Three weeks until spring. What to expect from the Russian Federation on the front line and what is dangerous for Ukraine in the rear
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By spring, Russia is unlikely to achieve a serious breakthrough at the front — the peak of its offensive has clearly passed. But the enemy will not stop trying to destabilize the situation in the rear, to collapse Ukraine from within — that is where the main danger lies.
Three weeks until spring. The dashed lines show a certain sharpness.
The last ten days have been very difficult emotionally. We will not repeat ourselves, many have already written: taking advantage of the real problems of Ukraine, Russia is intensifying instability from within, because it cannot solve its tasks at the front.
How this "cannot" looks "in the material".
The other day, Trump again mentioned the scale of Russian losses, indicating the figure of 900,000 (probably wounded and killed).
The "Information Resistance" group continues to count the killed who are publicly recognized in Russia itself. That is, this is the minimum of losses.
By January 30, 2025, the Ukrainian database contains 95,848 names that can be structured by region. And almost 450 people where additional data is needed.
In the period from December 31 to January 30, 5,089 people from Russia were killed. This is without Koreans, with Crimea, but without ORDLO. Some of these losses are from previous periods, but the lion's share is fresh.
According to the experience of Ukrainian calculations, the number of killed should be at least twice as high. That is, Russian troops lost from 10,000 people per month only killed people. If we calculate according to the classic ratio of 1:3, then the losses of the Russian army amount to at least 40,000 people per month. And this is MORE than if the Russians recruit mercenaries. Add deserters here.
What I already mentioned: for several months now the Russian army has been seeing a gap between losses and replenishment, reserves are disappearing. They stopped training new recruits a long time ago, they throw them into combat as soon as possible. The gap is widening. Hence all these attacks by suicide bombers on crutches.
DeepState has already given two figures:
In January, the Russians occupied the smallest area of Ukrainian territory since September 2024.
The number of attacks has been decreasing over the past week.
What is it about? This means that the autumn offensive wave of the Russian army has passed its peak and is decreasing. They already need to regroup to expand offensive actions in the direction of Pokrovskoye.
A month ago, I assumed that by March the Russians would lose the ability to press and advance even at the January pace if trends continue.
To break this trend, they must:
Either find a source of new recruits.
Or collapse the Ukrainian army from within.
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The first task is difficult without a new wave of mass mobilization. The second option has two components — internal destabilization in Ukraine and the cessation of foreign aid.
The cessation of foreign aid can occur both for purely external reasons and as a result of internal destabilization. Because the question will be real: who will be the final recipient?
Therefore, internal destabilization is the cornerstone of all constructions. Accordingly, they will increasingly direct resources in this direction.
You don’t have to be a fortune teller to predict that the next surge will be timed to coincide with the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion. It is necessary to show special composure.
What about the other side? Information has leaked that aid has been suspended, but has been resumed. If the previous volume is preserved, this is a certain stability until the summer. A signal from France regarding aircraft. A signal from the Netherlands regarding aircraft. For now, it will have little effect on the front, but it should affect the security of the rear (as part of the air defense system).
And Kursk, which eats up Russian resources. For Putin, there is an ugly prospect of receiving guests on May 9, demonstrating his inability to defend his territory.
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Again. This does not mean that our problems are not visible. As you can see. In the Kharkov region, in the Dvorichny district, everything is difficult, but the Ukrainian troops are doing the impossible. And not only there.
Together. Under the condition that:
Prevention of collapse from within.
Saving the amount of aid for at least several months.
The current level of losses of the Russian army without the possibility of rapid replenishment
— in the spring, prerequisites may arise for a temporary (!) stabilization of the front line.
This is the material basis. And then politics as the art of the possible, cognitive war, etc. begins.
All these figures and calculations in Moscow and Washington know better than we do. And they know a lot that we do not know. Especially in terms of the real state of the economy and the possibilities of weapons production.
There is a conflict between two motivations. On the one hand, it is possible to force activity in order to consolidate the prerequisites for stabilizing the LBZ and turn it into the basis for a ceasefire. The Americans have already called the stabilization of the front a necessary condition.
On the other hand, Putin will certainly have a motive to try to hold out for another six months. Which means: at first they will need time, and in the end the first round of Trump-Putin contacts will end in failure and will not lead to changes. Then another six months or so. And there is logic in that.
Because this year it is not only May 9 that is relevant for Europe, but also September that is relevant for the APR. And Trump's team makes it clear: the European scene (except for Israel) is the business of European NATO allies. And Washington has clearly indicated its priorities with invitations, first meetings (Japan, Australia, South Korea, etc.).
Therefore, if it is not possible to stabilize in the spring, in September there will be a symbolic opportunity of a large scale. Where – on the side of Russia – China will be actively involved.
What Ukraine can do now and what depends on Ukraine:
Not to fall apart from within, to maintain integrity.
Increase the effectiveness of support for the front, each according to its capabilities.
Then there will be a choice between the bad and the terrible, as well as a chance to fight for a better future.