Last stop: the front line. How and why Russia brings migrants to the occupied territories of Ukraine

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had a significant impact on migration flows and the economic situation in Central Asia. Despite predictions that the war would reduce the flow of migrants to Russia, and therefore the amount of money they send home, the opposite has happened.

The war has increased the number of migrant workers and the dependence of Central Asian economies on Russia.

What are the implications for Ukraine? 

Migration from Central Asian countries to the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine has been a growing trend since Russia's invasion. 

Ukraine’s National Resistance Centre cited a figure of 100,000 migrants brought to the Ukrainian territories by Russia at the end of 2023 but did not explain how it was calculated. At the time, Ukrainian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Mykola Doroshenko agreed that it was a realistic estimate.

Ukraine has never been a major destination for Central Asian migrants. Today, however, Russia is encouraging those who have come to Russia in search of work to depart for occupied Ukrainian land. Moreover, the occupied territories are often only an intermediate stop, with migrants’ final destination, increasingly, the front line itself.

How does the mechanism of attracting labour migrants to the occupied territories of Ukraine work? What are its preconditions? And what might its consequences be?

Migrants for construction work

In late 2024, the Russian government adopted a budget for the "recovery" of the occupied territories of eastern and southern Ukraine. Over the next seven years, it plans to allocate almost RUB 2.3 trillion, or approximately US$23 billion at the current exchange rate, for such purposes. The figure does not include funds that Russian regional administrations, companies and banks may provide if these lands remain occupied over the coming years.

A lot of manpower is needed for such development, which Russia itself lacks. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia is importing citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as cheap labour, to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by the war and compensate for the acute shortage of workers in Ukrainian lands.

Despite low levels of economic development and high unemployment, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates that the population of Central Asian countries will continue to grow in the coming decades, further exacerbating the difficulties of finding work. A lack of prospects and limited opportunities for self-fulfilment are forcing young people from these countries to seek a better life abroad.

Central Asian media outlets report that remittances from labour migrants account for a significant portion of GDP: up to 40% in Tajikistan, over 20% in Uzbekistan, and over 20% Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the governments of these countries assist citizens who decide to go abroad to work. 

For example, Uzbekistan has actively encouraged the legal labour activity of migrants by creating a whole system of support for its citizens abroad. They have been equated with the self-employed since 2021, guaranteeing their status in the country of future employment. They have introduced compulsory vocational training, and courses in the languages spoken in the countries where Uzbeks go to work. The state also provides its migrant workers with microcredits, facilitates their employment in other countries, and supports them with loans and land plots when they eventually return home.

When labour migrants leave for Russia via such mechanisms, they have a full package of documents required to legally reside abroad as a foreigner.. But there is a catch. All these papers have a limited period of validity, tied to the duration of the employment contract. When it expires, the worker faces a choice. They can return home and look for a new employer willing to spend time processing all the necessary documentation with the migration authorities. Or they can stay in Russia illegally and get by with temporary work, risking arrest by its security forces.

Russian authorities have also tightened control over migrants by introducing a register of controlled persons and a deportation regime. Laws that significantly restrict the rights of illegal migrants give Russian security forces additional powers to coerce Central Asian citizens. Moreover, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs has the right to deport migrants without a court order.

So it’s no wonder that Russian occupation administrators and their affiliated recruitment agencies have been successful in recruiting labour from Central Asia. This is facilitated by Russian propaganda, which spreads disinformation about how easy it is to get work in the new territories and "the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship".

Migrants are also tempted by legal employment, mainly in construction, agriculture, and the service industry, and the promise of reduced migration controls and residence permits. At the local level, the occupation authorities offer a fast-track procedure for obtaining identity documents, including Russian passports.

Moreover, the salaries in the occupied territory are no less, and often higher, than what migrants could earn in Russia.

Anna Murlykina, the former editor-in-chief of the Mariupol-based website 0629.com.ua, told Ukrainska Pravda about an interesting phenomenon in her hometown. When Russia occupied Mariupol, many workers from Moscow and St Petersburg were brought in. Later, the flow of money dwindled, the Russians began to return home, and a large labour shortage arose again. Now they are trying to meet the demand with migrants, who are paid less than Russians.

Migrants find themselves trapped when they arrive on occupied Ukrainian soil. The occupation authorities do not actually guarantee their rights to be upheld, and Ukrainian legislation does not apply in these territories. This makes migrants vulnerable to exploitation, labour rights violations, arbitrariness by the occupation authorities and even violence, with nowhere to turn for help.

Migrant workers on the battlefield

Lower wages than promised or no wages at all, poor working conditions, lack of social guarantees, and the sheer risk of being at the front line are among the many problems migrant workers face in the occupied east and south of Ukraine.  

There is, however, a much more serious problem which is also important for Ukraine.  

The National Resistance Center of Ukraine reports that the Russian military may mobilise migrant workers who were originally brought to work on construction sites. Sometimes, migrant workers who enlist are promised citizenship, and other times not. 

Quote from Mykola Doroshenko, ambassador: "Unfortunately, we have instances of Uzbek migrant workers in Russia being lured to the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, allegedly for construction and reconstruction of destroyed houses. Then their documents are taken away, and they are sent to the front line. I have reported this to the Uzbek side and asked the country's authorities to warn its citizens."

However, sometimes, the Russian military recruits migrant workers directly, to be sent to fight. Bloomberg shared the story of Soleh, a resident of Tajikistan who Russia attempted to recruit.

Quote from Soleh: "They recruit everywhere. While I was sitting in the deportation centre in November, they actively recruited me and promised citizenship if I signed a contract." 

However, despite the promise of good earnings, Soleh did not accept the offer and returned home. His friend's fate was different. Soleh says that his friend came to the migration centre to apply for a residence permit but signed a contract instead. 

Quote from Soleh: "Those who go to construction sites in the DNR and LNR [the self-proclaimed "Donetsk and Luhansk Peopleʼs Republics"] are persuaded to go fight there." 

Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma (the parliament's lower chamber) in December 2021, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that made it easier for foreign nationals who became contract soldiers in the Russian army to obtain Russian citizenship. 

This law was officially adopted in September 2022, but before that, recruiters began promising migrant workers that they would officially become Russian citizens within three months of signing their contracts. 

The Russian Defence Ministry systematically placed advertisements, both in Russia and in Central Asian countries, promising to pay up to RUB 200,000 a month (this was approximately US$3,000 at the 2022 exchange rate). The Wagner Group also conducted an advertising campaign for migrant workers on social media.

At the same time, Russia introduced rules under which naturalised Russian citizens could be stripped of their citizenship - something that has cost many of them huge efforts to acquire - unless they signed a military contract.

The risks faced by mercenaries

The legislation of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan prohibits citizens from mercenary activities and participation in foreign armed conflicts. Violators of this law who go to fight for Russia are tried from time to time. However, in practice, they often get off lightly.

The case of a Kyrgyz citizen, 32, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for participating in hostilities in Donbas, on the Russian side, was widely reported in 2023.

A citizen of Uzbekistan, 39, was sentenced in December 2024. After migrating for a seasonal job in Moscow in 2023, he signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces. At his trial, the Uzbek citizen claimed that during his deployment, he had killed ten Ukrainian soldiers but now felt remorse. The court sentenced him to 4 years and 2 months' imprisonment. 

The media also reported on citizens of Tajikistan who were sent to the front line by Russia under the promise of citizenship.  

Quote from the Tajik Radio Liberty service: "The Tajik authorities warned their citizens about the unacceptability of participating in the war in Ukraine, but so far, no one has been punished; or at least, no information about this has been disclosed." 

Migrant workers who go to the occupied territories of Ukraine, not to fight or dig trenches but as builders or handymen, for example, cannot be brought to justice simply for the nature of their work, according to Ukrainian legislation. This is stated by Ihor Ponochovnyi, the Prosecutor of Crimea, who has been specialising in violations of the law in the temporarily occupied territories for more than 7 years.  

Quote from Ihor Ponochovnyi: "If we are talking about migrant workers, it will mainly be administrative liability because they illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine. And employment, or lack of it, plays no role in the classification of an offence. But if the purpose of such a violation was to harm the interests of Ukraine, then criminal liability would be triggered." 

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian troops have captured approximately 30 citizens of Central Asian countries who were fighting for Russia.

These figures were reported to Radio Liberty’s News Of Pryazovia project [the region of Ukraine around the north coast of the Sea of Azov – ed.] by Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna. 

Of course, these military personnel do not take their passports with them to battle, so data on their non-Russian citizenship is usually established from the testimonies of prisoners of war. Their status is no different from that of Russian prisoners of war, except that they have the least chance of being included in a prisoner swap, because Russia is no longer interested in them once captured.

The probability that such individuals will be transferred directly to Central Asian countries is also very low, given how the courts in such countries have ruled against citizens accused of taking part in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Yusuf Kurkchi, First Deputy Minister for Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine (2016-2019) 

Rustem Khalilov, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Violetta Yurkiv, Yuliia Kravchenko

Editing: Rory Fleming-Stewart, Teresa Pearce