China’s Word Game: A New Narrative of the “One China Principle”

Diplomats and China watchers are familiar with the so-called “one China principle;” even “Uncle Roger,” a Malaysian-born comedian whose real name is Nigel Ng, knows what it means (and was banned in China for mocking it). The term is omnipresent – appearing at protests targeting political figures who dare to visit Taiwan, in Xi Jinping’s phone calls with world leaders, and in speeches at international events from which Taiwan is excluded.

And yet, only recently has the “one China principle” been touted by China as a “general consensus of the international community” (国际社会的普遍共识) and a “basic norm in international relations” (国际关系基本准则).

Chinese officials introduced the term “general consensus of the international community” at the 2007 World Health Assembly meeting that rejected Taiwan’s participation. The phrase was not officially translated into English until almost a decade later – by which point it had become a catchphrase in Chinese propaganda.

Chinese and English versions of the term “basic norm in international relations” were introduced at around the same time in 2016, the year President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progress Party was sworn into office. This term was introduced in the context of China-Taiwan issues, when Sao Tome and Principe established diplomatic relations with China, and has been frequently highlighted – including by former Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian, one of China’s most prominent “wolf warrior” diplomats – since 2020 (see the chart below).

In 2019, during a celebration of the 30th anniversary of China-Micronesia diplomatic relations, Huang Zheng, the Chinese ambassador to Micronesia, went even farther. He stated that “the ‘one China principle’… is a holy international law (神圣国际法) and a basic norm in international relations binding all states.” This claim may have inadvertently unveiled the strategic intention behind this linguistic game.

Reframing the “one China principle” as the “general consensus of the international community” and a “basic norm in international relations” is part of a deliberate effort to sow confusion and bolster Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. In essence, the phrase recasts cross-strait relations as domestic affairs, and seeks to preemptively delegitimize the international community’s intervention in any potential armed conflict. The strategy is not new; China has previously been accused of rewriting international law to advance its claims to sovereignty over territories in the South China Sea. Now, as China prepares to invade Taiwan, it is sparing no effort to find or fabricate a legal basis for the invasion and against foreign intervention.

As will be shown below, the “one China principle” does not qualify as a general principle of law, as is evidenced by how governments and courts around the globe address Taiwan’s status. The deception behind that claim aligns with Beijing’s recent lawfare campaign against Taiwan in that it is an effort to reframe the relationship as an internal affair and thereby preempt international intervention.

Definition of the “General Principles of Law” and China’s Twist

To debunk China’s rhetoric, it is necessary to review the definition of “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” The term derives from Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), adopted in 1945, which provides sources that ICJ judges shall apply when adjudicating disputes. These sources include treaties and international customs/customary international law. At the time, some worried the inclusion of this clause would endow the ICJ with legislative power to create new rules, while others believed it could grant the court greater flexibility in choosing applicable laws and rules.

Given the ambiguity of the clause, there is no consensus over the definition of the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Malcolm Shaw defines the general principles as “a rule that will be relevant, by analogy from already existing rules or directly from the general principles that guide the legal system,” while other scholars highlight characteristics such as “generality across common-law and civil-law traditions.” In practice, the ICJ referred to the general principles of law in the Lotus case as “international law as it is applied between all nations belonging to the community of States.”

Widely recognized general principles of law include the principles of reciprocity, equality of states, finality of awards and settlements, legal validity of agreements, good faith, etc. These definitions and examples underscore the high level of abstraction of the general principles, and why they can be applied in solving international disputes in various contexts.

China’s “one China principle” falls short of all these criteria. Although Beijing asserts that it is quite “clear and unambiguous” (there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China), one readily sees that the “one China principle” is anything but a “general principle of law.” It is incapable of guiding the legal system to resolve disputes outside the context of cross-strait affairs – and obviously fails there, as well.

In short, although China promotes its “one China principle” as a “universal consensus” and characterizes it as a “basic norm,” it fundamentally differs from the “general principle of law” as defined in the ICJ Statute. China’s word game, albeit strategically crafted, does not transform its particular foreign policy into a general principle of law.

Now, if the “one China principle” is not one of the “general principles of law,” does it qualify as a principle or rule that binds or guides states and domestic courts when dealing with Taiwan-related issues? The evidence suggests not.

“One China Principle” in Practice

On the surface, the “one China principle” seems to be widely accepted by governments around the globe. Indeed, Beijing asserts that around 180 countries have established diplomatic relations with China on the basis of adhering to its “one China principle.” However, this has been shown to be an exaggeration.