How Russian special services are turning Ukrainian teenagers into terrorists

Seventeen-year-old Sasko (name changed) went to school, played volleyball and learned to play the guitar. He has now been arrested and is awaiting trial in a detention center in Nikolayev. The young man is suspected of organizing a terrorist attack that was instigated by Russian intelligence. In an interview with DW, which took place in the presence of SBU representatives, the guy does not deny his involvement: "I can't even explain how I agreed to this."

Terrorist attack in Nikolayev

On February 14, 2025, an explosion occurred near a popular cafe in the center of Nikolayev.

"The sound was louder than when the rocket hit the factory," schoolchildren from the neighboring building recounted the events of that day.

Two months after the tragedy, the locals clearly remember the explosion, and the cafe's facade is still being repaired.

As the investigation established, a home-made explosive device detonated in a bag brought by a 42-year-old resident of the Poltava region. Employees of the cafe told DW that a few minutes before the explosion, the woman was sitting at a table and then bought pastries - in other words, she "didn't intend to die". Then the woman went outside, placed the bag at the entrance to the facility, where it exploded. Three soldiers from the Demining Center were killed - two engineers and a nurse, as well as the woman who brought the bomb. SBU investigators suggest she acted on instructions from Russian operatives, who detonated the explosives remotely.

The very next day after the terrorist attack, the police and the SBU detained the accomplices in the crime: four teenagers aged 14, 15, 16 and 17. According to the investigation, the boys made explosives and handed them to the courier. The oldest of them is DW's interviewee Saško.

How the Russians recruited Sasha

Saško, a teenager in tracksuits and clean-shaven, tells DW that one of his childhood friends found a part-time job on Telegram:

"In the beginning, he photographed buildings. And then he was offered a job with a higher salary."

The job was making explosives. The guy involved three friends in this task, including Saša. They were promised two thousand dollars for the four of them.

Following the instructions of the bosses, who introduced themselves as Roman and Oleksandr, the boys made an explosive, put it in a bag and gave it to a courier to bring it to Nikolaev. During the first attempt to detonate the explosives, Saša says, the explosives did not work, so he and a friend went to Nikolaev and spent three days repairing the device in a rented apartment.

Saško insists that he did not know what he was preparing the explosives for.  

"A friend told me that he was going to go abroad. Just as he was deceived, so was I." According to the suspect, bosses Roman and Oleksandr spoke Russian and ignored the boy's questions about the motives and purpose of the explosive order. Saša says that he did not see their faces: the bosses were giving instructions on how to assemble the bomb via video call on Telegram, but only Saško turned on the camera.

How Russian recruiters work

Criminals usually work according to a standard scheme: they post ads on Telegram about easy money, skillfully communicate with potential contractors and gradually involve them in the "case", starting with easy "tasks", explains the counterintelligence officer of the SBU department in the Nikolaev region.

"Recruits are lured with money and think they will get a reward for certain actions. But the SBU has documented that the perpetrators are not getting the rewards they were promised," he says.

Here's what happened to Sasha and his friends: after the terrorist attack, the bosses transferred a small part of the money to them, but he didn't receive anything more - the bosses cited transaction problems. Saša managed to spend all his earnings in one evening, and the very next day he ended up in custody.

While Saško claims that he did not understand where the explosives he helped develop would be used, his friend's correspondence, provided to DW by the Security Service, suggests otherwise. "The gift was a success. Minus nine TCC members," one of the suspects in the terrorist attack writes to his girlfriend.

The interlocutors then rejoice at the force of the explosion and the loss of life, concluding the conversation with the following messages:

Suspect: Now me and the guys have killed 10 people.

Girl: Serial killer. Fuck you.

 

Suspect: Hooray!

 

“This shows the subjective side of the detainees,” the counterintelligence officer comments, “because they understood what they were doing and they were bragging about it.”

The SBU employee adds: “covering up” in the form of “fighting TCC” is a common tactic of the Russian special services.

Communication with Russian bosses: DW experiment

DW also discovered this when it found suspicious ads on Telegram about significant earnings and, on behalf of a 16-year-old teenager, communicated with two people who, by all accounts, resembled representatives of the Russian special services. Both offered to burn TCC cars, promising $ 1,000 for each destroyed car. DW's interlocutors sent detailed instructions on how to find the right car and set it on fire, but the description of potential targets included any military vehicles. As an alternative, they suggested burning relay cabinets on the railway, but the prices for such "objects" were significantly lower.

One of the recruiters was kind, polite, advised to be "careful and cautious", promising "long and fruitful work". The other put pressure, was rude, demanded to get down to business faster and called his global goal "to burn absolutely everything". Both were reluctant to answer questions about the motives of their activities, referring to the fact that they do not work for any country and are not in Russia.

The SBU says that they already have results in identifying specific employees of the Russian FSB and the GRU Main Staff who recruit Ukrainians: they are suspected and put on wanted lists. The security service does not disclose the methods and means of searching and identifying both the recruiter and the recruit.

Terrorist attacks involving minors

The SBU began monitoring the trend of sabotage since May 2024. Initially, these were arson attacks on military vehicles or Ukrzaliznytsia facilities, and from the beginning of 2025 they became real terrorist attacks.  

 

“The Russian FSB and GRU have crossed all red lines,” comments Security Service spokesman Artem Dekhtyarenko, emphasizing that underage perpetrators can be eliminated as unwanted witnesses. In early March 2025, in Ivano-Frankivsk, a homemade explosive device detonated in the hands of two teenagers who, according to the SBU, had made it on behalf of Russian special services. Investigators believe the bomb was detonated remotely. A 17-year-old boy was killed, his 15-year-old accomplice lost his legs and vision, and two passersby were injured. Shortly thereafter, the SBU and police in the Ternopil region detained a 14-year-old schoolgirl, for whom, according to the SBU, the occupiers intended to detonate the explosives she was carrying near the district police headquarters. The investigation found that Russian manipulators forced the girl to make explosives, threatening to publish her nude photos on the Internet, which they had gained access to by allegedly hacking the girl's phone. By carrying out such terrorist attacks, the Russian special services, according to Dekhtyarenko, "are trying to destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine and sow panic in society."

The most vulnerable categories of the population for recruitment are people with various types of addictions, the unemployed and minors, says the SBU spokesman.

Since 2024, the Security Service and the National Police have detained more than 600 people on suspicion of collaborating with Russian special services. More than half of them are unemployed, 22 percent are minors.

 

Russian recruitment: who is at risk?

In an interview with DW, Vasil Bohdan, head of the juvenile prevention department at the National Police, defines children who are in the police's field of vision and are registered in preventive records for committed offenses as a risk group. At the same time, Bohdan emphasizes that any child can fall for the "hook" of Russian special services.

"When bosses give minors simple tasks, they evoke in them a sense of adventure, criminal romanticism, minors can "get carried away" with it."

To prevent recruitment, minors hold lectures for schoolchildren and students, and work with risk groups, says Bohdan. At the same time, he emphasizes that the key role is played by parents who should be interested in their children's lives, pay attention to the appearance of money or valuables of unknown origin in their children, and also build trusting relationships with children so that they can turn to adults with their problems.

 

What threatens those who cooperate with the FSB

 

Four people detained on suspicion of organizing a terrorist attack in Nikolayev face up to 15 years in prison. The sanction for the article of the law under which they are accused provides for life imprisonment, but such a sentence does not apply to minors in Ukraine, explains lawyer Polina Marchenko.

According to the lawyer, courts often do not impose the harshest sentences in cases involving minors, taking into account sincere remorse, cooperation in the investigation and incomplete awareness of their actions.

“In the case of Sashka and his friends, the death of three soldiers is clearly an aggravating circumstance,” says Marchenko.

The lawyer emphasizes that in cases involving minors recruited by Russians, parents may be held responsible for improperly fulfilling their parental duties:

"Guardianship and social services should be involved in such cases. ... They should determine what the atmosphere is in the family, whether the parents are fulfilling their parental duties: for example, question the neighbors about whether there are quarrels at home, whether the parents use alcohol or drugs, in order to understand why this happened," says Marchenko.

Sasko, who is awaiting the court's verdict in a detention center, says he is preparing for the harshest possible sentence, "and we'll see." The guy says he regrets what he did.

"That's all I think about. Like: why? Where could I have exposed this scheme? Where could I have gotten out of this?"

When asked by DW why he decided to speak to reporters, the suspect replied: "So that people know what they shouldn't do and what it means."