Download and read as a PDF: More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU
The EU-China Relationship
The current EU approach is structured according to the 2019 “Strategic Outlook on China,” a document providing a framework for EU-China relations.[1] It marked a shift in the EU’s approach to China, going beyond economic considerations and defining China in three dimensions: as a cooperation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival.
While the other two dimensions of the EU’s approach to China receive some explanation in the document, little detail is given for the third—“systemic rival”—beyond China being a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” As the only “negative” category, “systemic rivalry” has since become a flexible label used to describe various challenges in EU-China relations that do not fit under the other two pillars.
However, despite persistent China-related security issues, security concerns are largely absent from the Strategic Outlook, the key document shaping EU-China relations. Since it was adopted, Europe’s security landscape has changed dramatically, particularly due to Russia’s illegal military aggression against Ukraine. China’s backing of Moscow’s war efforts directly undermines European security. However, it is important to recognise that the security challenges China poses to the EU extend beyond its support for Russia, encompassing a range of well-documented hybrid activities.
China-Russia Alignment
Despite repeated claims of neutrality, China has become a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s illegal military aggression against Ukraine.[2] It provides dual-use goods, helps to circumvent sanctions, and facilitates Russia’s hybrid operations. EU and Ukrainian officials have pointed to China’s role as a “circumvention hub” for EU’s sanctions against Russia, acting as both a supplier to Russia and a transit route for western products.[3] Chinese entities have been sanctioned by the EU for supplying drone and microelectronic components to Russia. Chinese officials and state-controlled media have provided a platform for Russia’s talking points and disinformation narratives. China has criticised sanctions against Russia and regularly accused the west of starting and fuelling the war. Perhaps the sole positive role China has played is in deterring Russia from making excessive nuclear threats.
The security challenges China poses to the EU extend beyond its support for Russia
In diplomatic engagements with China, the EU and individual member states have consistently emphasised China’s support to Russia as a key irritant in EU-China relations. Beijing has also been asked to use its influence on Moscow to help end its war of aggression against Ukraine.[4] However, repeated calls by EU leaders and diplomats do not seem to have had any real effect, as China continues to sustain Russia’s war machine to this day, directly undermining European security.
A Threat to Security and Values
Beyond its support for Russia, China poses a challenge to European security in and of itself. This includes potential conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea, hybrid activities targeting EU member states, and weaponising economic and trade links for political purposes.
A conflict in the Indo-Pacific would have global ramifications. The report by Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö calls the potential economic and security impact of Chinese aggression against Taiwan or in the South China Sea “staggering” for Europe, likely triggering opportunistic behaviour from Russia against an EU member state.[5]
The EU’s most immediate vulnerabilities arise from espionage, cyber intrusions, and technology infiltration
While China’s military threat in the Indo-Pacific is a pressing concern, the EU’s most immediate vulnerabilities arise from China’s hybrid tactics—espionage, cyber intrusions, and technology infiltration—the evidence of which is clear and growing. Individuals suspected of spying for China have been sentenced in Estonia and indicted in Germany.[6] Chinese ships have recently been involved in cable-cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea.[7] In Belgium, a politician was recruited by China’s intelligence services to manipulate political discussion and discredit a researcher critical of Beijing.[8] The EU has called the use of hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors a threat to its security and values and has pointed at China which pursues its policies by using cyber tools and displaying hybrid tactics.[9]
National threat assessments confirm China’s targeting of the EU. The Swedish Security Service considers China, alongside Russia and Iran, as the greatest threat to Sweden’s security, stating that Beijing attempts to influence Stockholm’s decision-making.[10] The Danish Defence Intelligence Service notes that China is trying to sow discord between European countries to weaken the EU’s unity, for example, when mitigating risks of cooperation with China.[11] The Belgian security service similarly claims China is trying to damage intra-European relations.[12] Germany’s domestic intelligence services state that China seeks to create a favourable environment outside its borders for the Communist Party’s objectives and looks for influential political figures to speak in favour of Chinese interests.[13]
Multiple Chinese cyber groups have targeted the EU, with several of them linked to the Chinese state.[14] Western cyber security agencies have attributed cyber activities targeting European governments and lawmakers critical of Beijing as well as naval research activities and technology development to China’s state-sponsored threat actors.[15] The EU has sanctioned individuals and organisations associated with APT10, a group linked to China’s Ministry of State Security.[16]
China is a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) actor with a broad arsenal of tactics, which in turn can be connected to other forms of hybrid threats like economic coercion or cyber operations.[17] In addition to the promotion of disinformation narratives, intimidation and suppression of individuals and organisations by Chinese actors have also been reported in Europe.[18]
The EU should acknowledge this reality and explicitly label China a security challenge, adding a fourth pillar to the existing three
Security concerns extend to Chinese technologies. Measures like the EU’s 5G Toolbox were introduced largely due to national security risks associated with Chinese suppliers. Recently, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service has highlighted security risks related to Chinese electric vehicles and electricity network equipment.[19] Advanced technologies like these can become vectors for data collection, espionage, or strategic dependency. In extreme scenarios, China could exert substantial control over parts of Europe’s critical infrastructure.
China’s use of economic dependences to pressure and punish countries that defy its policies is a source of concern with potential impact on European prosperity and security.[20] EU member states have already experienced China’s economic coercion. In the case of Lithuania, this policy affected not only the country’s direct economic links with China but, more disturbingly, saw China pressuring multinational western companies to sever links with Lithuania.[21] This risk of weaponisation of economic links and dependencies would only increase in the case of a potential conflict over Taiwan.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Calls to also categorise China as a security threat have so far primarily stemmed from its support for Russia.[22] However, even before the full-scale war in Ukraine, when EU-China ties seemed positive, covert espionage, cyber threats, FIMI, and coercion persisted, showing that the EU cannot rely on goodwill or diplomacy alone to mitigate security threats from China. China’s hybrid activities against the EU make it increasingly difficult to engage with Beijing without also considering the security risks it poses on its own.
The EU should acknowledge this reality and explicitly label China a security challenge, adding a fourth pillar to the existing three. This would not be merely a rhetorical shift but a necessary alignment of the EU’s policy with actual circumstances. It would also provide member states with a more comprehensive basis for managing relations with China across multiple dimensions.
Enhancing policy coherence: China should be viewed not merely as a country but as a systemic-level actor that must be factored in nearly every aspect of EU policymaking. Formally labelling China as a security challenge would enhance consistency across policy areas and across the EU. Although the EU implicitly recognises China’s security risk through various initiatives—often actor-agnostic in name but effectively tailored to counter Chinese influence—these measures can be reactive and piecemeal. A clearly defined “security dimension” in the EU’s China policy would help coordinate member states’ efforts and limit ad hoc responses.
Assessing risks systematically: It would also further promote the idea that member states should treat China-related security risks more broadly and comprehensively, beyond the specific areas covered by existing EU initiatives. This should enable the EU to make more informed decisions when engaging with China and be prepared for long-term trade-offs, rather than addressing threats only after they arise.
Reflecting national concerns: Several member states’ security services already list China among the primary security threats, especially given Beijing’s close alignment with Moscow. Officially recognising these concerns at the EU level would help forge consensus on China policy. It also shields member states from the ramifications of acting alone and facing potential Chinese retaliation in isolation, allowing them to rely on a unified stance when calling out Chinese activities that endanger European security.
Raising awareness among the public and stakeholders: Explicitly labelling China as a security challenge would extend awareness well beyond government institutions, helping to combat the EU-wide lack of understanding of China-related risks, a weakness continually exploited by China’s foreign interference activities. A clear designation, consistently articulated by the EU and its member states, would reinforce vigilance among local authorities, SMEs, and subnational entities that might unwittingly expose themselves to Chinese influence. This, in turn, would bolster societal resilience against Chinese hybrid threats.
Signalling to Beijing: Labelling China as a security challenge would underscore the EU’s fundamental concerns also to China. It would signal that undermining European security comes with a cost for China. While China may push back diplomatically or resort to coercive measures such as economic retaliation, these actions would only reinforce the EU’s rationale for treating China as a security challenge.
Ultimately, security risks for the EU don’t stem solely from the specific activities of Chinese actors but also from the fundamental nature of the Chinese system: the Communist Party has placed itself above the law; the state and party are intertwined by design; the party aims to control all aspects of society in the country and is ready to leverage every sector for achieving its political aims. China’s private sector is no exception.
Taking proven security risks into account should be an integral part of a clearer-eyed and multifaceted relationship with China under any conditions—one that safeguards the EU’s long-term interests. This does not imply disengaging from China but rather ensures that Europe’s engagement is grounded in a risk-aware strategy that protects the EU’s values and security. The current upheaval in transatlantic relations should not make the EU less attentive to these risks.