. However, from 2027, it can be assumed that the Russian economy will experience systemic degradation, accompanied by technological backwardness, which will eventually lead to collapse, as happened with the Soviet Union.
The risk of this degradation is the biggest challenge for Putin today. Because winning the war but losing the economy is very similar to his favorite "geopolitical disaster" - the collapse of the USSR.
Putin's actions
As you can see, nothing catastrophic awaits Russia before 2027, but after 2027 there may be a strategic defeat in the war. If Trump proposes negotiations, Putin will respond from a position of strength and dictate unacceptable terms for neither Ukraine nor Trump.
Moreover, I think that before Trump's inauguration, military actions will be intensified in all directions, with the aim of demonstrating the "imminence of Russian victory". At the same time, given the above, it makes no sense for Trump to negotiate with Putin on his terms, realizing the possibility of his defeat after 2027.