Kadyrov, Prigozhin, mines and defense of Belgorod

Both Kadyrov and Prigozhin are interested in strengthening their position

At the end of May, the "conflict" of some of the most prominent participants in the Russian invasion of Ukraine was actively discussed. At first, against the background of sharp criticism of the leadership of the Russian army by the owner of the private army "Wagner Group", Ramzan Kadyrov spoke relatively calmly. But within days, the commanders of his units "directed their anger" at Prigozhin (Ahmat is not one unit). In response, the information resources of the media group Patriot (owned by Prigozhin) were directed against the "Chechen heroes". And if the resources, which are formally considered mass media, were relatively correct, then the authors of TG channels and groups on social networks did not choose their words. It looked very funny considering that back in August - November 2022, both key characters performed as a duet, expressing their pretensions towards Shoyg and his entourage. However, by the end of the week, both sides announced the past "telephone conversation" and withdrawal of mutual claims.

Some observers and journalists have already managed to declare that war within the Russian Federation will soon begin. The reality is much simpler (or more complicated). To begin with, about the "war". Prigozhin and Kadyrov never voiced even a cautious criticism of Putin. On the contrary, they showed every kind of support and readiness to, according to his instructions, almost "lie down with their bones". For a reference to "Chef Putin's connoisseur", he calls a completely different character "grandpa". And, accordingly, the criticism of the crazy grandfather refers to the second person and calmly fits into the formula "the king is good, the commanders are bad".

Who are Kadyrov and Prigozhin?

Is this showing off? Both characters were completely honest, and conflicts between them are very likely in the near future. To understand the situation, let's turn to the functionality of Prigozhin and Kadyrov in the scheme of the Kremlin elites.

Kadyrov:

— He governs Chechnya within the framework of the old agreements with Putin and, in fact, represents a kind of "exception to the rule" in the practice of replacing governors in the Russian Federation.

— He directed all the strings of the region's management to himself and turned into a kind of medieval monarch.

— Viktor Zolotov, the current head of the Russian National Guard (Rusgvardija) is Kadyrov's patron in securing energy resources. It was the withdrawal of the Ministry of Defense units from Chechnya that allowed Ramzan to demonstrate his "influence" at one time and contributed to the extraction of some fighters who fought against the Russian Federation from the mountains. The formula "the army left - they swore to their new monarch" was clear to them. Accordingly, all power structures in Chechnya (and most of them bear the name "Ahmat") formally belong to the Russian Guard or the Ministry of Internal Affairs (a Zolotov-influenced agency). The exception is the 78th SpN regiment, which was created in 2022 and is called "Ahmat-Pivnič".
But in the Russian Federation, another "personnel revolution" is taking place, followed by a "cleansing" of governors. The Gref-Kiriyenko group even puts under its control the regions that seemed "untouchable" until yesterday. The Kremlin has the experience of changing regional emperors who have "taken root". As well as Putin's support for the new personnel policy.
So, the leader of Chechnya is in control of the situation for now, but he is not sure if he can keep his "special status" for long.

Prigogine:

- He is a typical representative of the group of "trustees" - he is not formally included in any of the groups of Russian elites, but his services are used (or were used) by all the "towers of the Kremlin" to perform "delicate" tasks in which there is no possibility for the operation of legal Russian structure.And it's not just about the private army.

   — There are several different success stories. Among them are those who work in the field of media (troll factories, IPSO, etc.), owns the largest Russian private army, conducts geological research in risky regions (primarily in Africa).
   — In the African and partly Asian direction, his private army is an irreplaceable (so far) energy resource for ensuring the business of Russian companies.
— His media group still has a whole range of information resources (perceived by the population as local) in neighboring countries.

— Active recruitment in his private army and execution of tasks at the front made it possible to reduce the risk of necessary mobilization: postponing it, underestimating the total level of military losses ("Wagner" is not an army).
— After all, he invested tens of thousands (given the contingent and the logic described above, this did not worry the Kremlin too much) to present Putin with the image of a "Victory in Bakhmut". Greyvoron smudged the effect, but it was there.
- However, Prigozhin remains a "accessor", and his future depends on how much his services will be needed.

Motivation and different algorithms

Both Kadyrov and Prigozhin are interested in strengthening their position. Given the situation, the easiest way to do this (they believed) was to use the factors of war and the failure of the Russian army. Therefore, both simultaneously began to criticize the leadership of the army after the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from Kharkiv. But everyone had their own motivation or image of what they wanted.
For Kadyrov, the strengthening option consisted of receiving bonuses in one or more of the following areas:
— Strengthening one's own position in the block of Russian security forces. Ideally, as an independent figure, but (Kadirov soberly assessed his chances) in reality as a protégé of Zolotov.
— Attempts to get the "supervisor by region" functionality. At least in the field of mobilization and maintaining order. And here again we have a function within the activities of the commander of the Russian Guard.
— Updating (or strengthening) one's own positions as a source of power that can be used to stop crisis phenomena.

For Prigogine, the options are somewhat different:

— Legitimation of the institute of the private army and, based on that, entry into the group of security forces as a mentor of "new security structures".
— Preparing to start (and start) as one of the leaders of the new party project, which will be created to channel radical and imperial feelings (following the example of Rodin's party, after the second Chechen war).

Therefore, the simultaneous criticism of the leadership of the army by the two has a completely logical foundation. Both Prigozhin and Kadyrov must emphasize the inability of the Russian armed forces to solve the tasks set. And offer your services.
Prigozhin undertakes the task of capturing Bakhmut (in the fall of 2022), and Kadyrov gives his consent to the creation of an SpN regiment within the Armed Forces of Russia (which he avoided doing during his reign).
Both are for mobilization. Kadyrov tries to put pressure on the leaders of the Russian Federation, but is met with opposition from a group of technocrats and Sobyanin. He was informed that they do not want to see the leader of Chechnya as the ruler of the region. Prigozhin intensified the recruitment of prisoners into his private army and opened official recruitment points in numerous regions of the Russian Federation (without the legal status of his unit).
They could be allies in terms of creating a new imperial party project. But Kadyrov "is not Russian", and Prigozhin seemed too free and unknown to the public (until autumn 2022). The owner of "Wagner Group" is trying to solve this problem, becoming one of the politicians most open to the press. But the Kremlin is in no hurry to launch the party project and, judging by the reduced activities of other candidates, they are postponing its launch at least until 2024.

Disagreements and conflicts

Kadyrov and Prigozhin did not achieve success in the field of intersecting interests. More precisely, they partially achieved it, but each in their own direction. Accordingly, the algorithms for their further action differed.
Prigozhin continued his harsh criticism of the military leadership, especially using the "Bahmut" case. In particular, he once again "pulled out" Surovikin as a possible partner and contrasted the results of the actions of the "Wagner Group" with the failures of the units of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (and those affiliated with them). The culmination of the public showdown was, in fact, an ultimatum to withdraw their units from Bahmut.
From the moment of the ultimatum, the likelihood of conflict began to rise. At the initial stage, Kadyrov's units were considered as a replacement for "Wagner's". But for the ruler of Chechnya, this version of events was undesirable, and refusal meant "demonstrating cowardice." In addition, the prospect of "letting the Chechen formations be slaughtered" was also undesirable for Rosguardia commander Zolotov, who considers the residents ruled by Kadyrov to be "his" resource.
The Ministry of Defense had to ask for reserves to replace the Wagners in Bahmut. By the way, the blasting of the roads leading out of the city most likely happened in that period - to avoid an "uncoordinated" withdrawal of the Wagnerites from the city. The old Soviet "barricade" tactic.
But, be that as it may, Wagner's divisions left Bakhmut and Prigozhin implemented his plan of increasing his own importance. After all, in the event of an offensive by the Armed Forces, the units located in the background will be extremely necessary as a mobile reserve.
It was a threat to Kadyrov's image as a "savior of the situation" for his units. In addition, Zolotov, who is leading a policy of strengthening and at the same time minimizing the participation of the Russian Guard in frontline battles, is currently not interested in the emergence of a new independent "player" in the group of security forces.
The result was a public feud between Kadyrov and Prigozhin, each pursuing his own goals. But none of them questioned the "wise leadership" of Putin. In fact, they clashed over methods of securing their growing importance. At the same time, they created an informative excuse that made the citizens of the Russian Federation think about who is the "greater patriot" of this pair. A good option, because the list of candidates for "patriotism" did not include the leadership of the army.
Such a conflict could not lead to a real confrontation. Therefore, a solution was found in the form of "talks about the fate of the homeland", during which both sides allegedly decided to come to an agreement and resolve the conflict for the sake of "the future of the country".
But this does not mean giving up competition — both Kadyrov and Prigozhin are still in a vulnerable position, from which a way out is possible, among other things, thanks to a demonstration of loyalty to Putin and usefulness. Therefore, the following conflicts are possible. The dispute will be fought "who wants more for the king and the fatherland".

The Belgorod case is extremely important for both of them

The incursions of Russian volunteers into the territory of the Belgorod and Kursk regions showed the inability of the Armed Forces of Russia to ensure the effective defense of the Russian territory along the border. It is obvious that the forces of the RDK and the Russian Freedom Legion involved in the attacks are not sufficient to capture and hold large territories for a long time. But to prevent their operations, it is necessary to commit significant forces and resources. The army leadership can ensure the availability of such units only by withdrawing part of the units from the front.

Such a situation once again creates conditions for strengthening the influence of Kadyrov and Prigozhin. Both have a large number of fighters who can be deployed against the RDK and the Russian Freedom Legion. At the same time, taking into account the specifics of the attack, the level of possible losses will be lower than during intense fighting in the conditions of an offensive by the Armed Forces at the front.

That is, there is a possibility to position themselves as "saviors of Russia" with the least possible risks.
It is therefore not surprising that Prigozhin reacted quickly, declaring that his fighters would be the instructors for the "territorial defense" that was being created. Most likely, he is now trying to get approval for the transfer of most of the "Wagener" units to the Kursk and Belgorod regions. If he succeeds in this, Prigozhin will add "effective protection" of the Russian border regions to the "victory in Bakhmut". An excellent case both for a political project and for the continuation of the policy of joining the security forces as a mentor of one of the directions.
But a similar logic - the image of a "territorial defender" for small losses - is useful to Zolotov. And Kadyrov, whom the commander of the Russian Guard can use in this direction. Also, it is extremely important that the ruler of Chechnya participates in the "Belgorod operation", because in this way he demonstrates the possibility of using Chechen units in other regions of the Russian Federation. Specifically, "Russian".
So, after the end of one conflict between Prigozhin and Kadyrov, the stage of competition for tasks far from the front line, on the territory of the Russian Federation, begins. And this means that we can expect a new wave of mutual accusations. Only "civil war in the Russian Federation" will have nothing to do with it.

What about mines?

And, finally, the case of mining and fighting between units of the Wagner infantry regiment and the 72nd brigade of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. Demining was most likely done a few days (if not weeks) earlier. And, as written above, it was held to prevent the departure of the Wagnerites from Bahmut, which was not coordinated with the army command.
Did Prigozhin know about this? Most likely, yes. Why didn't you say that right away? We should not forget that Prigozhin is professionally engaged in IT business. And raising tensions about this case is appropriate at the right time and under the right circumstances.

"The stars aligned" at the moment when the last units left the city (convoys passed before that). Moreover, it is possible that the Wagnerians themselves created the preconditions for it. The parties are silent about when and how the firefight with the 72nd Brigade began. It is only known that it happened during "demining". But demining can be done in different places. Specifically, immediately in front of the position of one or another unit. Especially when it comes to the brigade that Prigozhin accused of cowardice and in which Shoigu tried to deploy "alternative to Prigozhin" units. We are talking about the Sturmski detachments, gathered from among the prisoners.
A skirmish ensued, most likely with casualties on both sides. But the beneficiary of this situation is Prigozhin: the Kremlin still needs the power of his private army in the war against Ukraine.
But there is a clear conflict with the structures of the army, which takes on the character of combat conflicts.
The logical solution in this case is to divide the units, even geographically. And here we mention the problems in the Belgorod region, where, in one way or another, troops must be sent. Therefore, even by attacking the 72nd brigade, Prigozhin is trying to get an extremely profitable and necessary contract for his private army.