A 30-Day Ceasefire: What Can Putin Do?
On the Eve of a 30-Day Ceasefire
The likelihood that Putin will agree to a 30-day ceasefire is quite high. And it is also very likely that, along with the agreement, he will repeat the mantra about the Russian constitution and the need to “liberate” Kherson and Zaporozhye.
So, what can be understood and predicted now?
• 1 •
Currently, about 30 to 35 percent of the fan patriots who want the war to continue and 60 to 70 percent of the silent majority who want the war to stop (the liberation of Kursk will be a complete victory for them) are clearly forming in Russian society.
• 2 •
At least half of the active fan-patriots are quite critical of Putin and his regime. Of course, now they have neither subjectivity nor a clearly defined leader. And their only idea is to continue the war for the sake of future greatness (so as not to be humiliated again).
But in the perspective of seven to 10 years (the maximum time perspective of the transition of power), this group will not simply disappear, it will turn into a powerful political group that will be the bearer of great resentment (in Russian realities – passionate resentment) for any solution other than the complete destruction of Ukraine. It should not be forgotten that Putinism, in many ways, grew out of similar resentment.
It is very important to pay attention to the fact that Putin’s entourage, although absolutely loyal to him, is thinking about the transition of power. And when it comes to further peace negotiations, they proceed from three components:
How will this affect their financial situation now;
How can this affect their further political future;
How will this affect the duration of Putin’s peaceful and happy rule (this point largely coincides with the previous one, but still, these are different logics: Putin’s logic of eternal rule without announcing a successor and the logic of the elites preparing for a transition).
It is sad for Ukraine: there is no one in Putin’s entourage who is ready to speak out loudly about the end of the “SVO”. In historical analogies, which we really do not like: there is no Mikoyan who opposed Khrushchev’s decisions at the height of the Caribbean crisis.
No matter how paradoxical it may sound, the main promoter of the peace agreement can now only be Putin. Let us recall that the national idea of Russia is “Putin should rule as long as possible and die as late as possible in the presidential chair”. He is ready to accept this deal if it will ensure him a long and happy rule.
And therefore, now much will depend on how the environment will behave: to scare Putin by destabilizing the system (appealing to 30 percent of the fan patriots) or, on the contrary, to appease him with the desires of that 70 percent silent minority and to scare him with a very real collapse of oil exports in the event of abandoning peace.
But, under any circumstances, Russia is no longer preparing for a ceasefire, but for negotiations on the essence of peace. And the main challenges for Ukraine are the following:
- - - The Russians will sell Iran and North Korea in exchange for concessions to Ukraine;
- - - The Russians will raise the financial stakes in the agreement with the Americans (increase the financial attractiveness);
- - - The Russians will try to destabilize the situation in Ukraine through certain leaks and possible provocations;
- - - The Russians may try to carry out some terrorist attacks under the Ukrainian flag (the probability is minimal, but you need to be prepared for it).
- - China should be especially highlighted, which, in the event of a 30-day ceasefire, will probably really join the game. It has two options for this involvement - either together with the Russian Federation or in a bilateral game with the USA.