Human Resources Game in Russia. First Results "The main question that remains unanswered: who has Putin relied on in all personnel games?"
1. What we talked about long ago has become reality. After the elections, Putin completely nullified all agreements with the elites. Now, the old rules of the game no longer function, and the new ones are yet to be established.
2. The main reconstruction isn't within the Ministry of Defense, but rather the downgrade of the former Secretary of the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, to the position of assistant to the president. Before his dismissal from the Security Council, Patrushev oversaw all security forces of the Russian Federation. Therefore, in general, a person overseeing security forces simply doesn't exist, with all the accompanying consequences. As for Patrushev himself, his new field of activity is shipbuilding.
On one hand, this is akin to the situation when Stalin appointed General Semyon Budyonny as the Deputy Minister of Agriculture for Horse Breeding. On the other hand, it's not just about the conflict with VTB management (which is responsible for building new ships), but also an extremely important part of the job, primarily related to the Northern Sea Route and all military fleets.
3. Regarding the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the tenure of Minister Sergei Shoigu, it was divided between Shoigu himself, on one hand, and Patrushev and Sergey Chemezov (along with remnants of former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's team, who currently work within the structures of Rostec), on the other hand. Therefore, we now see a blitzkrieg to purge the Ministry of Defense of top managers who were aligned with these figures. Simultaneously, there's an attempt to dismantle the existing corruption chain: Ministry of Defense (Shoigu) – Defense Industry (Chemezov) – security forces (Patrushev). It's also no secret that there are many people in the top leadership of the FSB who are close to Patrushev and Chemezov, and it remains to be seen whether there will be dismissals there as well.
4. Čemezov's victory in the government, of course, hasn't yet turned into a pyrrhic one for him. However, with all the personnel appointments, Putin has dismantled the strongest tandem in his circle: the Patrushev and Čemezov tandem, which could have become a state within a state. In fact, all the recent personnel changes are directly related to the increase in influence, and even the growth of this tandem.
5. The new Minister of Defense isn't an advocate for the "miracle of economic counter-sanctions," as many have written in recent days. Primarily, he served as the "state eye" in Prime Minister Mikhail
Mishustin's government. Within the Ministry of Defense, he has two main tasks: to clean up and redirect corruption schemes, as well as to improve the technological chains between Rostec and the military. Waiting for a miracle, as many write, is unrealistic. However, in certain problem areas, this approach will likely yield results. Again, it's about specific projects.
6.
It's important to pay attention to the inconspicuous position of the Minister of Sport, given to Sergei Kiriyenko's protege, Mihail Degtyarev. Apparently, the Kremlin feared creating a separate structure for youth (youth and migrants being two major problematic areas for the Russian government) and "hid" it within sports. It's significant that Kiriyenko wants to oversee this issue, but the new minister has also gained another presidential overseer - Alexei Dyumin.
Dyumin will oversee both the State Council (thus competing with Kiriyenko) and the Military-Industrial Committee (competing with Chemezov and, probably, currently supporting the new Minister of Defense of Russia, Andrei Belousov). Now, all analysts are saying that Dyumin's position as presidential aide is a stepping stone before he ascends further. Likely so. However, the previous transition (from governorship) stretched over many years.
7. The main question that remains unanswered is: who has Putin relied on in all these personnel games? For now, one can only speculate about whom this might entail, but the answer to this question will depend on who will comprise Putin's new inner circle after the politician number two (Patrushev) at least temporarily loses his status.