DFC Study: Russian Hybrid Activities in the Western Balkans: A Game in the Shadows

 

The study brings the genesis of the Russian understanding of the so-called soft power, and an analysis of the combination of political, military, diplomatic and cultural means used to achieve the strategic goals of the Russian Federation, with a special focus on representatives and promoters of Russian interests in Montenegro.

The growth of Euroscepticism in the region, fueled by disappointment due to the long-term process of European integration, a favorable political environment, and the fact that anti-Western narratives already have a certain number of supporters - these are circumstances that favor Russia and domestic representatives of its interests in presenting Russia as a political, military and economic alternatives to the West.

Therefore, the role of the European Union and the USA in the region must become more proactive and comprehensive, showing a higher degree of interest in the Western Balkans and opposing Russia's ambitions to expand its presence and influence.

 

Intensification of the Russian disinformation campaign

 

According to the study, Russian aggression against Ukraine had a significant negative impact on the perception of other countries about Russia's geopolitical position, which led to its erosion on the Global Soft Power Index. At the same time, the EU sanctions left consequences, so from February 2022 to June 2023, the value of imports into the EU from Russia fell by 84%, and the import of oil products from Russia into the EU in the first year of aggression fell from 29% to 2%.

The Russian response to this crisis was the intensification of the disinformation campaign - since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian campaigns have reached 165 million users within the EU on all social networks, and the data also show that pro-Kremlin propaganda had 16 billion views within the EU, while the ecosystem of pro-Russian accounts doubled since the beginning of the invasion.

Western Balkans – Sputnik, Russia Today and Serbia

 

One of the key tools for expanding Russian influence in the media space of the Western Balkans is Sputnik Serbia, an internet portal in the Serbian language, founded under the auspices of the Russian state news agency Sputnik (under EU sanctions). Its content is also picked up by local media, and the narratives it promotes correspond to the Kremlin's foreign policy interests: discrediting the EU and NATO, undermining pro-Western governments, spreading defeatism, creating an atmosphere of distrust in institutions.

 

How important the role of Serbia in spreading propaganda narratives is for Russia is also shown by the fact that in the midst of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Russia Today started working in Serbia (under EU sanctions). Serbia is the only country pretending to join the EU that did not harmonize its foreign policy with the EU, refusing to impose sanctions on Russia, which allowed propaganda media not only to keep the existing platform for spreading disinformation, but to expand it with other content (such as the podcast of the former editor of the oldest Serbian daily Politika, Ljiljane Smajlović).

 

Montenegro – ZBCG, SPC and IN4S

 

There are three key means of Russia's influence in Montenegro recognized by the Shadow Game study. Russian hybrid influence in the Western Balkans.

First of all, there are political representatives ("proxies") of Russian interests in Montenegro, embodied in the former Democratic Front, now the coalition for the future of Montenegro. According to the study, their transition from the opposition to the ruling structures contributed to the fact that they replaced open support for Russia and Vladimir Putin with the narrative of official Serbia about the interference of Western embassies in the internal situation in Montenegro, repeating the recycled narrative about the threatened Serbian national being in Montenegro.

Further, the study recognizes the connection between the Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches united in promoting the values of Orthodox Christianity, denying the Montenegrin national identity through the cult of saints. This axis gained additional strength with the signing of the Basic Agreement, although it is unclear whether the Prime Minister in technical mandate, Dritan Abazović, thereby knowingly or accidentally enabled the main Russian proxy player to have even greater influence in Montenegrin political conditions.

In addition, the DFC has repeatedly stated in its earlier materials that the field of media is the field in which the Kremlin has had the most success in the past period when it comes to the Western Balkans region. Propaganda content is distributed through portals, local tabloids and social networks funded by the Russian Federation.

For example, the Austrian Ministry of Defense published a map of the so-called ecosystem. From channels and bloggers for the spread of Russian military propaganda, on which the IN4S propaganda portal from Montenegro was also found, which, in addition to being the bearer of pro-Russian propaganda in the country, also promotes the only Montenegrin reporter from the Ukrainian battlefield, Igor Damjanović.

Moving Montenegro away from the realization of the goals of its European agenda, and the relativization of its credibility in NATO during the mandate of the 43rd Government of Montenegro (mainly in the technical mandate), while at the same time accepting unclear initiatives designed in po

Belgrade, represents a warning and a guideline for the 44th Government about to which direction it should not go. The inclusion of pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties with an openly anti-Western orientation in the government could not be interpreted as a step in the right direction.

The operation of Russian soft power in the earlier period, i.e. the mapping of key entities in the region and Montenegro, is shown in the DFC study The Role of Russia in the Balkans - The Case of Montenegro, as well as in the analysis of Ukraine's Shadow over Montenegro.