Fighting for Russia Becomes Less Profitable
The reduction in payments might sound reasonable at first sight, but given the widespread corruption, malice, and incompetence of the Russian Army and the medical sector, the changes mean that agreeing to serve under contract is becoming less and less profitable.
Until November 13, servicemen wounded in the so-called special military operation received 3m rubles (almost $30,000) as compensation for wounds. Since that date, they have received one-time payments depending on the severity of the injury. Those deemed severely wounded will still get 3m rubles, but those judged to have less serious injuries will get 1m rubles, and those with “minor” wounds 100,000 rubles. The possibility of outright injustice (and wrongdoing) from those operating the system is obvious.
The decision is clearly a budget-saving measure, and there are others. Well-paid mobilized soldiers are being forced to sign contracts, according to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel (as reported by the very useful @ChrisO_wiki X/Twitter account.)
For unofficial war correspondents, the so-called Z-bloggers, the changes are a failure of the state toward fighting men. As noted by the authoritative Z-community Telegram channel Rybar, “the [changes] might bring about (and will definitely bring about) a dual interpretation of certain cases of harm to health . . . and the scope or corrupt collusion.” It also reminded readers that even before the published changes, contusions and psychological trauma were not considered “a serious obstacle to continuing to perform tasks.”
Last year, independent journalists wrote that mobilized soldiers who were crippled and unfit for service were sent to assault units without proper medical examination and treatment. Take the case of 49-year-old Mikhail from Moscow region. He ended up at the front by accident, convinced that he was only going for two months of military training. He was wounded, leaving him with damaged ligaments and a pierced bone. He was offered no appropriate medical assistance despite the hole in his leg. A traumatologist in Podolsk pronounced him fit for service without even looking at his X-rays.
There are many stories like Mikhail’s, and indeed there are now invalid assault units composed solely of the wounded. In February 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense explained that only wounded and sick in its G category would have the right to leave a unit, that they must then undergo a medical examination with a view to returning them to the front. Those with shrapnel wounds and shrapnel remaining in their bodies, as well as soldiers missing fingers and teeth, are going to war.
The work of independent journalists is supported by the accounts of pro-war bloggers. Thus, one of the authoritative figures in the Z-community, Anastasia Kashevarova, complained at the beginning of November about problems with demobilization, which, she says, is possible “only if you die or had your limbs torn off.” She admits that soldiers often turn to her, including servicewomen, who have been diagnosed with hepatitis or cancer but are not released from military service. Analogous problems arise when reaching the maximum age for military service.
Another problem that Kashevarova notes is wounded troops remaining in foxholes for weeks without any possibility of evacuation. She offers the example of a soldier from Yakutia, Aleksander, who waited 17 days for evacuation and amputated his own leg above the knee to avoid infection. Now, when financial payments depend on the category of the wound, military medical staff will have even more incentive to downplay the nature of injuries and not provide proper diagnoses.
It is also hard for some veterans to get the promised payments, including for medical treatment, even if they manage to return from the front alive. That’s especially the case for former prisoners. As journalists discovered, “special contingent” men were enrolled as assault troops for six months without the status of volunteers, who are entitled to insurance payments for death or injury. Survivors are not issued military IDs, certificates of injury, or combat veteran certificates.
It is no better for the relatives of those killed or taken prisoner. Kashevarova says that families often receive no real news about the status of their relatives for months, let alone any payments. “The dead and missing are said to be prisoners or in the ranks. Prisoners are not given the status of PoWs, and after an exchange, they are told they are deserters,” the blogger wrote.
Russian soldiers also face serious abuse at the hands of their own commanders. Straightforward brutality is common enough in the armed forces, where commanders often have the power of life or death — there are innumerable reports of extra-judicial reprisals against “guilty” soldiers who are beaten, tortured, and held for days in frigid basements and earthen pits without food or water.
Now, such abuse has a new element. Correspondents report that in one unit “hostages were discovered whom the commanders beat and humiliated, and for months received millions of rubles from their service cards.”
Not that most will live long enough to enjoy any payment at all. Kashevarova records that the median lifespan of an assault trooper is now 12-17 days from the moment a contract is signed. The war has become an extremely unprofitable business in every sense.
Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy. The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.