After Berlin. What to expect from the negotiations?
Prospects for a peace agreement
The negotiations in Berlin between Ukraine and the United States, with the participation of Ukraine's European partners, on the conditions for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, have caused a new wave of informational and political excitement around the topic of peace negotiations and conflicting expectations regarding the prospects for ending the war. Ambiguous sources and expectations of a conspiracy are emerging. Some fear betrayal, while many sincerely hope that the war will end soon. A small spoiler right away: do not expect a miracle from the negotiations in Berlin. We can agree with the Americans on 90 percent of various problematic issues. Of course, this is at best. On some very complex issues, primarily the status of Ukrainian territories annexed by Russia and the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbass, we see no possibility of compromise. However, we can still reach an agreement with the Americans on most of the issues of the negotiations. The main problem will appear later - the Kremlin will not agree to a significant part, and perhaps even the majority, of the compromises that will be agreed between Ukraine and the US.
Already on Sunday, December 14, Putin's aide Yuri Ushakov stated: "If there are appropriate changes to the peace plan, we will have very sharp objections"... "There will be some absolutely unacceptable provisions for us, including those on territorial issues".
That is, even before the negotiations in Berlin were completed, the Kremlin showed its rejection of possible compromises that could be reached between the US and Ukraine. And this will be the main obstacle to the further process of negotiations on ending the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Representatives of the Trump administration (Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner) believe that the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops will lead to the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine. But this is an illusion. In Ukraine, they understand very well that unilateral concessions to the aggressor will lead to new ultimatums from the Russian side. After Donbass, the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Kherson and Zaporizhia will be demanded. However, Ukraine disagrees and will not agree to withdraw its troops from the territories it controls. Therefore, the Donbas issue is a dead end in the negotiation process.
Accordingly, no peace agreement should be expected by Christmas, and probably not in the near future. But negotiations will continue. The Kremlin, too, should not categorically reject the Americans' peace initiatives. Trump is too important for Putin, and therefore the Kremlin will continue the negotiating game with the Americans. It is quite possible that the Russians will offer some new pseudo-peace initiative, something like a "Christmas truce." But Putin will not make any principled concessions now. He still hopes to win the war against Ukraine, so he will not negotiate now.
The main question now is what Trump and his administration will do if they realize that negotiations on their peace plan are unlikely to lead to a quick signing of a peace agreement.
The riskiest scenario for Ukraine is to continue and intensify pressure on Ukraine to force us to comply with Russian demands. The Trump administration considers Ukraine to be the weaker party and believes that it is easier to pressure the Ukrainians to agree to concessions. But it will
look like direct aid to the aggressor and will provoke criticism, even in the United States, including in the Republican Party. In addition, Ukraine, unlike Russia, is showing a willingness to compromise in the peace process.
The scenario of renewed pressure on Russia is also likely (but to a lesser extent than pressure on Ukraine). A more likely scenario is pressure on both warring parties (with greater pressure on Ukraine), with a gradual reduction in the number of problematic negotiation issues and their severity. This is, in fact, what the Americans are doing now.
Many commentators are again talking about the possibility of the US withdrawing from the negotiation process. This option is also possible. However, if it happens, it will be temporary. Ending the war in Ukraine has become a matter of principle for Trump. The US withdrawal from the negotiation process will look like a personal defeat for Trump. In addition, such a failure will significantly reduce his chances of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. And vice versa.
In order for the peace talks to break the deadlock, the logic of the negotiation process must change. The most problematic issues, on which it is very difficult, if not impossible, to agree (such as, for example, the territorial issue), must simply be postponed. It is necessary to return to the primary and key issue on which a compromise is possible - a ceasefire.
This is where the cessation of all wars begins. And this process can take place in stages, as they tried to do back in March 2025: first, a ceasefire at sea and strikes on energy facilities, then a cessation of the war in the air, and in the final stage, a ceasefire on land. In parallel, negotiations can be held on other issues on which compromises can also be found (exchange of prisoners of war for all, humanitarian issues, the status of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, etc.).
In any case, a real peace process will depend on Russia's readiness to end the war. And for this to happen, it is necessary, first, to stop the enemy at the front (or at least slow down his advance as much as possible), and second, to continue and intensify international pressure on Russia.