Peace negotiations. Are they possible?

 

Ahead of the peace summit, which is extremely important for Ukraine, there is increasing talk of upcoming negotiations as a chance to end the largest war in Europe since World War II. Despite the sharp rejection of this idea in Ukraine, recently the Secretary of the National Security Council, Aleksandr Litvinjenko, admitted that Ukraine is aware that the war with Russia will end through negotiations. Recently, President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned that the "atmosphere in the world" calls for negotiations to end the war. The Ukrainian side expects that the basis for starting the end of the war will be precisely the "Formula of Peace" it promotes. No one is giving up on the ultimate maximalist goal of returning to the 1991 borders, but even Ukraine's friends, like Czech President Petr Pavel, say that these demands are unrealistic at this stage. Therefore, options are being considered for Ukraine to make certain uncomfortable concessions (temporarily). This should become a precondition for at least initiating dialogue between the victim and the aggressor. Zelensky has already announced that only three out of the 10 directions recorded in the "Formula of Peace" will be discussed at the summit in Switzerland: radiological and nuclear security, food supply security, and the release of prisoners and deported persons. It has been decided that the "heavier" topics (especially the withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, restoration of territorial integrity) will be postponed for the future.

 

The Western press is actively laying the groundwork for the beginning of the negotiation process. Messages are openly being sent out that "war-weary" leaders of Western countries are preparing to exert diplomatic pressure on Zelensky to push him into negotiations with Russia, in order to stop the bloody horror in the center of Europe. In line with this, a backdrop is being drawn - the objective problems of the Armed Forces on the front, the growing pressure of Russian troops, and the threat of Ukraine losing new territories. This depiction of events is covered almost every week, sometimes hyperbolized, in many Western media outlets.

 

The recent visit to Kiev by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, whose true motives remained behind the scenes, was interpreted by many as a preparation of Ukrainian partners for compromise in order to freeze the war.

 

But there are many obstacles on the way to negotiations with the Russian dictator. And one of them is caused by the decree of Volodymyr Zelensky from 2022.

 

All for negotiations, but...

 

A temporary victory for the organizers of the Peace Summit was India's agreement to participate in it - a country that is considered, if not "pro-Russian," then among the list of countries for which there is no doubt that it has a special sentiment towards Ukraine and its tragedy. In fact, at this stage, the Ukrainian plan is based on attracting more countries to its side, ones that the Kremlin has not yet managed to blacklist as "hostile." Zelensky states that it would be a diplomatic advantage if a significant number of countries participated in the event, and based on its results, an appropriate statement is adopted.

 

For all three points, technical roadmaps will be developed, which will then be planned to be presented to Russia, which is not invited to the peace summit, at various locations. The Ukrainian side, believing in the success of this format, draws direct parallels with the "grain agreement": then Ukraine negotiated its plan with the UN and Turkey, and they had already "settled" it with the Russians. This allowed Kiev and Moscow to avoid direct negotiations. Truth be told, it should be noted that the "grain agreement" achieved in this cunning manner has been disrupted and is currently not functioning. But involving as many guarantors as possible in Zelensky's "peace plan" should ensure it doesn't meet the fate of a "stillborn."

 

Russia predictably cries out that without its participation, all such measures are meaningless and does everything to disrupt the peaceful summit. Namely, the absence of representatives of the aggressor country in the West raises the greatest skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the negotiations. The Kremlin's stance is known for its cynicism: officially not giving up on peace talks, which Putin reiterated during a visit to one of his rare partners - China. However, this declared readiness is accompanied by numerous conditions: Moscow stubbornly demands that the "reality on the ground" be taken into account (meaning, at least recognition of its control over already occupied territories) and reliable guarantees - the concept of security for Russia, under which the Russian dictator actually sees a "fair" division of the world into spheres of influence by analogy with Soviet times.

 

Putin also regularly mentions the so-called Istanbul peace agreements between Ukraine and Russia. According to his version, they were ready to be signed at the very beginning of the war but were thwarted by the fault of the Ukrainian side and its "Western sponsors." If it were possible to reach an agreement in 2022, then Kiev could allegedly manage with "minor" concessions such as partial "demilitarization," a legal ban on "fascism and nationalism," rejection of Ukraine's NATO membership, status for the Russian language, etc., and it would be possible to avoid the current bloodshed. But all of these, of course, are fairy tales for which Putin has never been responsible.

 

Reminding of the Istanbul agreements, Putin never tires of repeating how he was deceived and betrayed, which has become a meme, even among the Z-generation. The dictator continues to insist that these pieces of paper can be the basis of a future peace plan. Of course, considering the same "reality on the ground." And the current attempts by the Kremlin to expand its control over Ukrainian territories at all costs, according to many observers, indicate the creation of a broader basis for future negotiations.

 

 

"The decree," which is tiresome

 

Another reason for Putin's dissatisfaction and a reason to accuse Ukraine of excessive "belligerence" and unwillingness to negotiate is the decree issued by Volodymyr Zelensky on September 30, 2022. With this decree, the Ukrainian president implemented the decision of the Security Council "Regarding Ukraine's actions in response to the attempt by the Russian Federation to annex territories of our state, with the aim of guaranteeing the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and restoring its territorial integrity." The first point of this decision reads: "Establish the impossibility of negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin."

 

It is necessary to understand the context of the appearance of such a document: it is not accidental that it was adopted on September 30, 2022. On this day, after hastily held quasi-referendums there, there was the "official" annexation of four Ukrainian regions - Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson by Russia. On the same day, the theft of Ukrainian territories was condemned by the European Union, the United Nations, and NATO, and Ukraine submitted a request for accelerated accession to the North Atlantic Alliance.

 

Since then, Zelensky has not revoked this decree, and Putin regularly reminds him of it, calling it a "decree," and throwing his hands up. He said we are not against it, but Zelensky himself banned any negotiations with Russia. The Russian dictator is, as usual, fickle: if you stick to the wording, then the decision of the National Security Council, on the basis of which the presidential decree was issued, does not mention the impossibility of negotiations with Russia. Only a specific person is mentioned - Russian President Putin. At least at that time, Ukraine recognized Putin as such.

 

So, will Zelensky's emotional decree from 2022 somewhat interfere with dialogue with the Kremlin, if it does happen after all? The aforementioned "grain agreement" showed that for reaching an agreement, if there is the will, it can be done without the involvement of the top officials of states and even without direct contact between states.

 

Another example of such a non-standard agreement is the infamous Minsk agreements - born after a sleepless night by Putin, then-President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President François Hollande. But there are no signatures of any of them on the final document. Instead, the most important roadmap, which was supposed to regulate the peace process and around which so much debate revolved, was signed by second-tier officials (Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov, OSCE Special Representative from Ukraine Heidi Tagliavini), representatives of separatists Oleksandr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plotnitsky without mentioning their status, and former President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. Thus, the "Minsk" case shows that it is possible to proceed without Putin's formal signature on other key documents.

 

Another example of such a non-standard agreement is the infamous Minsk agreements - born after a sleepless night by Putin, then-President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President François Hollande. But there are no signatures of any of them on the final document. Instead, the most important roadmap, which was supposed to regulate the peace process and around which so much debate revolved, was signed by second-tier officials (Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov, OSCE Special Representative from Ukraine Heidi Tagliavini), representatives of separatists Oleksandr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plotnitsky without mentioning their status, and former President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. Thus, the "Minsk" case shows that it is possible to proceed without Putin's formal signature on other key documents.

 

A diplomat notes that currently there isn't even a topic for contacts and negotiations between Ukraine and Russia: "So far, directions have been identified along which some general approaches can be formulated, and based on these general approaches, attempts to make plans for the implementation of these approaches will begin. Only then will it be clear whether it will even take off, and if so, then it will be possible to talk about some forms of conveying this information to the other side."

 

However, those around Zelensky, who has always shied away from excessive formalism, have a less conservative view of diplomatic canons. Former Deputy Head of the Delegation in the Contact Group in Minsk, and now Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation, international lawyer Alexander Merezhko, believes that from the standpoint of diplomacy, the most important thing is the authorization to represent and conduct negotiations on behalf of the state. To whom these authorizations will be delegated are purely internal matters.

 

"Sometimes it's not even necessary to sign a legally binding international agreement; it's enough to conclude a political agreement," says the parliamentarian. "Because the Minsk agreements and the Budapest Memorandum were not international treaties. It's important whom you're entering into an agreement with, whether it's a reliable counterpart or not. And such a political agreement can be even more reliable than a treaty. For example, in 1997, we concluded a friendship treaty with Russia, but it didn't work out. And now we are concluding international agreements of a political nature with various countries on security aspects, and they are more reliable."

 

 

In any case, if it concerns long-term peace (or, let's say, Russia's capitulation), nothing will prevent Zelensky from revoking his own decree on the impossibility of negotiations with Putin. However, Merezhko believes it is unlikely that the decree will be revoked.

 

"International diplomatic practice has developed many forms, especially for negotiations with terrorists. There is such a way of conducting negotiations as shuttle diplomacy, when there is a person who goes to one side that doesn't want to engage in direct negotiations, and then - to the other," says Merezhko. "And even theoretically, our president doesn't need to revoke the decree when it comes to negotiations. First, there is currently no talk of negotiations with Putin. Second, theoretically, they don't necessarily have to be conducted with Putin. I just remind you of the negotiations in the contact group in Minsk: there we didn't talk to Putin, but to his representatives - the same Dmitry Kozak, in whose place anyone could have been. The main thing is not the form, but the political will."

 

In essence, there's no need to delude ourselves: negotiations with any official Russian representative while Putin is alive will still be negotiations with Putin. But there are some ritual moments: yes, after the recent "elections" in Russia, Ukraine did not recognize the new-old Russian leader as legitimate. Given that Russia has now launched an informational campaign about Zelensky's illegitimacy after May 20, any direct agreements between the leaders of the two countries against this backdrop seem surreal.

 

It's worth noting that the same Istanbul agreements, which Putin is now waving around, were prepared by an emergency team, assembled on a rather loose principle: the Ukrainian delegation was led by the head of the "Servant of the People" faction, David Arakhamia, and the Russian delegation by former Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky. And although the "big bosses" in Kiev and Moscow were in constant contact, it's highly unlikely they would have signed agreements if they had been reached. Since then, the whole international coalition has been involved in the war, and it's hard to imagine such dialogues.

 

Since January 2024, the Ukrainian delegation has been working on participating in negotiations on the development and preparation of bilateral and multilateral international agreements between Ukraine and other states on security guarantees for Ukraine. The president recently carried out a personnel reshuffle within it. Currently, the main function of the delegation is to prepare for the signing of security agreements, which Ukraine is trying to conclude with as many states as possible. However, a similar composition (head and staff of the presidential cabinet, numerous government officials, etc.) could be involved in the context of broader agreements when the time comes. And the main instigator of this war may not necessarily be sitting on the other side of the table.