A lot of carrots and not enough sticks. How Russia is trying to integrate the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region

How the occupation authorities were formed in Zaporizhzhia region, and what is happening now in all spheres of life in the region

The occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions have been a bargaining chip in the negotiations between Russia and the United States for several months. Russia has been allegedly agreeing to withdraw from these territories in exchange for control of the Donetsk region, and then demanding that Ukraine give up both regions in full. Ukraine's position has not changed: withdrawal from these areas is impossible.

The occupation, in particular of the Zaporizhzhia region, has been going on for almost four years, and all this time Russia has been trying to integrate it into its state system. Local schools are teaching lessons about "Lenin's artificial creation of Ukraine" and actually forcing parents to send their children to the "Unarmy" by threatening them with problems for disloyalty. The Russians are creating incentive programs to encourage teachers and doctors from the Russian hinterland to move to the occupied territories, and deporting locals who have not yet received Russian passports.

Journalist Yuliana Skibitska and her French colleague Clara Marcoude talked to people who are involved in the occupied territories. Here is what life looks like in the uncontrolled part of Zaporizhzhia region.

Twenty-year-old Danylo (we changed his name at the request of the hero, because his relatives remain under occupation) left Melitopol in the summer of 2022. He wanted to leave on February 24, when he heard the first explosions. He didn't have time. The next day, columns of Russian tanks passed through Melitopol. The soldiers, Danylo recalls, were not aggressive. They calmly talked to the locals, saying: in a few days we will leave, everything will be as before.

Everything changed in a few weeks. on March 13, the Russians broke up a rally in support of the then-mayor of Enerhodar, Ivan Fedorov, who was in captivity. In May 2022, the occupiers were already looking for the most proactive people. They dressed in civilian clothes and came to the evacuation buses to see who was going to leave. Danylo says that it was then that it finally became clear that the occupation would be long.

In September, pseudo-referendums were held in the occupied territories. Putin signed a decree on the "accession of four new regions," but then the situation on the front was constantly changing. In September, the Ukrainian military liberated Kharkiv region, in November – Kherson, and Russia lost the only regional center it was able to capture. LIGA.net's interlocutors say that the active integration of the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region began in 2023.

Part one. Power

The beginning of the occupation. Chaos

"In the beginning, in 2022, the occupation authorities were formed as follows: after the Russian military captured the city, the commandant's office of the Federal Security Service would visit. The officers had lists of local officials, deputies, and leaders. They called them for "conversations" and offered to stay, saying: "You are the local authorities, you were elected, stay, Russia is here forever," says journalist and head of the Zaporizhzhia Investigative Center Serhiy Sydorov.

Before the full-scale invasion, the Zaporizhzhia Investigative Center covered corruption in tenders and local budgets. When the occupation began, the journalists collected information from local social media, telegram channels, news from friends, as well as through the network of contacts of those who had left, and communicated with those who remained.

"We studied who exactly remained among the leadership team – community heads, council secretaries, deputies, deputies," Sydorov continues, "and it turned out that the larger the city, the fewer people cooperated. In large cities such as Berdiansk, Melitopol, Enerhodar, Vasylivka, most officials left. The smaller the city, the more locals stayed. In Prymorsk or Kyrylivka, for example, the situation was calmer, people did not panic and stayed more often."

Serhii is sure that it was not because the south of the region was more loyal to Russia. In villages and communities, local heads often stayed because they believed they had to stay with the people to the end. Some were simply afraid. Those who refused to cooperate were often abducted and tortured by the Russians. This happened to the mayor of Enerhodar, Ivan Fedorov, and the mayor of Dniprorudne, Yevhen Matveev. The latter was not released from captivity. He died in a Russian detention center after being systematically tortured.

The situation was different in large cities. Representatives of pro-Russian parties such as Nash Krai, Opposition Platform for Life, and the Opposition Bloc remained there. Almost immediately after the occupation, they declared their loyalty to the new government and were given managerial positions.

Thus, Yevhen Balytskyi became the "governor of Zaporizhzhia region". Melitopol, which was appointed the administrative center of the region by the occupiers, was headed by his close associate Halyna Danylchenko. The housing and communal services in Melitopol were managed by a former local deputy from the OPFL, Serhiy Zolotarev, who replaced his associate Danylchenko in 2025. And the new local government in Enerhodar was headed by Andriy Shevchyk, a member of the OPFL.

The process of finding people willing to cooperate with the Russians was chaotic. Often, random people were given "positions". For example, Natalia Romanichenko, who had a production center for children in Zaporizhzhia and sold sausages and homemade dumplings on social media, was appointed "mayor of Vasylivka." Berdiansk was "headed" by Oleksandr Saulenko, a local small businessman and failed politician who was looking for a job as a labor protection engineer before the invasion.

Balytsky and his path to power

"Balytsky has always been in the shadows, but close to the authorities," says Serhiy Sydorov: "give him a little influence and let him get out of the way." He had representation in the regional council, a certain faction in the Melitopol city council."

Balytskyi comes from a military family. He studied at an aviation school in Tambov, served as a pilot for four years, and eventually returned to Melitopol. His family was engaged in a business typical of the nineties – buying up old factories for next to nothing, then reselling them or taking loans from the state "for development and restoration."

"The Balytsky's used to say that business and politics go hand in hand," says Svitlana Zalizetska, director of the RIA Pivden website, "That's why they always had their own media. Svitlana knows Balytskyi well, having worked for his radio station Yuzhnyi Prostir and his TV channel MTV-plus, which was one of the largest TV companies in Zaporizhzhia region before the occupation.

"But he was more of an administrative official than a businessman," adds Serhiy Sydorov, "He always wanted to be an important person. He had a certain nostalgia for the Soviet past: he liked to wear his old uniform to city celebrations, take pictures, and talk about "common history" and "grandfathers who fought."

Balytskyi first became a deputy of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Council in 1998. Seven years later, he joined the newly created Party of Regions and ran for mayor of Melitopol, but was unsuccessful. In 2012, Balytsky won in a majority constituency and was elected to the Verkhovna Rada. He also won in the same constituency in 2014, when the fragments of the Party of Regions created the Opposition Bloc. Balytskyi did not have a third victory – he lost to the then-mayor of Melitopol, Serhiy Minko, and returned to the Zaporizhzhia Regional Council.

"He [Balytsky] was very ambitious," says Zalizetska, "He always said, 'I will become president of Ukraine. After the full-scale invasion, it was clear to me that this man would be in charge of everything."

Strengthening the occupation. Changes

After appointing local collaborators, the FSB commandant's office in the occupied territories began demanding lists of ATO participants, former military, activists, and people who helped the Ukrainian army. Local officials passed these lists to the security forces, but did not personally participate in the torture. "Those were difficult and bloody months," says Sidorov.

After the pseudo-referendums, the Russians realized that the Ukrainian collaborators were not doing their job. They lacked skills, connections, and experience in the "systemic" Russian bureaucracy. They were replaced by officials from the Russian Federation.

anton Koltsov, the vice-governor of Vologda Oblast, became the "head of the government of Zaporizhzhia Oblast", while the so-called ministers of the occupied part of the region are politicians from Russia or occupied Crimea. Balytsky has a new deputy, Russian FSB officer Artur Saidov. The role of the "governor" himself has become more of a symbolic one, says Sidorov. He remains "in office" because it is important for Russians to keep local faces to demonstrate the alleged legitimacy of the government. Perhaps he was even allowed to have his own cash flow. But all important decisions are made exclusively by people from Moscow.

There is no consensus among the collaborators themselves. Volodymyr Rogov, who led the separatist movement in Zaporizhzhia in 2014 and then fled to Russia, wanted to be the "governor of Zaporizhzhia region" himself, but became only an ordinary member of the "Main Council of the Zaporizhzhia Region Administration". Since then, Rogov has dedicated every second post in his telegram channel to Balytsky. Mostly, these are accusations of loyalty to the Ukrainian authorities in the past and corruption.

Personnel changes also affected other areas. People from Russia began to fill the judiciary, police, and courts. There were very few local lawyers or judges left, says Serhiy Sydorov, because they could not work under Russian law. Gradually, those who worked in finance, utilities, media, or social security were also replaced. This is how the system was finally subordinated to Moscow.

Part Two. Propaganda

Recruitment of young people

On November 3 this year, the Melitopol propaganda telegram channel wrote that a lecture on "Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Educational Sphere and Youth Environment" was held for high school students in one of the schools. The organizer was the "Department of Culture, Sports and Youth Policy of the Administration of the City District of Melitopol". The title of the presentation was "Why is history becoming an instrument of information warfare?" and one of the topics was "Lenin's artificial creation of Ukraine". This event clearly illustrates what the occupation authorities are banking on – and this is, first and foremost, the youth.

The Russians began actively working with teenagers in the first six months of the occupation. In July 2022, this work was formalized into the organization "Yug Molodoy". Its director is now 20-year-old Yulia Klymenko, who in 2022 was still studying at a Melitopol school. First, Yulia became the head of the Volunteers of Russia movement, then the youth wing of Putin's United Russia party.

"Yug Molodoy is engaged in "educational and patriotic work" and even publishes its own magazine. Members plant roses, distribute St. George's ribbons, greet World War II veterans, and write letters to the Russian military. Now in the occupied territories act there are dozens of similar organizations. However, they are mostly joined by the same people. Even the official website of Yug Molodiy talks about only a thousand participants from all the occupied territories, and according to Svitlana Zalizetska, the same faces are always present at propaganda events.

The second important aspect of working with young people is their militarization. This task is largely entrusted to the Yunarmiya. Created back in 2016, during Russia's full-scale war with Ukraine, the Yunarmiya became one of the main tools of military propaganda. In 2025, one billion rubles were allocated for its work. "The Yunarmiya is more than a game of soldiers," the Russian propaganda website writes, "Yunarmiyas take part in military-patriotic events, do drill training, and learn the mechanics of working with weapons. But they do not stop there and support the participants of the special military operation."

In the Unarmy, children learn to shoot, train with the Russian military, participate in Victory Day parades, and collect aid for Russian soldiers at the front. While until 2022, the "Unarmy" in the occupied territories was rather formal, now children are actively involved in the movement. The age of entry has been reduced from 14 to eight. For children from the newly occupied territories and orphans there is a separate program called "Youth. Mentoring". Often parents send their children to the Unarmy to avoid problems with the occupation authorities, who carefully check the involvement of schoolchildren in the movement. The strategy is working well for Russians – as of 2024, the Unarmy entered about 35 thousand children from the temporarily occupied territories.

Education

Education is another priority area of work with young people. Olena Shapurova has been involved in it for a long time. Before the full-scale war, she was the director of the Melitopol Industrial and Economic College for about ten years. In 2020, the RIA Melitopol website wrote about conflicts within the college – Shapurova was accused of unlawful dismissals and corruption. However, at the time of the occupation, Shapurova was still listed as the director of the college. According to her, on March 14, representatives of the "new local authorities" called her and offered to head the "Melitopol Department of Education".

"Shapurova persuaded local school principals to cooperate with the occupation authorities, but they did not agree," says Zalizetska. "Then she began to appoint principals herself, people close to her. Her husband, a former athlete Roman Dziuba, became the principal of the 15th school. In 2024, bodyguard Mykhailo Shchukin took over."

Teachers who remained in the occupied territories continued to work online in Ukrainian schools, and children continued to study. The Russians tried to control this process by organizing door-to-door inspections, threatening parents with fines and even deprivation of parental rights. Some of the children tried to study in Russian and Ukrainian schools in parallel, but it was difficult to combine it. At the same time, the Russians completely transformed the school system into a Russian model, and in 2025, they officially banned the teaching of the Ukrainian language and the history of Ukraine.