13.12.2024.

Energy independence of Ukraine: reality and prospects for the winter season

Ukraine is in the 2024-2025 winter season. entered with an extremely difficult situation in the energy sector. Within months, three years of Russian aggression destroyed more than 50 percent of the country's energy infrastructure, including thermal power plants, power transmission networks, and renewable energy sources.
Almost all energy in the occupied territories, as well as key facilities in the controlled territories, were affected or completely destroyed. What to say if 87 percent of all coal-fired power plants are irretrievably lost. And about 70 percent of the installed wind capacity and a large part of the solar stations are currently unavailable due to military operations, damage and unfavorable weather conditions.
Currently, Ukraine's energy system operates under the constant threat of Russian shelling, which aims to destabilize its functioning. In December 2024, massive rocket attacks again forced the country to implement blackout plans affecting millions of citizens.
Questions arise before Ukraine: how to ensure a stable supply of electricity and thermal energy in wartime conditions? What alternatives can help avert a humanitarian crisis? Are there any relevant experiences from other countries? Agency UA.News investigated this issue.
From crisis to crisis: realities of the Ukrainian energy system
One of the key challenges for the Ukrainian energy industry (besides, of course, enemy shelling) is the reduction of available nuclear production capacity. In many ways, the reason lies in the loss of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. Before the war, this power plant provided about 25 percent of the total electricity production in peacetime conditions, and its occupation created a deficit that was difficult to compensate. Currently, only three nuclear power plants are operating in Ukraine, providing approximately 7.8-7.9 GW of capacity, which covers about 50 to 55 percent of winter demand.
Hydropower plants also suffered significant losses due to the destruction of dams and stations, especially Kahovska HPP. In general, about 30 percent of hydropower was lost. In addition, the low water level in the reservoirs of the Dnieper Cascade makes their operation difficult, especially during peak loads. It is extremely difficult to balance such things, and that is also why the light goes out so often for Ukrainians.
The situation with renewable energy sources is also critical. Most of the wind farms are either in the occupied territories or are not working due to damage. Operating capacities only provide about 370 MW of the existing 1.9 GW of installed power.
In general, the state of the power system remains consistently poor, with small periods of short-term improvement in the situation. The scale of the destruction is too great to go through the winter without power cuts, even if peace suddenly comes and the shelling stops - protection from which, it turns out, existed mostly only in the words of officials, not in reality.
And in the conditions of regular attacks by the Russian Federation on energy infrastructure facilities, everything becomes even more complicated. After all, although the energy has a certain reserve of stability, it is already almost exhausted, and the cumulative effect of the attack can lead to even greater destruction and even, in the long run, collapse.
 
Alternative energy sources and imports
In response to all the challenges of the time, Ukraine is trying to compensate for the deficit: primarily by importing electricity from the European Union. Currently, imports are around 2-2.1 GW at their peak, but this is not enough to fully cover the needs, especially during peak hours.
In addition, the option of more active use of mobile gas turbine aggregates, autonomous boiler houses in urban areas and other alternative solutions is being considered. Such installations can help ensure energy balance in regions that experience the longest outages. However, their implementation is complicated by rather high costs and the need for additional protection against shelling.
The modernization of the electrical distribution system also plays a significant role. Integration with the European energy system ENTSO-E makes it possible to receive emergency aid in the form of additional imports, but this requires further adaptation of Ukrainian networks to European standards. Currently, additional lines are being built in the west of Ukraine, which aim to ensure even greater imports from the European Union.
 
The experience of other countries as a guide for Ukraine
The experience of other countries that have faced crisis conditions, such as wars, shelling of critical infrastructure or simply prolonged power outages for internal reasons, can serve as a guide for Ukraine. These examples show how national governments, communities and international partners are able to find solutions in extraordinary circumstances.
At the same time, it should be understood that none of the mentioned countries in their recent history faced challenges of such a scale as Ukraine. However, their practice and experience can still be valuable for Ukraine.
For example, Finland, which has not been at war for a long time, has harsh climatic conditions and very cold winters. This country has developed an efficient system of centralized heat supply. Finnish thermal power plants simultaneously produce electricity and thermal energy, which enables optimization of the use of resources and reduction of losses. This is especially important when access to external energy sources is limited. In case of possible grid damage, Finnish municipalities have backup autonomous energy sources such as mini CHP or diesel generators.
In addition, Finland is actively developing a heat storage system. These are special installations that store excess thermal energy for use in peak periods. In crisis situations, this approach helps to ensure the basic needs of the population even in conditions of energy shortages - for example, in the event of work interruptions due to severe weather conditions.
The example of Israel is somewhat closer in context. Due to constant security threats, this country pays a lot of attention to decentralized energy. Each residential area or strategic infrastructure facility is equipped with local purpose systems such as solar panels and batteries. In the event of hostilities, this minimizes dependence on main power grids, which can be damaged.
Israel is also implementing so-called "smart grids", which enable the automatic redirection of energy flows to priority facilities - hospitals, water supply, military facilities, pensions for the elderly, etc. - in case of damage to other parts of the network. However, despite the closeness of conditions (war and constant security threats), Israel may not be a very relevant example for Ukraine due to the difference in climate: there are no cold winters, and the thermometer always has a positive temperature.
Another interesting example is Great Britain. During World War II, the United Kingdom faced frequent Nazi bombing, which destroyed the country's critical infrastructure, including power plants. The main response was a national campaign on the rationalization of energy resources. Citizens were explained how to save heat, light and fuel, and were encouraged to join local initiatives for the reconstruction of infrastructure.
The government also created special repair teams that quickly restored damaged buildings. The modern equivalent of this approach in Ukraine are mobile energy groups that deal with the emergency repair of damaged networks.
Finally, the case of South Korea may be useful. This country was also not at war for long, but it regularly faces natural disasters and the existential geopolitical threat of its northern neighbor.
Seoul pays a lot of attention to investments in reserve capacity. The country has created huge underground reservoirs for oil and gas storage, which ensure the stability of the energy supply in the event of a crisis. In addition, the state government has developed national energy crisis response plans, including modeling situations where major infrastructure facilities are out of service. This approach includes training the population to act in emergency situations, including the use of alternative energy sources.
Application of these examples in the Ukrainian reality may include:
- Implementation of large-scale decentralized solutions: from home solar panels to mini CHP and mobile modular boiler houses;
- Development of a program to support citizens in the purchase of generators (for business and private houses), heaters or energy accumulators;
- Increasing the resilience of key facilities through infrastructure protection, reserve capacity and energy diversification.
International support and adaptation of best practices to local needs remains crucial in this regard. Only through effective coordination at the state and local level will Ukraine be able to winter more or less successfully in the conditions of the third year of war.
As a conclusion, it can be stated that Ukraine faces extremely difficult conditions during the winter period. Despite the massive shelling, the energy system still shows a certain amount of resilience, but its resources are extremely limited.
In the short term, it is crucial to strengthen integration with European energy markets, as well as to mobilize domestic reserves to stabilize the situation. At the same time, long-term energy independence is only possible if systemic reforms, investments in renewable energy sources and the development of decentralized production are implemented.