Phantom Army: Why New Russian Divisions Won't Change the Situation on the Front

 

We will consider several factors that are of key importance and affect the nature of combat operations, but are not directly related to the actions of enemy units and formations in certain selected directions.

 

The question of completion

 

Today, according to various estimates, the total number of the so-called "united group of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Southwestern Military District" (the official name for the various groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation fighting in Ukraine) is from 610,000 to 630,000 people. This figure is not static, it is constantly changing, with more or less people, depending on various factors, starting from the regrouping of troops to the increase/decrease in the pace of mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces of Russia. However, there are no significant changes (about 50,000 thousand) more or less. It is clear that the Russian command at the end of last year (2024) failed to achieve the "planned" number of 730,000 to 750,000 soldiers in its "active army". The deficit is at least about 100,000 people.

According to numerous reports, the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation plans to increase the total strength of its armed forces by approximately 320,000 to 340,000 people this year. And as far as I understand, it is planned to get the missing 100,000 soldiers in the "active army" precisely from this increase.

Thus, the Russian command plans to solve two main tasks at once in the field of recruitment for the further conduct of the war:

- to compensate for the high level of losses in a number of units and formations that are directly participating in the hostilities;

- if possible, to increase the number of the strategic grouping of troops in Ukraine, especially in its reserve component.

It is clear that in this case all this is directly related to such a non-trivial process as the formation and deployment of strategic reserves. And as a consequence — the planning and conduct of further offensive operations.

 

The main difficulty for the Russian military command in this matter is that it will be very problematic to ensure such a significant "recruitment" solely at the expense of "hybrid" mobilization, which has a mixed contractual and forced nature. In order to further achieve the tasks set, they will have to carry out a full-fledged and open mobilization schedule (mobilization) of their army. More precisely, they will announce (and carry out in reality) the next stage of the so-called "partial" mobilization, which no one (at least officially) has even canceled.

The Kremlin has not yet made a final decision on the beginning of its practical implementation. It must be understood that they are fully aware of the possible social and political consequences of such a radical step and are still trying to "come up with the necessary indicators" on the deployment of mobilization exclusively in a "hybrid way".

Why is this so important for the further progress and content of the war?

Because the scale and intensity of hypothetical offensive actions by Russian troops (for example, in the spring and summer of this year) has a direct and immediate connection with the number, structure and combat capabilities of their main groups, as well as with the state of their strategic reserves.

The math here is simple and straightforward. If, figuratively speaking, you send, on average, 30,000 to 40,000 people to cities such as Avdiyevka or Toretsk (these are still "careful" calculations), then it is quite possible to imagine how many you will need, for example, at the moment to "attack" the Slavonic-Kramator agglomeration via the "Sukharov" or "Ksakharian agglomeration" or the Dnieper in its lower reaches, despite ongoing losses. It is obvious that even the presence of that very "scarce" 100,000 additional troops for the entire strategic grouping of troops will not make the "time" special in this sense.

It is needed - "rise, great country, rise to the death battle." But the longer the rise lasts, the harder it is. And even for "good money". Well, if they even try to "rise" without money, by force, then it can be ended "by mail, telegraph and telephone",

and this time not so much by the forces of some half-witted sailors from the "Aurora", but by completely "reliable" reserve units and formations.  

 

On reorganization (reformation)

 

In the two Russian general military armies (OVA), which currently operate as part of the grouping of troops (GV) "South" — the 51st OVA and the 3rd OVA (yes, these are the former, so-called "army corps of the DPR and LPR"), by reforming separate motorized brigades (omsbr) into motorized divisions (omsbr) they were transformed into motorized units.

It is likely that each of the armies will have three motorized divisions. It is still too early to say how this will all look in practice, but in some brigades of these armies, on the basis of which these divisions will be formed, there are already those that significantly exceed the brigade level in number (at least formally). The rest will probably be disbanded.

In addition, these brigades operate directly at the front not only with their “regular” composition, but also lead a certain number of units attached to them (as a rule, some separate infantry/motorized regiment-battalion, or even more of them, in whose composition they are mostly “partially mobilized”).

Probably, the Russian command is trying to regulate the processes of combat management in these armies by improving their organizational and staff structure.

It is assumed that each of the motorized divisions that will be part of these armies will consist of four “line” regiments – two assault and two “reinforced” + a self-propelled artillery regiment (SAP), as well as a set of combat and logistical support units at the divisional level.

The term “motorized” in relation to these formations should not be misleading. Infantry regiments and battalions will make up the lion's share of these components. The name “motorized infantry”, most likely, will be attached to them in advance. Although the Russian command plans to "reform" all rifle units and units of these divisions into motorized units in the future.

For clarification, it is planned that the 51st OVA will include three motorized rifle divisions — the 1st MSD, the 110th MSD and the 132nd MSD. But the 132nd MSD will, for example, be formed on the basis of the 101st and 109th separate rifle regiments (OSP), three separate rifle battalions (OSB) — the 269th, 270th and 272nd — will be united into the second rifle regiment of this division — the OSP will be only formal, and the 10th rifle part of the 1436th MSP division (the four-digit regiment number clearly hints that it is also not completely "motorized",

because apparently "by its origin" it belongs to the so-called "mobilization reserve" with a very limited number of precisely "motorized" means).

 

For these formations, the "tank question" also remains open. It is unclear whether each of the divisions will receive a tank regiment or will be limited to a separate tank battalion and regular battalions in the regiments. But, by all accounts, it will be very tense with tanks in these divisions, and therefore in both armies. It is quite possible that each of these armies will receive a separate tank regiment and will rest on it (well, or rest "in peace")...

The presence of anti-aircraft missile and engineering-mining units, as well as other formations of the regimental level, is obviously not provided for in these divisions. Most likely, these types of troops in the composition of both armies will be represented exclusively by units of the "special battalion/division" level. It is likely that such regiments will appear exclusively at the army level.

Based on all of the above, it can be concluded that this "reformatting" of the organizational and personnel structure of both "Donbas armies" is most likely being carried out solely as an improvement of their management system and is unlikely to lead to a significant increase in their numbers, and therefore combat capabilities.

On paper, these "Donbas armies" with three "motorized" divisions in their composition will look quite "threatening". In fact, they will most likely remain as army corps in terms of their combat potential.