Why is the Russian-Serbian influence operation in Montenegro so successful?

For years, Montenegro has been a target of influence operations by Russia and Serbia, which have successfully placed their people in key positions within the state apparatus of the country. This success is significantly aided by the local political and media culture, which Russian and Serbian ethno-religious narratives have deeply contaminated. These narratives insist on a tendentious interpretation of Montenegrin history and culture, framing it as peripheral to the central and dominant radical Orthodox Pan-Slavic Russian-Serbian ethnic and cultural space.

Under such interpretations, Montenegrin history and its national and state uniqueness are dismissed as nonexistent outside the unified Russian-Serbian space.

The average Ukrainian or Belarusian reading this would likely notice striking parallels, where these two countries’ history and national distinctiveness are similarly viewed through the lens of a narrative about a singular Pan-Russian Orthodox cultural space centered in Moscow.

This raises the question: Why is the influence project successful in some cases, such as Belarus and Montenegro, while in Ukraine, it has faced strong resistance, ultimately leading to armed conflict?

The level of democratization in a society emerges as the most logical answer. In the autocratic environments of Belarus and Montenegro, autocratic ideas take root more easily. In contrast, Ukraine, due to its size and the development of civil society and free media—legacies of the first Orange Revolution—managed to mobilize a critical segment of society to resist Russian political and cultural dominance.

In Belarus, the regime’s brutal crackdown on the 2020 protests effectively secured the stability of its autocratic rule.

The media presence of Russia and the Russian language has influenced both Belarus and Montenegro, but the reactions have varied in different parts of Ukraine. The strongest resistance came from the western regions, where the process of consolidating a national identity evolved and stabilized gradually. In contrast, in the eastern regions, only the horrors of war accelerated these processes.

Additionally, the presence and unity of the Orthodox Church in Belarus and Montenegro strengthened Russia’s influence in Belarus and that of Serbia and Russia in Montenegro. In Ukraine, the Eastern Orthodox tradition included the structurally developed Greek Catholic Church and, until recently, the “canonically unrecognized” Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).

In Montenegro, the media plays a special role. Although Russian media outlets are under EU sanctions, which Montenegro’s foreign policy aligns with, many Serbian media outlets remain unaffected. These were developed before, during, and after the political changes of 2020.

One such outlet, the infamous IN4S, was founded by the current rector of the University of Montenegro, an outspoken pro-Russian activist. This news website, despite its peak popularity being behind it, maintains a war correspondent in Russia and in occupied parts of Ukraine. Through its channels and presence in Serbian mainstream media, this person manages to impose a pro-Russian narrative about the war in Ukraine in Montenegro. The individual in question, Igor Damjanović, has replaced the late Miroslav Lazanski, a former war correspondent and Serbian ambassador to Moscow, in Serbian media. Despite his modest education, Damjanović’s persistence and ruthlessness have brought him success. Besides visiting war zones in Ukraine, he also travels to Central African countries that recently experienced coups sponsored by Russia and Wagner. In addition to promoting Wagner, this propagandist also supports Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime while criticizing mainstream Russian media in Serbia, the RT Balkans, and Sputnik for being insufficiently disciplined and dedicated to propaganda.

Damjanović’s Montenegrin counterpart in aggressiveness and ruthlessness is Vladimir Vuković, a Berane native with a similarly modest education and streetwise demeanor. Vuković manages the Serbian para-state tabloid Alo in Montenegro, which disseminates the worst kinds of Russian propaganda.

The most successful project of this system is the portal Borba, founded by Aleksandar Vučić’s close friend Dražen Živković. Živković now hosts a popular TV show on Prva television, one of four national broadcasters in Montenegro owned by Serbian para-state structures.

The dominance of Serbian media in Montenegro was particularly evident during Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s visit, where he felt so emboldened during a press conference that he insulted his hosts, later labeling Montenegrins as separatists, signaling that unionist ambitions are not as suppressed as assumed.

The recent arrest of Montenegrin soldiers in Kosovo highlights the extent to which Montenegro’s defense sector has been compromised. For months, the Serbian regime’s media pressured Montenegrin authorities not only to support and release the soldiers but also to reward them for promoting Serbian propaganda in Kosovo.

With upcoming changes to social media operations likely to accelerate under the new U.S. administration, another channel for these Serbian and Russian influence efforts is opening. This development puts Montenegro and the region at risk of programmed political behavior by Russian and Serbian extremists.