Asserting agency: How Europeans can ensure Ukraine’s security

Ever since Trump’s election, Europeans have anxiously waited for the new US administration’s “plan” to end the war in Ukraine. The last few weeks, since the Munich security conference and the resumption of US-Russia talks have been a traumatic awakening, culminating with the catastrophic meeting between Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and US president Donald Trump at the White House on February 28th.

To respond to the challenges raised by Washington’s approach, European leaders have gathered on several occasions over recent weeks to discuss to weigh in on the negotiations and on how to contribute to Ukraine’s security. Last Thursday they agreed on a joint defence spending plan of €800bn. While welcome, this needs to be accompanied by an immediate focus on the content of their offer for Ukraine. In other words: what goals should Europeans pursue and how can they achieve them?

European leaders’ overarching goal should be to preserve the existence of a sovereign and viable Ukraine, meaning that it has control over its own political decisions and will not face future Russian aggression. To respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, Europeans should aim to ensure that whatever is negotiated with Russia should omit domestic issues—the war isn’t a result of Ukraine’s domestic situation, and its end will not be achieved through changes in Ukrainian politics. When Ukraine should hold elections or how it should regulate the use of languages or local self-government should be left for Ukraine to decide. Similarly, constitutional provisions regarding Ukraine’s EU and NATO aspirations should not be part of the negotiations.

And to ensure that the outcome of the negotiations complies with international law, Europeans should insist that the most sensitive issues should be left open for future discussions rather than tackled immediately. This includes the status of specific territories or accountability for Russia’s aggression and war crimes—no agreement on these points is better than a bad one.

Finally, to achieve a viable Ukraine, security guarantees are needed. Deterring future Russia aggression is necessary for the reconstruction of the territories still controlled by Ukraine and for the return of refugees. So far, Europeans have largely been left out of the US-led negotiation process. Offering their own security guarantees can also support Ukrainian’s sovereignty and viability at the negotiation table by giving legitimacy to Europe’s role in the country’s future.  To achieve these goals, European leaders’ discussions of Ukrainian security must, therefore, go beyond the possibility of “boots on the ground”. The European offer to secure Ukraine’s future should rest on four pillars:

1. Strengthening Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself

This requires European countries increasing and frontloading their military assistance to Ukraine and boosting Europe’s and Ukraine’s defence production. This will limit the effects of a reduction or withdrawal of US military assistance and ensure this assistance will be sustainable in the long term. Training and advising the Ukrainian military will also help reconstitute a more efficient force—three years of war and thousands of casualties have affected the best trained units and commanders. At the same time, Ukraine’s experienced military could also provide valuable training and advice to their European counterparts.

2. Containing Russia’s capacity to reconstitute its offensive potential

Europeans will have to define which sanctions they may be ready to lift as an incentive to reach a possible agreement and as leverage in negotiations, and those which should remain to hamper Russia’s ability to rebuild its military. Those that should last are mostly sectoral sanctions, including export controls which could be shifted to the EU’s trade policy (where decision-making doesn’t require unanimity). A strong focus should be on improving the implementation of these restrictions and to better screen financial flows to and from Russia.

3. Enhancing Europe’s ability to identify and act upon signs of a renewed military build-up on the Russian side

This will require a significant investment in observation and intelligence capacities. But it will also require outlining in the ceasefire itself: for example, a future agreement could include some provisions regarding areas where deployments of troops and hardware would be restricted around the frontline. Assuming there will be no international interposition force or monitoring presence—a role that Europeans would not be able to play in any case as it would require the approval of Moscow, which is very unlikely—some technical means of monitoring and verification should be put in place. This could be accompanied by a joint Russian-Ukrainian monitoring mechanism, ideally involving a third party (or a group of countries acceptable to both sides), to manage isolated incidents around the frontline.

4. Ensuring a presence on the ground

That could be part of future European security guarantees, provided by a group of willing and able countries. The goal of this presence would not be peacekeeping or monitoring (for reasons stated above) but deterring Russia from resuming offensive operations and reassuring Ukraine on its security. It would be deployed in key strategic areas and signal the readiness of participating countries to react to Russian actions. Some European governments have expressed their readiness to deploy troops, provided such a deployment would have an American backstop—which Washington has so far dismissed. Ultimately, the strength of such a European plan will hinge on the readiness of participating countries to react, including by force, to Russian actions—whether these are mere tests, provocations or a real attack.

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Europeans are already struggling with a fundamental reassessment of the pillars of their own security, questioning the reliability of their main ally and their ability to cope with this new strategic environment. When putting forward their own offer, they should be aware that Ukraine is a test case for European agency: whether they are able to shape a coherent and credible plan or end up divided and unable to act will define how they are perceived by Russia, the US and others, which may then conclude that pressuring Europeans and playing on their divisions pays off.