Overlord and vassal: Why Lukashenka cannot turn his back on Russia

First

 

"This is not a matter regarding our deep-seated relations, primarily with you, the Russian Federation. Therefore, chatter about this multi-vector policy and reproaches directed at Lukashenka are absolutely incompatible. Besides, I have been working as president for over thirty years. It is no longer for me to change vectors. Some have even gone so far as to claim that 'Lukashenka is not an ally.' Well, that is a matter of taste. For now—and I believe it will continue to be so—we find a common language with the leadership of the Russian Federation."

 

Quite eloquent, isn't it? In effect, he was offering excuses to unnamed Russian bloggers who had accused him of near-treason. That is why he went on to assert that "there is no betrayal, nor should there be." I could cite hundreds of such sentences where Lukashenka swears ultimate loyalty to the "elder brother."

 

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You know what I have noticed over all these years? It is a fairly traditional pattern for the Belarusian dictator. Whenever he or his officials take even the most modest steps toward the West—after even the most cautious attempt at normalization with "Western partners"—Lukashenka invariably feels compelled to make a maximum pro-Russian statement. Just so Moscow, God forbid, does not get alarmed or brand him a "traitor."

 

And while Lukashenka offers excuses, Moscow—speaking through a low-ranking official—declares that he is ours and going nowhere. Aleksei Polishchuk, Director of the Second CIS Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, stated that Belarus conducted talks with the US based on the goals of "Union integration with Russia."

 

"Our Belarusian friends have always emphasized that contacts with the West are possible exclusively on the basis of equality and mutual respect, subject to strict compliance with national interests and the objectives of Union integration with Russia," Aleksei Polishchuk said in an interview with the Russian agency Interfax.

The Russian Foreign Ministry representative recalled that these principles are embedded in the Union program of coordinated foreign policy actions, the next three-year iteration of which will be approved in November at a joint meeting of the boards of the foreign ministries of Belarus and Russia.

Consider the irony of the situation! Such a minor official—the Director of the Second CIS Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry—patronizingly remarks on Lukashenka's policy: as if to say, don't worry, everything he does with the Americans is for our benefit in Moscow.

 

A third-tier clerk effectively dictates how Lukashenka must behave so as not to anger the Kremlin. This eloquently illustrates the nature of the relationship established between Moscow and Minsk after 2020: a relationship between an overlord and a vassal.

Yet once upon a time, things were very different. Lukashenka permitted himself to provoke scandals; gas and milk wars erupted, and personal conflicts broke out. Incidentally, relations traditionally deteriorated sharply during election campaign years in Belarus.

 

Here is what then-President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev (remember him?) said about relations with official Minsk in November 2010, one month before the presidential election:

 

"The election campaign there is built entirely on anti-Russian narratives, hysterical accusations that Russia is unwilling to support Belarusians and the Belarusian economy, and curses directed at the Russian leadership. Behind all this lies a clear desire to pit the states—and accordingly, their peoples—against each other. The drive to fabricate an image of an external enemy in the public consciousness has always characterized the Belarusian leadership. It is just that previously America, Europe, and the West as a whole played this role. Now Russia has been declared one of the primary enemies."

 

Furthermore, Medvedev claimed in that speech that in the very first minutes of their private conversation, Lukashenka began speaking negatively about and disparaging previous Russian leaders—Yeltsin and Putin.

 

Today, it is hard to imagine that such things took place—especially knowing what that same former Russian President Medvedev has turned into. But there was also the shutoff of Russian gas, the hit piece series The Godfather on Russia's NTV channel, and the milk wars. There were also the Minsk Agreements, the non-recognition of South Ossetia, the non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea, attempts to purchase Venezuelan and American oil, excellent political relations with Ukrainian presidents, and even the refusal to host a Russian air base in Belarus, as well as a meeting in Minsk with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

 

Yet even during the most fierce battles with Moscow, I am convinced that Lukashenka never truly intended to walk away from Russia. All of Lukashenka's past maneuvers with the West were, I believe, not genuine changes of allegiance, but tactical moves designed to boost his bargaining leverage with Moscow. "Pay me more, or I'll run to the West," Lukashenka was effectively saying.

 

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Therefore, when people asked ten years ago—and ask today—whether Lukashenka might change course mid-flight, shift away from his pro-Russian stance, and switch sides to the West, my answer then and now remains unequivocally no.

 

How can a man walk away from Russia when year after year he repeats words that make any honest Belarusian sick to hear:

 

"As a Soviet person, it is difficult for me to say it—Russians, Belarusians. We are virtually one people."

 

However, that is all sentimental rhetoric. The issue here, of course, does not lie in any firm value-based political principles of this man—he has proven repeatedly throughout his biography that he can swap any principles if it serves his interest.

 

There are a number of economic, political, personnel, ideological, and even psychological reasons at play.

 

First, the economy of Belarus is integrated into Russia's at a record-deep level today. Currently, around 67% of Belarusian foreign trade goes there, and even more passes through Russia's further East to China and Kazakhstan, which together with Russia rank among Belarus's top five trading partners.

 

Second, the West does not trust Lukashenka, who burned numerous bridges due to human rights violations and repressions, and—most importantly—became a co-aggressor during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while Belarusian industry works ever more actively for the Russian defense sector.

 

Third, any real turn toward the West would require concessions that jeopardize the foundations of his regime (the release of political prisoners, free elections, an independent press).

Fourth, any hint of a pro-Western pivot is dangerous for Lukashenka's inner circle of security officials (who face only the Hague in the West) and oligarchs, who have no interest in a transparent and competitive business environment.