Xi's latest moves show that corruption remains a major problem for the Chinese military

He Weidong, China's second-highest-ranking general, and Navy Admiral Miao Hua, a former senior political official in the Chinese military, are the latest high-ranking military officers to be targeted in an anti-corruption campaign in the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

General He's removal is the first removal of an active commander in the Central Military Commission since the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.

General He has not been seen in public since March this year, and the investigation into his activities has not been made public by Chinese authorities.

In the announcement of their expulsion from the Communist Party, General He, Admiral Miao and seven other senior military officials were accused of “serious violations of party discipline and are suspected of serious crimes related to duty involving an extremely large amount of money.”

Defense Ministry spokesman Zhang Xiaogang said in a statement that the alleged crimes were “serious in nature, with extremely harmful consequences” and praised the purge as “a significant achievement in the anti-corruption campaign of the Party and the military.”

The expulsion of General He, 68, has implications beyond the military, as the former commander was also one of the 24 members of the Politburo, the second-highest level of power in the ruling Communist Party.

One of two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, He was the third-most powerful commander in the People’s Liberation Army and was considered a close associate of President Xi Jinping, the military’s supreme commander.

Admiral Miao was previously removed from the Commission in June after being investigated for "serious disciplinary violations." The announcement of the expulsions of senior military officials came just days before the Communist Party Central Committee, an elite body of more than 200 senior officials, was due to hold its Fourth Plenum in Beijing.

Other military officials expelled from the Communist Party of China along with General He and Admiral Miao include He Hongjun, a former senior official in the PLA Political Work Department, Wang Xiubin of the Central Military Commission’s Joint Operations Command Center, former Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang, and two former political commissars of the PLA Army and Navy.

Observers have noted that many of these officials have not appeared in public for several months.

Former People’s Armed Police Commander Wang Chunning was also named in the statement and removed from the national legislature in September this year, along with three other PLA generals.

Ja Ian Chong, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, said that this “kind of shake-up” in China’s military leadership is now happening so often “that it has somehow become more normalized than before.”

“In that sense, it seems to be part of the progression of Xi Jinping’s rule,” Chong told Al Jazeera.

“It could also be interpreted as further consolidation of power by Xi Jinping, and in that sense, it would suggest that the party is becoming more centralized and that control over party machinery is stronger than ever,” Chong said.

Senior military officials in China are most often removed for “serious violations of discipline” – a common euphemism for corruption.

He and Miao join a string of high-ranking figures, including two former defense ministers, who have fallen victim to an anti-corruption campaign in the Chinese military over the past two years.

Analysts say the corruption may have undermined China’s combat readiness – raising fears in Beijing as the country embarks on its biggest military build-up in decades.

‘Chronic distrust’

Chinese President Xi Jinping has waged a sweeping campaign against deep-rooted official corruption since he came to power more than a decade ago.

Supporters say the policy promotes clean governance, while critics say it helps Xi flush out political rivals.

In the past two years, the action has focused on the armed forces, and since the summer of 2023, almost 20 military and defense industry officials have been dismissed.

 

Some of the most senior officials to be removed so far include two defense ministers.

State media confirmed that both Wei Fenghe and his successor, Li Shangfu, have been expelled from the ruling Communist Party and are under investigation for corruption.

"Xi appears to have a chronic distrust of his top military officials," Ankit Panda, a senior Stanton fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told AFP.

Analysts at the time linked the purge to a sweeping investigation into the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, which oversees China's nuclear and conventional missiles and would likely be Beijing's first line of attack in the event of a major conflict.

Both former defense ministers had ties to the Rocket Force - Wei previously headed a unit, and Li Shangfu a department that developed weapons, including missiles.

The unit's head, Li Yuchao, and chief of staff, Sun Jinming, were expelled from the Communist Party and are under investigation for corruption.

Three senior officials were also removed from their positions in the state's missile defense organizations in December 2023.

The British newspaper Financial Times reported that Defense Minister Dong Jun was under investigation - a claim Beijing denied at the time and called "pure fabrications".

But the dismissals of Miao and Dong, now confirmed, suggest that a corruption purge in China's military is widening.

Miao had no direct ties to the missile force, having risen through the military before being promoted to navy admiral in 2015.

Similarly, Dong built a career in the navy and eventually became its commander.

Reports of Dong's downfall suggest that "the rot in China's military remains deeper than previously suspected", Neil Thomas, a China policy fellow at the Asia Society, told AFP.

The showdown comes as China has increased military pressure on Taiwan and repeatedly clashed with its neighbors over disputed territory in the South China Sea.

But analysts say corruption in the military may be raising concerns that the military is not up to the task.

“Corruption in China’s military should rightly raise questions about its ability to achieve military goals and achieve the ‘great rejuvenation’ envisioned by Xi,” wrote Heather Williams, director of the Nuclear Issues Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

 

Compromised

Bloomberg, citing U.S. intelligence, has reported that widespread corruption in the Rocket Force has led to equipment malfunctions and even the substitution of rocket fuel with water.

“If true, these shortcomings would jeopardize missile operations, calling into question China’s readiness and overall nuclear capability,” the Federation of American Scientists wrote in an open letter in response to the claims.

Xi has vowed that the reunification of mainland China and Taiwan is inevitable and has pledged to take “all necessary measures” to achieve that goal.

The recent showdown “raises questions about who is left to trust and how deep the scandals that have brought down key officials in the Chinese military are,” said Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University in the United States.

“It must be a huge distraction… while pressuring the PLA to be ready for war with Taiwan by 2027.”

During a visit to air force personnel in the central province of Hubei, Xi urged them to root out corruption and "unhealthy tendencies."

"(We must) keep our duty and mission firmly in mind, raise our sense of war-readiness and tighten our preparations for military combat," Xi told the troops.

But after the shake-up at the top of China's military, analysts expect the crackdown on corruption to continue to distract from that goal.

"Competition for leadership positions is so fierce that it could lead to mutual accusations among officers, leading to endless cycles of arrests, re-appointments and accusations," Victor Shih, an expert on elite Chinese politics, told AFP.

The latest personnel changes in China's military show that Xi Jinping is seeking to tighten control by placing his political apparatus under the jurisdiction of a disciplinary body. They also demonstrate his ongoing efforts to remove factions from the military.

The sweeping changes suggest that China's military is still struggling with corruption and instability, at the expense of its combat readiness.

 

Concrete evidence of Xi’s intention to tighten control over the military’s political organization is the dismissal of its chief and the promotion of a disciplinary inspector to the position of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that has overall control over the armed forces. The Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese government organization enforces party rules and internal party discipline. This applies in particular to the arrest of corrupt officials.

In October alone, nine active-duty generals were charged with serious violations and expelled from the party and military. Shortly thereafter, during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, Zhang Shengmin, secretary of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection, was promoted to the position of vice chairman of the CMC, thus restoring the structure of a dual vice chairman: a political cadre and a military officer (Zhang Youxia).

Born in 1958 in Shaanxi Province, Zhang Shengmin served in the Second Artillery (now the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force) before briefly working in the PLA’s General Political Department. He became political commissar of the Logistics Support Department in 2016 and was appointed secretary of the CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection in 2017, joining the CMC at the 19th Party Congress.

Zhang’s continued presence in the CMC after the 20th Congress is closely linked to his oversight role in the military. Since the 18th Congress, he has overseen the purges of many senior officers.

“As well as pointing to corruption and misconduct, this must reflect deep political struggles within the armed forces. While a military coup is unlikely, factionalism and self-serving networks remain pervasive in the armed forces, and the recent ouster of Political Work Department chief Miao Hua is significant,” according to Australian think tank ASPI.

Miao Hua, a second-generation military cadre, served in military units and then as a naval political commissar before being appointed director of the Political Work Department at the 19th Party Congress. His failure to advance further points to political constraints. During the 2015 military reforms, the CMC separated the Commission for Discipline Inspection from the General Political Department to prevent political cadres from monopolizing personnel appointments, oversight, and counterintelligence. However, the department’s two subsequent directors, including Miao Hua, fell from grace, and many of their associates, including the recently ousted CMC vice chairman He Weidong, were also removed. These cases likely stemmed largely from factional alliances built on mutual benefit and promotion control.

 

The severe factionalism in the military’s political system clearly created an opportunity for Zhang Shengmin’s rise. In July, the Ministry of National Defense issued regulations titled “On Vigorously Promoting Fine Traditions and Completely Eliminating Toxic Influences That Reshape the Image and Prestige of Political Cadres.” The document emphasized political loyalty, integrity, fairness in personnel management, and leading by example. The recent major personnel changes are likely to trigger a reshuffle within the military’s political apparatus. With Zhang’s promotion, the disciplinary organization may now dominate political and personnel management, replacing the monopoly of the Political Work Department. It is likely that Xi’s long-standing concern was that the former General Staff and General Political Departments had excessive centralized power. The 2015 reforms reorganized the command structure by separating combat zones and force-building services and creating new branches of service. The CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection was made independent and placed on an equal footing with the Political Work Department to prevent unilateral control over appointments. Yet the Political Work Department has remained largely unchecked, which has likely exacerbated factionalism. Its leaders, including Miao Hua, have retained enormous influence over promotions, rivaling the influence once held by former CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou.

This is apparently why Xi has accelerated the leadership shake-up, particularly within the political work system, promoting Zhang Shengmin—with his experience in military discipline inspection—to the position of vice chairman. The appointment signals Xi’s intention to dismantle the entrenched political work hierarchy and replace it with a structure based on supervision focused on the disciplinary apparatus, effectively merging political work and discipline enforcement under a single body headed by the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection.

After the Fourth Plenum, Xi’s unwavering control over the military has been confirmed. Rumors of potential coups seem implausible. The primary mission of the new military leadership is not necessarily to prepare for a conflict over Taiwan; instead, it is likely to ensure the full implementation of Xi’s directives.

Ahead of the 21st Party Congress in 2027, this new structure will allow Xi to retain political influence even if he no longer holds the formal titles of general secretary, president or chairman of the CMC - as he will control the generals who dominate the CMC.

Meanwhile, from a military capability perspective, the promotion of a disciplinary inspection officer like Zhang Shengmin to such a high position is rare in the world and suggests that corruption within the Chinese military remains unresolved. Despite multiple purges and institutional reforms, recurring instability in the personnel system raises questions about the actual combat readiness and cohesion of the Chinese armed forces.