Propaganda, bribery, resettlement and... savings. How Russia is trying to "conquer" the occupied territories

How to make an assessment? Any action, any policy requires resources. Resources are the budget. And by analyzing Russian finances, we can come to some rather interesting conclusions. In particular, let's say, which areas is the Kremlin "ready to trade" if events develop according to a negative scenario for the Russian Federation and a quick freeze is required. Let's get started.

 

Outlines of Kremlin policy

 

After occupying the territory and holding the "referendum", the Russian Federation faced several political tasks:

- To show its population that "Russia is restoring order". That is, it needs personnel for conventional "large-scale construction".

- To create the same image outside. To demonstrate the restoration of peaceful life and, allegedly, better conditions for citizens than in Ukraine.

- To ensure control over the process. That is, to resolve personnel issues and implement the decisions made.

- To ensure the loyalty of the local population, and in the long run, its assimilation.

On task 1, information sometimes gets through. For example, a railway to Crimea or highways. But for Russia, the key (especially in terms of maintaining the situation) is people.

More precisely, their demonstrative support for the Kremlin as an additional argument for "justifying" the occupation and confirming territorial claims to Ukraine. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on mechanisms that can ensure results according to tasks 3 and 4. These include: saturation with foreign managers. Russia does not trust "foreign" leaders much - and the occupied territories (even those occupied in 2014) have not yet become "theirs". In addition, the Russian Federation is pursuing a policy of minimizing the independence of "subjects of the Federation".

In this case, it would be naive to believe that Putin would rely on local elites. Even if they swore allegiance to the king 1000 times. What is happening? Since 2023, a mass import of Russian managers to key positions has begun. The locals, for illustration, of course, remain. But they cannot act independently - at every stage of decision-making (and their implementation) there is staff from Russia.

 

Some of them use work "in new regions" as a springboard for career advancement. These Kiriyenko girls (he is the curator of personnel policy and policy in the occupied territories) receive a promotion after four to five months of "business trip".

The second group is those who came for a longer period. The level of representatives of this subgroup is lower management, but high business qualities are not required of them. This requires diligence, detachment from local elites and loyalty. Most often, thanks to the Kremlin, since the previous place of living and working may not have been very comfortable (even compared to the front-line regions).

 

Issues of demonstrative loyalty are being addressed in the short term by population replacement policies. Some of the pro-Ukrainian residents have left the territory. Those who remain are being forced to take Russian passports. Initially, this requirement was made mandatory for all real estate transactions (including confirmation of ownership), for work. Putin’s decree further requires “Ukrainian citizens illegally residing in the Russian Federation to legalize themselves” by September 10.

Simply put, residents of the temporarily occupied territories are being offered the option of obtaining a Russian passport or leaving. And, finally, encouraging the reverse process – the return of refugees to the occupied territories. There are both carrots and sticks here: the threat (realized) of nationalizing “ownerless” real estate, on the one hand, and budget compensation for property damaged as a result of hostilities, on the other.

But betting only on the local population is risky. The Kremlin understands this and is implementing the old imperial policy of “replacement.” When instead of the deported or exterminated (in our case, refugees in Ukraine and Europe), loyal populations are imported from the depressed regions of the Russian Federation. And these newly arrived citizens will be sincerely grateful to Putin and will perceive the threat of returning territories to Ukraine as a threat to their vital interests. By the way, in Crimea, the Russian Federation managed to replace up to 20 percent of the population.

Assimilation. The most complex and long-lasting project. The task is to raise a new generation of Russian citizens. The Russian Federation implemented this policy without restrictions in Crimea and, with its specificities, relatively successfully in the territory of the so-called "L/DNR" (in the initial stage, they created a regional, but no longer Ukrainian identity there).

For these purposes, personnel are needed - teachers, university lecturers, library staff, cultural centers, etc. Such people should be brought, preferably for a long time, leaving them to live in the new region. And, finally, only regular events (from holidays to street decorations) that create the necessary and, most importantly, permanent atmosphere. Then time flies.

All of the above is possible only if resources are available. First of all, money. Therefore, it is appropriate to assess the planned spending of the Russian Federation in the so-called "new regions". More precisely, subsidies coming from the Center - their size and specificity allow us to assess the contours of the policy in the occupied territories.

Financing of Russian policy in the occupied territories is carried out in several areas, established in the budget of the Russian Federation for 2025:

- The State Program "Recovery and Socio-Economic Development of the Donetsk People's Republic, Lugansk People's Republic, Zaporozhye Region and Kherson Region" was adopted by analogy with the "Crimean". Its total budget for 2025 is 319.6 billion Russian rubles, or (at the average annual exchange rate) about three billion dollars. On the whole, this is just creating a "picture" - investments in construction, infrastructure, medical facilities, etc.

- Targeted financing of projects in the interests of other departments. For example, part of the road construction is financed from the budget of the Ministry of Defense. Part of the work on the restoration of port operations under the "export promotion" program.

- Maintenance of facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Investigative Committee, the FSB, as well as official housing for such categories are budgets of the relevant departments. Most of the budgets of these departments are closed. But according to the collected data, it is planned to spend at least 140 million Russian rubles (about $ 14.7 million) on providing housing for officers. It is worth remembering that a significant part of the "square meters" is the confiscated housing stock of Ukrainians who left the occupied zone, which is "state income". And by September, the size of this housing stock will increase many times over. It should be repeated once again - the figures for housing are minimal - something that the authors of the budget law (or speakers at the Duma speeches) did not consider it necessary to hide under the label "secret".

But there is another mechanism. More precisely, a group of 222 separately prescribed areas for which inter-budgetary transfers and subsidies for the subjects of the Federation are provided for performing tasks important for the central government. The occupied territories of Ukraine pass through 177 of them. Moreover, 32 (and only 11 - within the framework of the above-mentioned state program) are aimed exclusively at the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions (their parts occupied by the Russian Federation).

The latter give an idea of the specifics of the work on the transformation of the occupied territories into "Russian". Moreover, both from the point of view of priorities and from the point of view of the implementation phase: in some areas, the expenditure figures are approximate - simply in equal shares for each of the regions. This indicates an understanding of the need for spending, but a lack of understanding of how much money is actually needed. But some of the directions were calculated and planned in detail.

 

Specifics of cash expenditures. A story about numbers

 

To begin with, it is worth mentioning the investment programs in the "change" picture. The program (logically) provides for the purchase of medicines and subsidies to medical institutions. But, in addition to this, there is funding for various types of sports structures, and even "ANO (Autonomous Non-Profit Organization)" - this is the name of non-profit organizations in the Russian Federation.

For example, funds for the participation of regional "teams" in competitions. Next is the construction of sports halls and open spaces. Of course, schools. And, for example, public transport and school buses.

And here is the first "but". It is surprising that public transport for the so-called "L/DNR" and the Kherson region is "forgotten" in the school bus program. The same goes for ambulances. Again "without Kherson residents". Looking more closely, it should be said that these are not unique examples of "forgetting".

 

In short, the costs, the results of which can be "shown" to local residents, amount to about 75 million dollars in equivalent. At the same time, for example, the program for the development of "rural areas" demonstrates the lack of real plans, but the availability of money - "500 million" is allocated to each of the regions. Without details and specifics.

Of course, someone has to talk about successes. Therefore, regional information systems will be financed with money from the federal budget. With a total budget of the program of 1.688 billion Russian rubles. To this should be added about 1.15 billion in grants and subsidies to various non-governmental organizations "in the center" for work in the "new territories" and the creation of "patriotic content".

In total, the Russian Federation will spend about 401 million dollars in dollar equivalent to create an image of the success of "peaceful life". But this is not enough. The Kremlin needs to carry out population exchange - to expel part of them from the occupied territories, and part, on the contrary, return. And bring your own. This is where the fun begins.

Russia has launched a "compensation" program for property damaged and destroyed as a result of hostilities. To receive payments, of course, you must have a Russian passport and contact local authorities. It is planned to spend more than 21 billion Russian rubles ($226 million) for these purposes.

Of which 16 are planned for the Donetsk region. The program is designed for at least three years. Budget plans include similar expenditures for both 2026 and 2027. A good "incentive" for those planning to return. The only questionable thing is the disproportionately small share of Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. But why is this so - a little later.

The next stage is to attract new residents. Managers, teachers, propagandists, and so on. Simply put, those who will govern and educate the local population. For such people, salary increases comparable to the "northern coefficients" are provided. And, also, a one-time payment of "raising". Including young specialists.

In short, it looks like this:

 

- Cultural workers – 620 million.

 

- Doctors in rural areas – 270 million.

 

- Teachers in primary and secondary schools – 2.11 billion. Plus an additional supplement of 294 million. Plus "lifts" for teachers for relocation - 16 million.

And, finally, the most "fat" item - additional payments to all (!) civil servants - 14 billion. And if we take the division by regions, then the amount for each region significantly exceeds the average indicators for the Russian Federation for individual subjects of the Federation.

If you think that's all, there are also benefits for paying for housing and utilities. The number of beneficiaries naturally includes "new residents". For these purposes, the Russian Federation is ready to spend another 819 million.

In total, at least 19 billion rubles or $ 190 million are spent on additional payments and benefits. At the same time, there is a noticeable imbalance in the amounts allocated to "cultural workers" - most of all in the Lugansk and Kherson regions. Although they are not the most densely populated.

But, perhaps, the most problematic in terms of the perception of "great Russian culture" by residents. Such a disproportionate imbalance, but only in the Lugansk region, concerns incentives for the relocation of teachers.

 

And finally, housing construction. Three programs are key here:

- Improving housing conditions for war veterans and persons equated with them.

- Construction of housing for war veterans and persons equated with them.

- Subsidies for the construction of new housing by local authorities.

The first two programs include a clearly defined target group. It is logical to assume that these are not "veterans of the Second World War" - there are very few of them left.

But they could be "veterans of the SVO", simply military pensioners. More than a billion Russian rubles will be spent on housing for such people in the four occupied regions by 2025.

And here again there is a surprising imbalance, the largest costs fall on... Zaporozhye region. Lugansk and Kherson received the least.

 

But the local government housing construction program is even more exciting. It is planned to allocate money to the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. In Zaporizhia, 0 rubles are allocated for these purposes in 2025.

The first tranches in 2026. And Kherson, 0 rubles for all three years of the budget plans. Strange, isn't it?

 

About distortions

 

Speaking of distortions in budget financing, it is noticeable that the cultural and educational component is sharply increasing in the occupied parts of the Kherson and Lugansk regions.

It seems that not everything is going smoothly there with the "Russian world". There are plans to radically change the demographic picture of the region with the Zaporizhia region by bringing in "young professionals" and military pensioners. Simply put, creating a kind of analogue of Crimea.

But at the same time, the Russian Federation is in no hurry with capital investments in the Kherson region and is postponing expenses for the Zaporizhia region until 2026. This suggests that the Kremlin will see these regions as a "bargaining chip" if the war follows scenarios that are extremely undesirable for Russia.

 

Of course, we are not talking about the entire Zaporizhzhya region - that is not the reason why military personnel are brought there. And no one will simply "return" Kherson. But until the outlines of an agreement exist, Putin is in no rush to spend money. At the same time, work continues on replacing the population and nurturing the loyalty of the local population.

 

What does this have to do with Ukraine? At a minimum, assess what programs the Russian Federation is implementing and respond to them in a timely manner:

- Population replacement is a worrying process. But finding out who is being transported can make the relocation, at least, psychologically unpleasant for such "new residents".

 

- Russia cares about schools - policy mistakes regarding ORDLO should not be repeated. Mechanisms are needed to provide real educational and cultural content to occupied Ukrainians.

 

- The Kremlin is bribing with "compensation" - it makes sense to analyze social support for temporarily displaced persons and think about how to support these people. Including housing (of course, not modularly).

- After all, the Russian Federation is trying to "reward" its soldiers with Ukrainian land and real estate. No one is stopping Ukraine from thinking about mechanisms for involving foreign volunteers in the settlement of currently prepared (or occupied) territories, which are currently helping to repel Russian aggression.

 

- Any other real (not just media) projects that will strengthen Ukraine's positions and make it more difficult for Russia to implement its policy of control over the regions. If you don't act now, tomorrow may be too late.