How Ukraine Resists Russian Federation Disinformation Campaigns

Since 2014, Russia has actively employed fake news and disinformation in its aggression against Ukraine. How have the narratives changed from the beginning of the war in Donbas to the full invasion? In the war against Ukraine, from its very inception, alongside physical force, Russia has actively utilized psychological influence, particularly disinformation campaigns. Let's recall at least the story spread by Russian television about the "crucified boy" - a child allegedly executed by the Ukrainian army in Donbas in 2014 - which ultimately turned out to be fabricated, or the allegedly bred unsupported fictions about Ukrainian birds and mosquitoes artificially created and intended for "disease transmission," which were propagated by Russian mass media. How have Russian methods of disseminating disinformation in Ukraine changed over the past 10 years, and how is Ukraine confronting them.
The Metamorphosis of Russian Disinformation
Even in the early days of Ukrainian independence, Russia spread stories about a single nation of Russians and Ukrainians and tried to blur the differences between the two countries as much as possible, notes Alina Bondarchuk, deputy head of the Disinformation Counteraction Center at the NSDC.
"When the war (in Donbas. - Ed.) began in 2014, it was followed by more aggressive narratives, especially about the 'Maidaners,' attempting to discredit the Dignity Revolution," she says in an interview with DW.
During the full invasion, Bondarchuk observes, disinformation took on a "surreal character." "Claims that mouth fresheners were found at Ukrainian army positions supposedly drugs. There were also combat mosquitoes, geese, and pigeons that Ukraine allegedly infected and sent to Belgorod," she notes.
Such statements, particularly, were articulated by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, but no evidence was provided.
Subsequently, according to Bondarchuk, the Russian Federation began to "hit sensitive topics," attempting to undermine the unity of Ukrainians - war, mobilization, wounded, dead. Currently, the goal of Russian disinformation, as she points out, is to induce Ukraine to negotiate under Russian conditions, as well as to sow panic and distrust towards the authorities among the Ukrainian population.
Ways of Spreading Russian Federation Disinformation
Currently, disinformation about the Russian Federation is mainly spread through the internet and social media - Telegram, TikTok, YouTube, X, explains Alina Bondarchuk from the Disinformation Counteraction Center.
"Before the start of the full-scale war, there was also oral tradition: a large number of people worked in the Russian Federation or had relatives there and they told Russian stories to their acquaintances," says Bondarchuk.
Another source is Russian television, whose signal is still available in border villages and near occupied territories, says Elena Holub, an analyst at the Institute of Mass Information (IMI).
"At the onset of the full invasion, Russian channels were even caught in central Ukraine. And there were people consuming it," she says in an interview with DW. As emphasized by Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Disinformation Counteraction Center, Russia uses signal jammers on the Ukrainian border with the Russian Federation and instead broadcasts its own radio and TV channels. "Therefore, it is necessary to intensify work with local self-government, which should have people responsible for countering disinformation in their ranks," he emphasized in an interview with DW. Nevertheless, the influence of television has radically decreased compared to the period before 2014 when Russian television channels were among the top 10 in terms of viewership in Ukraine, notes Ruslan Deynichenko, co-founder of the volunteer internet project StopFake, which has been tracking Russian disinformation since 2014.
Blocking Pro-Russian Channels on Social Media
The fight against disinformation in Ukraine is taking place at the state level. For this purpose, since 2021, the Disinformation Counteraction Center has been operating at the NSDC, which exposes Russian falsehoods and monitors them on social media. "Cooperation with Google has been established. We provide expert opinions on the narratives being distributed on the channel. YouTube (a part of Google) considers and decides on blocking. More than 200 channels have already been blocked," says Bondarchuk.
According to Kovalenko, CPD similarly collaborates with Meta, the conglomerate that owns the social media platforms Facebook and Instagram, as well as the social network TikTok, with which CPD recently initiated official cooperation. The situation is somewhat more complex with the Telegram messenger, which is actively used in Ukraine by both mass media and the government, as well as public structures and socially active individuals. Bondarchuk reported that CPD does not collaborate with this platform regarding the blocking of disinformation.
Volunteer Initiatives to Combat Falsification
Volunteer initiatives are also active in combating disinformation in Ukraine. Specifically, the StopFake project has been fact-checking information spread by Russian media since 2014. "If we can prove its falsehood, then we will publish an article refuting the claims made. We have succeeded in undermining the reputation of Russian mass media as a reliable source of information," Deynichenko is convinced. According to him, StopFake has exposed more than 100,000 Russian false pieces of information during its operation. "Additionally, we have an agreement with Facebook, which, based on our refutations, removes disinformation from its networks. It particularly labels those who spread such information," said the volunteer.
There's also the volunteer project BRAMA, currently supported by the Ukrainian cyber police. Essentially, BRAMA is a Telegram channel through which people send links to pages on social media and messengers that they believe contain disinformation. If BRAMA volunteers conclude that it's indeed false, subscribers are encouraged to submit complaints to these platforms. "The more complaints there are, the greater the likelihood that the source will be blocked, as the final decision to block or restrict access to channels and communities is made by the messenger or social media administration," explained the cyber police to DW.
More than 200,000 members have already joined BRAMA, thanks to which over 28,000 sources have already been blocked, according to law enforcement representatives.
Protect Your Mind from Russian Propaganda
The flow of disinformation from the Russian Federation has increased since 2022, especially due to the use of Ukrainians abroad as propagandists, says Kovalenko from CPD. "I'm referring to so-called bloggers who have left Ukraine. They try to build an 'alternative' Ukraine that supposedly opposes the authorities. It's very difficult for people to understand whether they are working in the Russian Federation. This is a new challenge for us," he says.
However, as DW interlocutors point out, Ukrainian society has become more resilient to disinformation. According to Kovalenko, disinformation directed at Ukraine has recently been less engaged in the information field compared to 2021. "The media literacy of people working in mass media has increased," he says.
Although information consumers still believe in fake news or conspiracy theories, Kovalenko adds. According to the head of CPD, to improve this situation, media literacy classes need to be introduced at the elementary school level. "Then, in 10 years, we will have a very strong society with critical thinking. In the near future, we will not be able to lower the threshold of people with low media literacy," Kovalenko believes.
To protect your mind from disinformation, Elena Holub from IMI advises thinking more critically and controlling emotions. "Because under the influence of emotions, we become more vulnerable to propaganda and disinformation," she emphasizes.